Discussion between jobermark and Ron Maimon

Ron Maimon

4:00 PM

(you're going to give me carpal tunnel)

(My wrists are getting sore!)

jobermark

It does not matter. In what way will you prove that this computer can capture meaning?

Ron Maimon

When you are simulating molecular events, you don't want to get the behavior exactly right, since you are simulating a stochastic process (a random thing), you only need to reproduce the statistical behavior of the object.

Look, I am making a subtler argument than Wittgenstein, in 30 seconds.

jobermark

Nothing about this addresses the concern you told me you would address.

Ron Maimon

When molecules collide, the precise time is random, and any finite truncation of the time to collision real numbers is not important, when the bits you ignore are random. There is a precise statement of this (due to me, but probably well known).

Oh, please. I am writing it.

jobermark

You might model Newton, but that is not a model of human meaning.

Ron Maimon

4:04 PM

So, for example, when you have diffusing molecules, the number of bits you need to store for their position is only the log(V/(D\tau)^1/2) where V is the volume and D is the diffusion constant, and tau is the mean time to the next interaction.

jobermark

This is pointless. I have heard out this argument and reject it. I will not keep just listening to more and more detail of the 'simulation as solution' argument. So far none of this is original or relevant to the concern it pretends to address.

Ron Maimon

It's a complete and correct argument. There's nothing to reject.

The number of bits is finite, you need a random oracle.

These are the two real objections.

jobermark

You can model current physics, and keep adapting your machine to model closer physics. But physics itself is incomplete.

Ron Maimon

The other objections is "maybe there's quantum magic in microtubuals".

I don't need the complete laws of physics to do this, just the stochastic laws of molecular motion, and binding.

And the binding is the main information carrier.

jobermark

No, the other objection is that only a complete model of reality and not of our model of reality is a model of reality

Ron Maimon

4:05 PM

This is what I worked on professionally, by the way, when I worked professionally.

To simulate proteins with the least number of bits. I gave a formalism for that.

This is how to do this type of simulation in practice, for proteins. Then you need to consider RNA.

jobermark

If you want to get farther, you need a real complete model, not a model of a model and Turing.

Ron Maimon

It's a finite computation, and our computers today can handle a fraction of a cell.

jobermark

You only need that because you have accepted it as an axiom, which I already rejected.

Ron Maimon

What did I accept as an axiom?

You agree that the simulation would work to simulate the cell, and the human being.

You only then reject that the thing can process meaning like we do.

jobermark

The idea that computation simulating realtiy models experience.

Ron Maimon

4:07 PM

I didn't say it models experience exactly.

Experience is primitive in positivism. I said "it can process meaning like we do".

jobermark

So what value does it have?

It does not capture human meaning unless I can put my thoughts into it.

And since grammar fails, I cannot do so unless it directly models experience, not a model of experience.

Ron Maimon

I said "it can process meaning like we do", and "it can produce the same stuff as a human". So it can write the plays of Shakespeare, have the conversation we are having, it can listen to you and understand you in the sense of responding to you and developing your ideas further, indistinguishable from a human.

jobermark

That remains unproven unless it really simulates reality, not just the things that you assume matter.

Your assumption that only certain things matter is the real problem with all forms of Positivism. Since the meanings of the things taken to matter continuall change.

Ron Maimon

The point is that it will produce a simulation which will produce the statistically plausible output of molecular positions with time.

jobermark

Statistically plausible does not matter.

Ron Maimon

4:10 PM

This is not an assumption, this is in the realm of science, and is subject to experimental verification. There is no problem with simulation.

jobermark

Carnap wants to model reality, one can't.

Ron Maimon

Statistical plausiblity is very important, it's what truncates the simulation to a finite number of bits. The rest are random.

jobermark

No, you are here bashing the whole of philosophy by assuming science is good enough. It isn't,

Ron Maimon

(or rather, from a finite but too large to be practical number of bits to a realistic number of bits).

jobermark

This is just basic physicalism. An axiom.

Ron Maimon

4:11 PM

No, I am bashing philosophy because of the distinction YOU JUST MADE, between "modelling meaning" and "responding to your queries" extending your ideas, and having this discussion.

jobermark

Too much of your faith relies on convention.

Ron Maimon

That's not physicalism, or any ism. That part is just physics.

That the simulation works is not a part of philosophy.

By "works" I mean produces a behavior that cannot be distinguished statistically from the outputs of the physical system.

jobermark

Why is that meaning of 'works' supposed to matter to anyone?

Ron Maimon

If you were talking to a bot right now, would you admit this bot has a mind?

I mean, if I were a bot.

jobermark

Read Kuhn?

Ron Maimon

4:13 PM

We've had a pretty long Turing test.

I'm asking you, not Kuhn.

jobermark

Science is your religion. That is fine, have whatever religion you like.

Ron Maimon

That's what Turing was saying, long before internet chat. That when you have this kind of conversation, you know the agent on the other side is thinking.

jobermark

Believing you have a mind is not knowing its contents.

Ron Maimon

Science is not my religion.

My religion is religion.

Ordinary monotheistic religion.

jobermark

If you think 'what matters' is simulation, science is your religion. What ever else you worship is a pretense

Ron Maimon

4:14 PM

Any kind will do, I am not happy with the current models.

It's not a pretense.

That's one of the most difficult things to reconcile with positivism.

God and positivism are like oil and water.

That's why so many people have a knee-jerk reaction against it.

jobermark

If religion is about what matters, and you have defined what matters as science, anything else is a pretense

Ron Maimon

I am telling you there is light at the end of the tunnel.

jobermark

That is also Wittgenstein.

Ron Maimon

I am not saying "what matters is science".

What matters is determined by your ethics.

jobermark

Then why is all philosophy beyond science meaningless.

Ron Maimon

4:16 PM

I am talking about what is precise.

I didn't say philosophy beyond science is meaningless.

jobermark

Ethics can be as precise as physics.

Ron Maimon

I said that two frameworks that predict the same results for sense impressions are to be identified.

Physics is computable and ethics are not.

jobermark

Then computation has no value, and is not a proper part of philosophy.

Ron Maimon

It's computable "in the limit", like the Halting problem.

jobermark

(As part of a counterargument)

That is also Wittgenstein.

Ron Maimon

4:18 PM

It's difficult to explain, because it's right on hthe boundary.

Computation is the finite stuff, and the limit is God.

The limit is not attained.

That's not Wittgenstein, it's Church, Kleene, and Turing.

I read Wittgenstein (by skimming).

jobermark

It is a model of something, but that is not meaning. So it is not a philosophy.

Positivism does not capture human thought in a meaningful way. In presuming to say only that which is 'clear', matters, it devalues all ethical thought.

It is something, just not valuable in any important way.

Ron Maimon

How do you know that it is not a model for meaning?

That's a very strong statement you are making dogmatically.

I gave you a detailed argument that it is a model for meaning.

That's the argument from simulation. It produces an entity which can fool you into thinking it knows and understands meaning.

jobermark

No, you gave me an argument that it is a model of something.

It is a model for models of meaning,

I already knew everything you just said. I already rejected its relevance. You will not listen to the reasons why. This is an exercise in pointless frustration and your own ego-stroking.

Ron Maimon

The argument is complete when you apply the axiom of positivism--- any entity that can fool you into thinking it has property X is indistinguishable from an object which has property X, and the position that it has property X is not distinguished by the senses from the position where it does not, so you might as well say it has property X, because it has all the observable hallmarks of something with property X, and that's ultimately what property X means.

Huh? You didn't give a reason why.

jobermark

If it ever becomes a proper model for meaning itself, physics would be over

Ron Maimon

4:23 PM

You just made an assertion that "it is a model of something, but that is not meaning".

The physics of molecules is long over.

jobermark

It is a model for models of meaning.

Ron Maimon

Why not?

Why?

I mean, why is it not a model for meaning?

It is my model for meaning.

jobermark

Get it?

Ron Maimon

No

jobermark

Except for ethics, which either is or is not meaning.

Is it a model for ethics?

Ron Maimon

4:24 PM

Ethics is a limiting conception.

jobermark

Don't care. Is is a model for ethics?

Ron Maimon

Huh?

Oh, you mean "is computing a model for ethics"

jobermark

Is Positivism capable of handling ethical arguments?

Ron Maimon

It is a model for ethics in the limit of infinitely long running time, infinite complexity, a limit which is never quite attained.

Yes!

jobermark

No

The feeling we should not kill one another contradicts the obsserved universe.

Ron Maimon

4:26 PM

That's the whole point I'm bringing that Carnap et al didn't--- you can formulate ethical arguments within positivism.

That's what I did that is new.

It's the only new thing I did in this whole ancient mess.

That's why I'm here writing about it.

The point is "how do you formulate ethics in positivism?" It's an extremely important question. Carnap's answer was "Why bother?" And that didn't get a lot of mileage.

jobermark

Your axim says like behavior is the same thing as like being.

If I kill on one side it is ethical, on another, not. Similar behavior is not similar activity, especially morally.

Ron Maimon

Sort of, observable behavior is the same thing as being.

You need to define morals then.

That's exactly the sticking point.

It's not so easy to do, because you need to understand what ethics means in terms of observable consequences.

jobermark

Before you can give one, you need a conception of thinking that does not say identical behavior is evidence of identical thinking.

Ron Maimon

identical behavior in all circumstances is what identical thinking means.

In positivism, that's what it means.

Why does that contradict ethics?

Genuine question.

jobermark

I need to go to work. This is a lot of nonsense. Actually consider whether physics is or is not definitive of reality. Since it models reality, it cannot define it. Period. You can only act otherwise by making it your god

Ron Maimon

4:29 PM

I don't see where you see a contradiction.

My God is the God of Abraham Isaac and Jacob.

It's perfectly well defined positivistically.

jobermark

Hypocrisy creates identical behavior out of totally different thinking.

Unconscious hypocrisy is rampant and the source of most evi.

Ron Maimon

It's not really identical, because you can scan the brain, or discover the hypocricy with enough probing.

jobermark

My god is the God of Jesus of Nazareth, far from that of the modern Church.

Ron Maimon

When you say "identical", you don't mean the same thing as when I say "identical". I mean really identical.

Yes, Jesus is a fine model for God.

The question is how to formulate the faith in Jesus in a way satisfying to a positivist.

I can tell you how to go about it, I think.

Because I did it, and it was from a Christian source (but probably one you disapprove of!)

jobermark

I believe in Jesus the man.

Who says very much the opposite of what the Church turned him into.

Ron Maimon

4:32 PM

But Jesus is not a man right now.

jobermark

This is all evasion and crap.

I really mean goodbye now. Remain self-deluded by not considering any alternatives.

Ron Maimon

I mean, Jesus today is not a man. Jesus is manifested in the will of the Christian community in some sense.

That's the resurrection.

jobermark

Go die.

Ron Maimon

Huh?

That's not particularly consonant with what I read of Jesus.

Why do you wish ill will toward me?

What have I done to you?

I am trying to sincerely incorporate the ethical reasoning of Christianity into a positivist framework, sincerely and with utmost respect.

Anyway, if you would like the positivist intepretation of Christian teaching--- "In the beginning was the word" is "in the beginning was the 'logos'", meaning discrete information, so I interpret this as computation. "And the word was God" is defining God as a computational entity.

jobermark

He came not to bring peace, but a sword. Said so.

Ron Maimon

4:40 PM

The computational entity is given meaning in the teachings of Jesus, and in the guidance of the holy spirit making a more perfect realization of God's will.

jobermark

It is all in your attitude. I think I can tell you what religion to have?

Ron Maimon

Yes, that's the struggle to Christianize the Roman empire, as I understand it. It will sever children from their parents and so on.

jobermark

What is that?

Ron Maimon

I don't have an attitude.

I am sincerely trying to sort this out.

I have partial understanding, and some things still nebulous.

It's hard to talk when there is a wall of potentially violent reactions.

jobermark

You have an unassailable position, and you cannot understand that I don't find it relevant in any way to anything that matters.

Ron Maimon

4:41 PM

What the heck?

jobermark

But the reasons I give get rejected with less than half a thought.

Ron Maimon

It's not designed to answer questions about the meaning of life.

Jesus and those concepts are much more sophisticated

the positivism is just a foundation.

jobermark

OK, then I can say it is not a complete philosophy. But it purports to be one.

Ron Maimon

It's not a conclusion.

jobermark

Over and over again.

Ron Maimon

4:42 PM

It doesn't purport to be complete in the high end.

jobermark

You might not.

Carnap did.

Ron Maimon

Meaning, it doesn't purport to have the answers of meaning of life, and religion.

Carnap didn't understand God.

jobermark

But those are part of philosophy.

Ron Maimon

He was an atheist.

jobermark

And no philosophy that stops at physics can get there.

Ron Maimon

4:43 PM

Yes, I am not saying it resolved all philosophical problems.

I am saying it gives the foundation in which you can discuss these problems without getting hung up on pseudo-distinctions and imprecise language.

jobermark

But you are saying that all physicists accept it and will ignore all other aspects of philosophy.

Ron Maimon

It doesn't solve the problem of ethics, you need to understand deeper things for that.

jobermark

So physicists don't need an ethics

Ron Maimon

But it does solve the problem of communicating ideas precisely, and that's important.

jobermark

Your post is very strong.

It says physicists will ignore philosophy until philosophy accepts logical positivism.

Ron Maimon

4:45 PM

My post is decrying the rejection of positivism as a foundation, not demanding that positivism be taken as a conclusions.

There is no conclusion to the problem of ethics, or philosophy. It's just that you can't even start when the foundation is not settled.

jobermark

Lots of philosophers proceed from positivism, with additions for important stuff.

Ron Maimon

The foundation is settled in physics, because physics doesn't have to deal with ethics.

Who?

jobermark

They reject it as complete.

Ron Maimon

I don't see any positivism anywhere anymore.

It's incomplete only like life is incomplete. At the high end, the limiting conceptions.

It's a complete foundation, meaning it allows you to speak precisely.

jobermark

For Kuhn, periods of normal science are fully positivist. But positivism cannot resolve the issues between paradigms with undefinable terms. Something weaker has to step in

Ron Maimon

4:47 PM

I see. That's an interpretation of positivism that I don't think is charitable to Carnap.

jobermark

OK, but meanings of terms have to arise somewhere.

Ron Maimon

I don't think that Carnap would even agree with this interpretation.

jobermark

And to the degree Carnap would say those terms never have meaning, science cannot continue.

Imprecise meaning is necessary often.

Ron Maimon

Well, when you are switching paradigms, there are terms you don't know the meaning of. But the positivism just tells you that two meanings that agree on the outcome of all experiments are indistinguishable.

jobermark

And this boolean notion that precise=meaningful keeps any other process that investigates paradigms hobbled.

Ron Maimon

4:48 PM

So when you finally find a meaning, you can switch between all interpretations which produce the same results without mental effort.

It's not a dogmatic assertion about everything having to be defined by logical sentences.

It's an assertion about when two models are to be identified, when their sensory experience is complete.

I mean, "identical" not "complete"

I am getting tired.

jobermark

But he keeps saying precise = meaningful, over and over again. And it is not true, there is an important imprecise meaning present that converges to a precise ont

Ron Maimon

I see, I didn't read much Carnap.

He is talking about his own model of meaning.

jobermark

Positivism as a position has this boolean notion of meaning.

Ron Maimon

Sort of, it needs a layer of interpretation to incorporate imprecise meaning.

jobermark

Then yuou do not know what you are talking about, quite literally.

Ron Maimon

4:51 PM

The reason it works, despite the fact that it has only this boolean notion--- no it works, let me explain--- this is subtle

jobermark

OK, but then it is a part of a complete philosophy, but you need more, it cannot be 'foundational' in any absolute sense.

Ron Maimon

is because the working of any computer can be written as a logical sentence. Logical sentence can represent the relation of bits inside an computer.

I am explaining----

jobermark

No, you are asserting.

Ron Maimon

So when you use purely boolean logical notions of truth, you can express any statement about the memory of any computer

What I am asserting now are mathematical theorems, not opinions, really.

Bear with me.

jobermark

Fine, that helps converge meanings of words in no way. It says until they are converged, there is no basis on which to compare them. It makes important human processing forbidden to have meaning.

Ron Maimon

4:53 PM

So the meaning one should give in positivism to an imprecise body of knowledge, like psychology, or the dynamics of social groups, is by the computer which simulates the people who have psychology or social groups.

jobermark

No, take me seriously.

Ron Maimon

Ok, hold on, I was writing something. I'll read in 20 seconds.

jobermark

Behaviorism worked, until it became intractable because the words had meaning but were imprecise!

We tried that. It failed. The modeled part of meaning cannot be the biggest part. Period. In any science that wants to move forward on a regular basis.

Ron Maimon

The sentence, when considered as a logical sentence, is as long as the computer simulation is long in megabytes, it's absolutely enormous. So while the sentiment works, and it can be made true, it is not useful for describing imprecise things well. This is the essence of Wittgenstein's argument. but again, it's a confusion between "in principle" and "in practice".

Ok, read your stuff.

jobermark

So every theory needs a positivist core, but needs to work around this asinine notion of meaning as precision.

Ron Maimon

4:55 PM

The asinine notion is an in principle notion, it isn't useful in practice.

Even Carnap knew this.

It's just a foundation in which you know what you are talking about, but to speak about "frustration" (for example, in this conversation) you are talking about extremely complex things that don't have a simple boolean test, even though they can be made into this in a computational simulation.

jobermark

The whole of formal logic exists. It is incomplete, and does not apply well to revolutionary periods of science.

Ron Maimon

It applies to everything that can be simulated, including revolutionary period in science, and non-revolutionary periods in science. It just isn't useful for day-to-day expression.

Because the day-to-day expression is too complicated to model fruitfully on a computer.

It's too big.

jobermark

Right, during normal science people are positivists.

Ron Maimon

During all science people are positivists (usually).

The formulation of quantum mechanics was done by die-hard positivists.

That was the biggest revolution there was, ever, in any science. It's still controversial.

jobermark

No, when the terms are ambiguous and no experiment can identify the named things, you cannot treat the statements with positivism.

Ron Maimon

4:59 PM

They defined terms which were not ambiguous, using positivism, one by one, through the experiments they could perform.

jobermark

They all produce the same data, because the data are what the theories are trying to explain. So by positivist standards all the competing theories hav ethe same meaning

Ron Maimon

And those terms that they couldn't assign expreimental meaning to, they rejected as superfluous.

Right.

If two theories produce the same data, they're the same theory.

jobermark

Going through them in that way IS NORMAL SCIENCE by defintion

Ron Maimon

Going through what? Alternatives that produce the same data? That's not science at all, that's just mathematical reformulation.

People do it, but it's not considered an advance.

jobermark

So to say the activity of revolutionary science can be conducted postitivistically implies it is already done when it starts

Ron Maimon

5:01 PM

But revolutionary science is done positivistically, all science is done positivistically. Nobody cares if you claim an idea without testable consequences.

jobermark

The contenders for the new paradigm produce no data, only interpretations of existing data. Choosing a paradigm allows one to decide that data will test it,

Ron Maimon

The revolutionary aspects are when the concepts of the new theory don't map to the old ones.

jobermark

And new candidates arise that try to cover all of the data, including what the old theory failed at.

Ron Maimon

The contenders for the new paradigm produce new different experimental predictions, or else they are not contenders.

jobermark

They do so, but some are quite tortured in the attenpt

Ron Maimon

5:02 PM

I don't understand--- this is too general.

jobermark

That is Popper and not Kuhn. If you just disbelieve Kuhn don't use his language.

Ron Maimon

Do you mean, say, relativity vs. fixed ether theory?

I don't "disbelieve" Kuhn, I just don't think he's so deep.

He's right about what happens.

But it happens more commonly than he thinks.

I mean, every decent scientist has half a dozen paradigm shifts in his own head in his own lifetime in his own field.

You don't need to go to the early 20th century to find them.

jobermark

OK, so the 'periods' are overlapping.

And he is somewhat wrong about that,

Ron Maimon

I mean, I could list paradigm shifts I went through all day, and I wouldn't think of them all.

jobermark

But he defines the different periods. Testing a theory requires already accepting the paradigm provisionally

When you are trying to choose what to do next, it is based upon imprecise meanings.

Which positivism declares valueless.

Ron Maimon

5:05 PM

Sure, but the paradigm is sort of fluid, any two "paradigms" that produce the same outputs are considered equivalent. The distinction between the old and new paradigm is based on predictions mostly.

jobermark

The entire objection all philosophers have to positivism is that there is imprecise meaning, you cannot just write it off.

And many of them think there is mostly imprecise meaning.

The kind of meaning relevant to 'revolutionary science' is imprecise.

And Carnap says that means it is not meaning.

IF that is not the position you think you are defending, then everyone here is going to misunderstand, perhaps violently.

The point is not that philosophy somehow disowns physics, but that it insists there is more, and that even physics occasionally requires more in order to continue past certain junctures.

Ron Maimon

What I am saying is that positivism is a foundational philosophy, it isn't designed to deal with imprecise meanings and nebulous concepts. it is designed to deal with understanding what "meaning", "thought" and "precision" really mean as concepts. The nebulous stuff is just as nebulous within positivism, it is just removed by many layers of abstraction from the foundation, and in principle (not in practice) can be reduced to the precise thing. But we can't do it, because it's too complicated.

But it's still important to know that it is there, the precise thing, because it allows you to get rid of the pseudo-distinctions.

So that you don't argue over meaningless things, which happens all the time in philosophy.

jobermark

But the ambiguous meanings, to the extent they will eventually contradict cannot be represented by the precise formulations upon which your foundation insists.

Ron Maimon

The kind of meaning in revolutionary science is usually positivist, for example, Einstein knew there was a wave attached to photons. But he didn't know what that wave WAS, or how it related to the particle.

The ambiguous meanings, even with its contradictions, can be represented in a precise foundation, using an intermediate computer to simulate the imprecise thinking.

jobermark

The point of view you need is not Einsteins, but that of the first person to believe him

Ron Maimon

5:12 PM

The computer is precise, but its internal computations produce contradictions.

What do you mean?

jobermark

Why do you need the computer then?

What basis does your foundation give us?

Ron Maimon

Because the computer implements the reduction of the imprecise to the precise.

jobermark

And that helps how?

Given that it does not actually happen.

Ron Maimon

It allows you to speak about the meaning, to know what is vague and what is precise, and to know when you have completed the project of understanding something.

jobermark

But is only theoretical.

Ron Maimon

5:13 PM

It does happen, but extremely slowly.

For example, to understand language grammar, you need a computer program that understands grammar.

To understand the mind, you need an AI.

jobermark

The computer of which you speak is not real, but theoretical. So it does, in fact, not happen.

Stop objecting to things just to object.

Ron Maimon

The grammar business? That's not hard.... it's just done incompetently by linguists.

Language grammar is not that complicated. Semantics is.

The reason is that grammar is done automatically by "cheap circuits" that don't bother the parts of our mind that does the ideas.

The algorithm is pretty simple.

But, for example, chess evaluation is solved.

jobermark

This is getting pointless. Not only are you not listening, you are inventing things of your own to respond to

Ron Maimon

Or at least, solved as well as grandmasters understand it.

What?

I am explaining what the foundation gives you.

It doesn't let you speak about sophisticated notions better.

It just lets you see what makes them sophisticated.

And it stops you from arguing over pointless distinctions that don't make sense.

It's not the whole world, but it's something, and even this little bit has been taken away in the philosophy department.

jobermark

5:39 PM

Sorry, unplanned transit from train to desk.

Let me just say that I think someone like Daniel Dennett, of "Consciousness Explained" would be considered a positivist in your sense, in that he believes stuff is reducible to simulation, but he would never consider himself a positivist, because he accepts that intermediate forms have meaning and are still useful despite their internal contradictions.

So your notion it that what you are describing has been rejected is vastly overstated, and your naming it as positivism is just netting you enemies.

It is true that many folks think this kind of reduction is possible, and relevant, or symbolic logic itself would have gone out of style. But positivism means more than that. It means that 'sophisticated enough' stuff is 'sophistry' -- and the rest of us are surely not in line with that.

Dennet is not getting fired any time soon. But if psychology itself advances much, he might move to psychology rather than philosophy.

From another "Kuhnian' point of view, 'suppressing' your style of positivism to be *just a part* of any future philosophy is not an oppression of physics or psychology by philosophy, but their fledging as reasonable sciences that can be trusted to be well-behaved parts of a worldview.

Ron Maimon

7:13 PM

Dennett is almost a positivist, in that he accepts their conclusions, but not their principle. The founding principle is "two ideas which are identical in sense impressions are identical period". That's incompatible with the logical coherence of the zombie concept, something Dennett accepts, but does not use the basic positivist tenet to refute. Your characterization of Carnap et al, is naive, they thought exactly like I do, to the tee, except for the God bit.

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Discussion between jobermark and Ron …