Does Wittgenstein's Tractatus establish serious bounds for discussions of the supernatural from a modern point of view?

Question

In today's mathematics, we have many variants of logic (propositional, first order, higher order, fuzzy logic, etc.). These are all self-consistent formal systems that are based on some set of axioms.

In Wittgenstein's Tractatus, he demands a logical structure for thoughts and basically says that only sentences that mirror such thoughts are valid.

However, it seems to me that he assumes there is one and only one real logic after which our thoughts can be ordered. On the other hand, in principle, the different logics could have been available to Wittgenstein before 1920.

I don't know if his considerations survive to the present day. I wonder if these problems have been discussed by other philosophers, and maybe even resolved. In particular, I'm curious what the modern relevance is of Wittgenstein's early claim regarding the usefulness of discussions about the supernatural.

Answer 1

In today's mathematics, we have many variants of logic (propositional, first order, higher order, fuzzy logic, etc.). These are all self-consistent formal systems that are based on some set of axioms.

True. Furthermore, some logics are classical, some are non-classical, and some are deviant-- but let's not let that detain us here.

In Wittgenstein's Tractatus, he demands a logical structure for thoughts and basically says that only sentences that mirror such thoughts are valid.

And, in the Philosophical Investigations he famously walked back from the absurdity of this claim, pointing to all kinds of thoughts and sentences that do not take the form of propositions. This does not mean that we necessarily need to follow the late Wittgenstein in rejecting the early Wittgenstein, but we should at least be aware of the critique, and be prepared to respond to it.

However, it seems to me that he assumes there is one and only one real logic after which our thoughts can be ordered. On the other hand, in principle, the different logics could have been available to Wittgenstein before 1920.

I don't recall him addressing this at all, nor do I see what the substitution of a different logical formalism would have on his project. Do you have a concrete example where the use of a different logic would result in a significant change to the system of the Tractatus? Or is this merely idle speculation?

I don't know if his considerations survive to the present day. I wonder if these problems have been discussed by other philosophers, and maybe even resolved. In particular, I'm curious what the modern relevance is of Wittgenstein's early claim regarding the usefulness of discussions about the supernatural.

Wait, what? How does "the supernatural" come into play here at all? At the moment, this appears to be a gross non sequitur. If you think there is an argument to be made which would link the substitution of non-classical or deviant logics into the schema of the Tractatus and "the supernatural", go ahead and make the argument-- I don't think you can expect us to connect those particular dots without a lot more to go on.

Answer 2

The existence of different logics is interesting, but not particularly relevant, because of Godel/Turing universality. If you have a statement about possibilities, a statement in modal logic, you can encode it in a semantics about possible worlds, in a first order logical form about an expanded universe of discourse (see Kripke semantics). Further, if you have a "fuzzy logic", you can speak about it in an appropriate axiomatic mathematical system which includes real numbers, and makes a map between propositions and fuzzy values.

There are also Baysian probability calculi which can be thought of as a different logic, some people regard quantum amplitudes as a logic, while other schemes regard permission as in the logic. What you put in the logic and what you put in the axioms is largely up to you.

But the main point is that the ordinary first order logic is complete, it will produce any logical consequence of any axioms, and this was proved by Godel. This means that if you have a mathematically precise description of some other logic, you can always talk about this logic in terms of first order logic, and consider the other logic as axioms on top of first order logic. This is not a natural point of view, but it is a possible point of view.

The universality of first order logic is the logical analog of Turing universality--- that a finite complexity computer with unbounded memory can simulate any other computer with suitable programming. The formalism of logic is like the instruction set, the axioms are like the instructions of the program, and the deductions are the running of the program. A Turing machine can do Godel deduction (you can program a computer to deduce in first order logic) and Godel deduction can describe a computer, so the two results are essentially equivalent, and anything that can be stated in any coherent logical system is something that is meaningful for a computer to analyze and interpret.

So there really is only one type of logic, and Wittgenstein is mostly right. Althogh it is a mistake to attribute this to Wittgenstein, who was not as mathematically or logically precise at the mathematicians and logicians of the early 20th century in whose footsteps he followed, not as precise, nor as iconaclastic, as Russell, and did not contribute commensurately to the formal developments as Russel did. Further, one may say that Wittgenstein's ideas have a sonority and a lack of mathematical precision that leads those in techical fields to perhaps use the phrase "running one's mouth". The proper attribution of first order logic, the recognition of its importance in philosophy, and the associated logical postivism, better belongs to Hilbert, Frege, Boole, Quine, Godel, Turing, Russel, Whitehead and others who come before. It continued with those who built the Vienna school, including Carnap, which made logical positivism the ascendent philosophy until the 1970s.

The use of predicate language to remove ambiguity, and the thesis that all statements should be formulated in some predicate language about precise observable criteria, is the central tenet of logical positivism, which flourished in the mid-20th century, but took a beating in the 1970-90s. This coincided with the popularity of the illicit drug cannabis, and once the influence of the cannabis smokers wanes, it should be rehabilitated.

Answer 3

However, it seems to me that he assumes there is one and only one real logic after which our thoughts can be ordered. On the other hand, in principle, the different logics could have been available to Wittgenstein before 1920.

Wittgenstein's early and later view of logic entails that there cannot be multiple logics. A calculus is a means of transforming symbols, and there can be as many of these as one has transformation rules. Logic however, in Wittgenstein's sense of the word, is different. He regarded propositions as bipolar (Tractatus) and, later, bivalent (Investigations). He rejected Brouwer's view that there are propositions with no truth value and Lukasiewicz's multi-valued logics (in the 1932-1935 Cambridge lectures). Their systems are calculi which specify alternative transformation rules, but these are not the rules of language and not, therefore, the rules of logic in the required sense. A language can be governed by these rules only by altering what it means to be a proposition, and therefore what it means to have a language. Logic, proposition and language are all internally related concepts.

I don't know if his considerations survive to the present day. I wonder if these problems have been discussed by other philosophers, and maybe even resolved.

These considerations have very much survived. Michael Dummett in particular has argued that alternative logics (such as dropping LOM or multiple truth values) entail alternative metaphysics. This has led to much discussion about how we could build a 'theory of meaning' for language such that the answers to metaphysical questions would all be determined by the right meaning theory. This actually goes against both the early and later view of Wittgenstein that logic does not entail any metaphysics at all, for the propositions of logic do not correspond to any state of affairs. They are rules which are tautologies (in the Tractatus) or grammatical rules (Investigations).

There is a modern resurgence of interest in metaphysics that is profoundly un-Wittgensteinian. The problems have not so much been resolved as exacerbated, and a return to Wittgenstein's penetrating solutions (in the later philosophy) would be very helpful.

In particular, I'm curious what the modern relevance is of Wittgenstein's early claim regarding the usefulness of discussions about the supernatural.

There are a number of comments on the 'mystical' in the Tractatus which are related to the doctrine of showing what cannot be said, but this doctrine was abandoned by the later Wittgenstein as confused. There is no such thing as ineffable metaphysics. Those modern philosophers however, like Dummett and Davidson, who have revived the old Tractatus approach to philosophy, could well be said to be committed to mystical, or supernatural views, about the nature of the world, reality etc. I do not see, though, that they have solved any 'problems' in these areas any more than Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas or Descartes solved them.

Answer 4

There is a large literature on this: priest has two relevant chapters in his doubt truth to be a liar.

It is true that there are many logics, all of which are more suited to some purposes than others. However, this does not preclude there being one true logic in W's sense of the term.

The thing to bear in mind is what the purpose of logic is. The philosophically interesting one, which W plausible held, is to capture logical consequence (See Dummett's Justification of Deduction for an argument that this must be prior to any other concept).

Hence, if we are not pluralists about logical consequence (Beall and Restall are an example of such pluralists) we should think that there is a single notion of logical consequence we are attempting to capture. The logic that does this would be the one true logic.

The other logics we have are appropriate for other purposes, or where the domain allows us to add further restrictions on the consequence relation. But from the mere fact that there are different logics we are unawarranted in concluding that there is no one true logic.

I think this is all irrelevant to concerns about the supernatural. One should always, in my view, be careful about reading too much into logic -see for example those that misuse Goedel's Incompleteness Theorems.