NEADS wargames before 9/11
Hi there,

I know, the wargames stuff has been beaten to death here, and gumboot has done valuable work on this. However, I´m currently doing some private work on wargames before 9/11. Since it may be useful for some JREFers, I´ll share it here, to be dealt with in detail in the near future. This is all just work in progress, so don’t expect too much.

http://www.archives.gov/legislative/...rt=affiliation
The NEADS interviews which can be found at the above link are the whole material I base my comments on at this time, which refer to the question how well prepared NEADS was to counter 9/11. I specify this question to what wargames NEADS practiced before 9/11. I won´t discuss the post-Cold-War changes/non-changes in general.
9/11 included multiple suicide hijackings from the interior US using planes as weapons and the cases were handled by NEADS and the FAA, both of which could see primary signals only (UA 175 excluded).
For my question, I had to split these features into eight:

(i) FAA participation
(ii) No simulated, but real planes
(iii) Hijack mission
(iv) Suicide mission
(v) Plane being used as weapon
(vi) Multiple hijackings
(vii) Planes from the interior and in the interior
(viii) No transponder signal

This is what NEADSians told about wargames before 9/11.

(i) Concerning FAA participation:
Quote:
„Aires noted that NEADS has worked with individual FAA En Route Centers on exercises, but not with any national FAA entities. Aires noted that all the military exercises would be in special use airspace. He noted that all the FAA would do was control an aircraft until it reached the military airspace.“
Bill Aires

“They had a cell that would play the FAA in the exercise.”
Dawne Deskins

“The first tool Powell would refer to in the case of a hijack would be the hijack checklist. The checklist is for both the Senior Director and the Technician. They coordinate the information they receive with the FAA (Federal Aviation Administration).“
Jeremy Powell

“Speicher informed Commission staff that NEADS locally simulated exercises are not coordinated with the actual FAA, but instead NEADS personnel act as the FAA. He continued and noted that in a live exercise there may be some "real" coordination, but most of the live flight exercises took place in the Warning Areas off the coast. There might have been actual participation from the FAA as they controlled aircraft to enter the airspace in which the exercise took place, but that would be the extent of the participation [Commission staff notes that this level of participation is far from substantial, and would not require a high level of inter-agency familiarization]. […] He noted in live flight exercises there might be coordination with the FAA involving receiving a "trusted agent" response from the FAA, but more than likely it was through a simulated FAA operator.”
Clark Speicher
(ii) Concerning simulated or real planes:
Quote:
“A typical design would include course deviation in which the hijacker forces the pilot to fly to a designated landing point. They would not do these hijacks exercises real world.”
Dawne Deskins

“Marr noted he participated once with a live exercise for a hijack headed north from St. Louis in the south. They attempted to scramble aircraft internally in this exercise, and Marr commented that it did not work very well.”
Robert Marr

“According to Powell, some hijacking practice has involved scenarios in which the hijacked flight is incoming from overseas. One, in Powell's recollection, involved a flight coming out of Canada. Powell noted that mostly these exercises are done in simulation. There were various live exercises; but none that involved hijacks. Powell commented that such live exercises would be extremely difficult to run.”
Jeremy Powell

“Speicher noted that in a simulated exercise whether or not a fighter made and completed its intercept would not be a concern at NEADS. The exercise would be considered complete once all of NEADS protocol and procedures were practiced. Speicher noted that he has practiced scenarios, both live and simulated, in which a change in Rules of Engagement (ROE) is passed to pilots. Speicher does not recall any exercises or real world situations in which NEADS was called upon to protect the National Capital Region. […] He noted that prior to September 11, 2001 (9/11) they practiced locating primary targets inbound as live flights over water. But a live flight over land would be too difficult to coordinate.”
Clark Speicher
(iii) Concerning hijack exercises:
Quote:
“Bianchi noted that there were hijack suicide exercises but that those aircraft would be intercepted while over water.”
Steve Bianchi

“A typical design would include course deviation in which the hijacker forces the pilot to fly to a designated landing point. They would not do these hijacks exercises real world. […] Deskins noted that there really were not the assets to do a large scale real world exercise to practice hijack response. […] She noted that there are exercised scenarios in which an aircraft is hijacked in France. In this exercise there is a long "lead in" time that involves receiving intelligence and having the crews practice using their hijack checklist. Ifit is a "straight" hijack scenario then it does not involve identification because the aircraft is already identified as hijacked. She states that she does not have a firm recollection of the details of these exercises. ”
Dawne Deskins

“Marr noted he participated once with a live exercise for a hijack headed north from St. Louis in the south. They attempted to scramble aircraft internally in this exercise, and Marr commented that it did not work very well.”
Robert Marr

“He noted that NEADS has practiced scenarios that involved passing the shadow of hijacked flights over Canadian airspace.”
Robert Marr

“McCain worked a hijacked plane in the Lufthansa aircraft event. It was intercepted and followed by Canadian F18s, and F16s from Burlington escorted the flight at the US coast. NEADS designated the flight a "Special 15", and the flight continued to JFK Airport. McCain was an ill Tech at the time. In this circumstance, all the questions that the ill Tech team needed to answer were asked and answered. It was a "very easy scenario", since they exercised and drilled for this type of event on a weekly basis.
They would have a Fertile (Northeast generated) RICE (large scale - more than seven targets - exercise). The scenario would be varied from over land to over water.”
Joe McCain

“According to Powell, pre-9/11 training in respect to hijacked planes was geared towards NEADS' role as a response agency; it was trained for and a check list for what needed to be done was sequenced. There is an actual SD/SDT Checklist #6 that has a checklist of hijacking procedures. A different checklist exists for scrambling fighters from separate air force bases.
The first tool Powell would refer to in the case of a hijack would be the hijack checklist. The checklist is for both the Senior Director and the Technician. They coordinate the information they receive with the FAA (Federal Aviation Administration). […] According to Powell, some hijacking practice has involved scenarios in which the hijacked flight is incoming from overseas. One, in Powell's recollection, involved a flight coming out of Canada.“
Jeremy Powell

“Hijack exercises were conducted several times a year as far as Sanderson recalls; though he cannot remember specific scenarios.”
Ian Sanderson

“Hijacking scenarios that he conceived were primarily personal views; there was no substantive intelligence.“
Mark Stuart
(iv) Concerning suicide exercises:
Quote:
“Bianchi noted that there were hijack suicide exercises but that those aircraft would be intercepted while over water. Bianchi noted that in these training episodes the suicide bombers were threatening to use a bomb to destroy the aircraft, and that these were not threats on infrastructure.“
Steve Bianchi

„At this point in the interview Deskins noted to Commission staff that she does believe NEADS exercised scenarios in which a terrorist would take a "small airplane that would run into something", or was full of chemicals, or would be a ground event.”
Dawne Deskins

“He envisioned terrorists taking over planes and piloting them at the last possible moment as they crashed.“
Mark Stuart
(v) Concerning planes being used as weapon:
Quote:
“Bianchi noted that in these training episodes the suicide bombers were threatening to use a bomb to destroy the aircraft, and that these were not threats on infrastructure.“
Steve Bianchi

“She recalled an exercise in which an aircraft was used to release chemicals, but not a hijacked plane. She does not remember participating in an exercise in which a hijacked aircraft crashed into infrastructure. […] At this point in the interview Deskins noted to Commission staff that she does believe NEADS exercised scenarios in which a terrorist would take a "small airplane that would run into something", or was full of chemicals, or would be a ground event.”
Dawne Deskins

“He can not specifically remember […] a scenario in which an airplane would be used as a weapon.”
Ian Sanderson

“Speicher noted there is a "liability" period before the Battle Cab staff forms for twenty- four hour operations when an exercise is about to begin. He continued and noted that there is a distinction in exercise objectives between having weapons "on board" an aircraft and "using the aircraft" as a weapon.”
Clark Speicher

“Documents on his hard drive will substantiate that on March 24, 1999 Stuart drafted a briefing on the threat of terrorist use of aircraft to crash into buildings. He briefed, over time in 1999, 2000 and 2001 the logical progression that linked hijackings to the use of explosives in vehicles [probable reference to Embassy bombings] and then, logically, to the use of aircraft. He recalled briefing his scenario at annual intelligence conferences at both CONR and NORAD. At CONR the receiving official was Col Tom Glenn, now retired; at NORAD it was the J2, Navy Captain Kuhn. […] Specifically, Stuart said we should ask Col Glenn what happened to Lt Col Stuart's concerns on terrorist activity, e. g. using planes as weapons.”
Mark Stuart
(vi) Concerning the possibility of multiple hijackings:
Quote:
“She does not personally recall the design of a hijack with multiple hijacks or terrorist take over.”
Dawne Deskins

“Multiple hijack scenarios were not addressed in the training.“
Joe McCain

“He can not specifically remember […] a scenario that involve multiple hijacks”
Ian Sanderson

“He never imagined multiple hijackings in any scenario.”
Mark Stuart
(vii) Concerning exercises involving planes from and in the interior:
Quote:
“Bianchi does not recall any training exercises that were planned to address an air threat to the National Capital Area that involved an intercept of an aircraft after it crossed into national land borders. Bianchi noted that there were hijack suicide exercises but that those aircraft would be intercepted while over water.“
Steve Bianchi

“Marr noted he participated once with a live exercise for a hijack headed north from St. Louis in the south. They attempted to scramble aircraft internally in this exercise, and Marr commented that it did not work very well.”
Robert Marr

“Marr noted that he did not recall any specific exercises that included direct defense of the National Capital Area. He noted that NEADS and NORAD had training and scenarios that called for protection of large scale areas.”
Robert Marr

“"Occasionally" in exercises aircrafts take off internally (from US over-land airspace). Often the aircraft would leave from Chicago, and instead of going where it was flight planned, would go to Toronto.”
Joe McCain

“He can not specifically remember a scenario practiced of a hijack within US airspace;”
Ian Sanderson

“Speicher does not recall any exercises or real world situations in which NEADS was called upon to protect the National Capital Region.”
Clark Speicher

„In all cases he briefed that a hijacking would originate overseas, inbound to the U.S. He never imagined it could happen inside the U.S. Stuart thought that security vulnerabilities overseas made it far more likely that hijackings would come from without.”
Mark Stuart
(viii) Concerning loss of transponder signal:
Quote:
“McCain states to his knowledge it was never exercised that the target would stop squeaking its transponder.“
Joe McCain

“He noted that prior to September 11, 2001 (9/11) they practiced locating primary targets inbound as live flights over water. But a live flight over land would be too difficult to coordinate.“
Clark Speicher
First brief Comments:

(i) FAA participation
Just in small scale, if at all.
(ii) No simulated, but real planes
Mostly simulated, denial of any hijack live exercise by Deskins and Powell, affirmation from Marr.
(iii) Hijack mission
Multiple exercises involving this, no surprise.
(iv) Suicide mission
Anticipated without plane being used as weapon. One unsure from Deskins about plane as weapon.
(v) Plane being used as weapon
Denial from most NEADSians, but the one unsure memory from Deskins, and at least briefings on this possibility by Stuart.
(vi) Multiple hijackings
Not anticipated
(vii) Planes from the interior and in the interior
In combination with a hijack, yes, concerning to Marr, but it didn´t work well. No, concerning to the other ones. General agreement that none of the scenarios included the National Capital Area. McCain mentions internal flights in combination with a course change, not hijacking.
(viii) No transponder signal
Anticipated, but overseas.

TBD, and have a nice day.
Additional comments, this time including NORAD/CONR and relevant material from box t-0148-911MFR-boxes-11-15.
(i) FAA participation
Quote:
“He stated that other agencies - such as the FAA - may have been involved in a NORAD exercise prior to 9/11 at the ARTCC level, but not at the national level. The possible exception to this that he could recall was the Positive Force exercise series, which is a CJCS multi-agency exercise with national players.“
Ken Merchant

“Eberhart commented that prior to 9/11 there was not much interest between the FAA and NORAD to share in exercises. The FAA priority was to serve the economic needs of the air traffic, whereas NORAD at times would be seen by the FAA as infringing on this priority by the use of space in exercises“
Ed Eberhart

„They at times had joint exercises with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). It depended on the type of exercise as to whether actual FAA employees were involved. Dooley noted to Commission staff that prior to 9/11 she had "worked" the "tail end" of a hijack, but has no recollection of it.”
Huntress ID (MSgt. Dooley), box interview
(ii) Real or simulated
Quote:
“There is simulated and live training. It takes up to 150 days. There are also academic training modules incorporated. They finally must qualify through the standing evaluation process. Overall responsibility is held by Master Corporal Childhouse (Canadian) at NEADS for Air Surveillance training.“
Jeffrey LaMarche & Jeffrey Richmond
(iii) Hijack
Quote:
“Prior to 9/11 Richmond dealt with hijack training that postulated the "typical" hijack scenario. The primary responsibility of an AST in that circumstance would be to maintain the track of the aircraft.”
Jeffrey LaMarche & Jeffrey Richmond

“Mr. Merchant cannot remember a time in the last 33 years when NORAD has NOT run a hijack exercise, but stated that they were always resolved peacefully, that is, NORAD did not project shooting down a hijacked aircraft.”
Ken Merchant

“McKinley referred to the eighties as the "decade of hijacks." He noted that fighters would perform their intercept, identify, and escort the aircraft to a safe landing with routine proficiency.“
Craig McKinley

“Del Toro noted that almost every exercise was built to respond to some type of general aviation event, and in large scale multi-day training exercises there would often be a hijack scenario.
Millovich commented that "at one point" almost every scenario they exercised included a hijack;“
Jim Millovich & Robert DelToro
(iv) Suicide mission
Quote:
„Scott noted that while he was on active duty there were scenarios that exercised hijacked aircraft carrying WMD onboard (sarin gas, etc.). He remembered a unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) that was approaching New York City that was exercised. But Scott does not know of any exercise while he was on active duty that accounted for a hijacked suicide mission. He did not partake in those exercises once he left active duty.“
William Scott

„Millovich commented that "at one point" almost every scenario they exercised included a hijack; but never in his knowledge was a scenario of a suicide hijack event.
Del Toro explained that there was once a testing of a force protection ground-based air defense capability that built into an exercise including a general aviation threat to the outheast Air Defense Sector (SEADS), but that event was built to test the force protection capacity of the base.“
Jim Millovich & Robert DelToro
(v) Plane as weapon
Quote:
“Prior to 9/11 Richmond dealt with hijack training that postulated the "typical" hijack scenario. The primary responsibility of an AST in that circumstance would be to maintain the track of the aircraft. They had never been trained in circumstance that the plane would be hijacked and used as a weapon.”
Jeffrey LaMarche & Jeffrey Richmond

„McKinley noted that if exercises did take place that can be compared to the 9/11 hijack attacks then there were no intelligence warnings that drove these exercises. He noted that "the exercise kids probably put on their creative hats" and developed interesting scenarios to test the operations capabilities of their sectors but there was no indication that the scenarios paralleled a credible threat.
McKinley noted that to his knowledge before he left for the Pentagon there were no 9/11 type scenarios built into their exercises. The hijack scenarios that were exercised involved a successful escort to landing and negotiation with the hijackers.”
Craig McKinley

„Scott noted that while he was on active duty there were scenarios that exercised hijacked aircraft carrying WMD onboard (sarin gas, etc.). He remembered a unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) that was approaching New York City that was exercised. But Scott does not know of any exercise while he was on active duty that accounted for a hijacked suicide mission. He did not partake in those exercises once he left active duty.“
William Scott

„Millovich commented that "at one point" almost every scenario they exercised included a hijack; but never in his knowledge was a scenario of a suicide hijack event.
Del Toro explained that there was once a testing of a force protection ground-based air defense capability that built into an exercise including a general aviation threat to the outheast Air Defense Sector (SEADS), but that event was built to test the force protection capacity of the base.“
Jim Millovich & Robert DelToro

“Hawley mentioned the pre-inaugural tabletop exercises, including exercises regarding the use of planes as a weapon. Hawley noted that this issue was raised by Lee Hamilton with Mike Canavan during the Commission's hearing. Hawley thought that in December 2000 some scenarios that were "pretty damn close to 9-11 plot" were practiced. Canavan was definitely in charge of that. Hawley said that one of the scenarios may have had something to do with a chartered flight out of Ohio that had turned the transponder off. Mike Wiechert ran a lot of these exercises. It really forced you to think outside the box. The topic was in the FAA's thoughts, the discussions.”
John Hawley, TSA, former FAA, box interview (recommended)
(vii) Interior US
Quote:
“Prior to 9/11 NORAD did not run an exercise involving a hijacking over the National Capital Region (NCR), but there were events within exercises that involved the NCR.”
Ken Merchant

„Scott commented that despite the notice of the terrorist events that were analyzed in the RAM report they still looked at the NORAD mission as a direct mission to protect the continental United States (CONUS) from external threats, and that it was a firm and Constitutionally sound line between what was a NORAD responsibility and what was a FBI/law enforcement responsibility.
He also commented that the exercises that accounted for threats from aircraft headed from outside CONUS that entered into CONUS qualified as a NORAD responsibility strictly because threats that originate outside CONUS are DoD events. He explained that hijackings prior to 9/11 were not scene as a national emergency, and that once hijackings became a national emergency the DoD took some responsibility for the response.“
William Scott

„Huntress ID noted to Commission staff that they have participated in hijack training scenarios - mostly for flights inbound from overseas - but had never exercised a hijack overland. The procedure for response that they were familiar with in the case of a hijack entailed establishing a visual identification of the target by a fighter. The time they had to do so would depend on whether or not the target was squawking. If there are multiple mode 3s, or ifit was a primary target only, then the time frame to establish a positive identification would be complicated. If the flight is over water the time limit is roughly 2 minutes to 5 minutes once the flight passes the "core line" (a specific distance from the coast at which the priority of the event is escalated). There is no time limit overland. The scenarios practiced before 9/11 most frequently that involved finding an aircraft that was a primary target were practiced; but most of those scenarios would be over water. Even in the drug interdiction context they were not allowed to take military action with anything over domestic airspace.“
Huntress ID (MSgt. Dooley), box interview
(viii) No transponder
Quote:
„Huntress ID noted to Commission staff that they have participated in hijack training scenarios - mostly for flights inbound from overseas - but had never exercised a hijack overland. The procedure for response that they were familiar with in the case of a hijack entailed establishing a visual identification of the target by a fighter. The time they had to do so would depend on whether or not the target was squawking. If there are multiple mode 3s, or ifit was a primary target only, then the time frame to establish a positive identification would be complicated. If the flight is over water the time limit is roughly 2 minutes to 5 minutes once the flight passes the "core line" (a specific distance from the coast at which the priority of the event is escalated). There is no time limit overland. The scenarios practiced before 9/11 most frequently that involved finding an aircraft that was a primary target were practiced; but most of those scenarios would be over water. Even in the drug interdiction context they were not allowed to take military action with anything over domestic airspace.”
Huntress ID (MSgt. Dooley), box interview

Additional comments from FAA employees (accidental discoveries, incomplete):
Quote:
“Pre 9-11 there was hijacking content in exercises in the Dynamic Simulation lab, but they were not extensive exercises. Training was vastly different than the actual hijacking of airplanes on 9-11. In training scenarios the pilot was still in control of the airplane. All exercises were based on that given. There were also scenarios when the pilot would use a code word or the pilot would verbally explain if the situation allowed.
She has participated as a controller with military aircraft out of McGuire Air Force Base and Warren Grove (military airspace just above Atlantic City). She wouldn't have known how to contact NEADS then, but they now have a direct line to Huntress Controll (NEADS).“
Lorraine Barrett

„Every year as part of refresher program have training on procedures for hijack. Does not know if there were every multiple hijack scenario testing. Prior 9111 no awareness of faa/military/dod exercises here at ZNY. Thought believes there have been some at Kennedy that were simulated as hijack on ground at airport. No knowledge of one with an airborne aircraft.”
Mike McCormick

“There were very few hijacks pre-9-11 for a controller to respond to in the real world. He recalled no exercises or drills-there was very little emphasis and drills. He had no knowledge of any exercises or drills sponsored by the FAA or the military and certainly none with multiple hijacking events.“
Paul Thumser
Own comments:
Mostly affirmation of what was already said, some new information on transponder-related issues; there is a recurring pattern visible: NEADS/NORAD employee x says “There was no such exercise, AFAIK” (e.g. loss of transponder signal in the interior), NEADS/NORAD employee says “Um, yes, there was, but mostly it was otherwise” (e.g. loss of transponder signal outside Continental US airspace).
No big difference with respect to 9/11 preparation, IMO, but I´ll have to check the details.

Originally Posted by Hokulele View Post
I noticed a few transcription typos, did you want these corrected?
Gladly! When I´m gone through all the available and relevant material (which includes the stuff at Scribd and 911Myths as well), I´ll cite all relevant statements in one posting, and check them before – but massive overlooking of transcription typos is guaranteed, so your corrections are appreciated.
Originally Posted by Brainster View Post
Good work, Progge, I will link this at SLC in the morning.
Nice to hear, thanks.
Originally Posted by MikeW View Post
Do you have a permanent online home planned for the finished work, when it's done?
Yes, but probably in German, and not before 2010.
Originally Posted by MikeW View Post
If not, I'll happily host it.
You can use every material I post here for whatever purpose. Just be sure to check the sources for yourself, I might make mistakes as every other person (-> kinda pointless to tell this to you, I know).
OK, back to RL for now.

Originally Posted by Swing Dangler View Post
The government via the 9/11 Commission has already provided the relevant information to you.

It is too bad you are slow to find this because you wouldn't have wasted the time or space cherry-picking quotes with this post:

http://www.scribd.com/doc/16411947/N...Hijack-Summary

This 9/11 Comission document already proves much of your summary wrong.
Thanks Swing, I know the above document. As you might have seen, I said that this is all work in progress - first things first, and for now I decided to start with NEADS statements. One of the next steps will be to look at exercises we know (e.g. the ones you refer to) and then to compare with NEADs statements, and then to evaluate.
I did a quantitative analysis of the above document (in German, at the present stage), and I have some comments on it, too; but I´d like to document the NEADS statements first, if you allow me to.
So, postponed is not abandoned. I´ll come back to this later, and I hope you have the patience to wait until then.

FAA on NORAD wargames before 9/11
So far I´m gone through the relevant stuff at NARA, and didn’t find any real significant additions at Scribd, except few comments from Duffy, Worcester and Stiers, echoing what was already said.
I hold the so far explored body of statements to be representative for the NEADS/NORAD/USAF side. I will cite all NORAD statements in the next posting to have them clustered for later reference.
This posting is meant to document FAA statements on the wargames issue, i.e. about participation in NORAD exercises and pre-9/11-contact to NORAD in general. I will not address FAA training independently from NORAD, and I will not address FAA-NORAD issues independently from wargames and pre-9/11-contacts (although some statements cover this, too).

ZNY:

Quote:
“She has participated as a controller with military aircraft out of McGuire Air Force Base and Warren Grove (military airspace just above Atlantic City). She wouldn't have known how to contact NEADS then, but they now have a direct line to Huntress Controll (NEADS).
Pre 9-11 she had never heard of anything like what happened that day.”
Lorraine Barrett, controller

“Battliglia was not aware of procedures to notify the military, or of procedures to ask for military assistance in the case of a hijack. His only training was to tell his supervisor in the case of a possible hijack. Bottiglia understood that the Traffic Management Unit (TMU) had responsibility to make decisions regarding procedure and contacts in the case of a hijack. At the working position his job was to relay information through command. […] Bottiglia noted to Commission staff that he has never been involved in a real life military intercept on a hij ack and has never participated in a simulation that would vector a military aircraft towards a target. He noted to Commission staff that he understands usually HUNTRESS and/or GIANT KILLER are contacted by the FAA to coordinate air traffic controls for the warning areas. He knew of the Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS), but did not know that the call sign HUNTRESS was for NEADS. He was not familiar with a number to call other than NEADS. He was not aware of how to contact NORAD.“
David Bottiglia, controller

“Kurz next stated, after 9-11, the FAA micromanaged all events that remotely resembled a threat to aircraft. The FAA does interact more frequently with the military .today. Kurz believes FAA involvement in military training and exercises prepares the FAA personnel to interact with the military in a real world event. After 9-11, FAA controllers regularly interacted with military personnel including fighter pilots during the maintenance of fighter caps over major urban areas and critical infrastructure. These efforts served to further improve and enhance the relationship between the FAA and the military.“
James Kurz, TMU coordinator

“McCloskey was not really familiar with the Northeast Air Defense Sector and what role it played. Prior to 9/11 he had never participated in any joint FAA/military exercise. Not post either. No idea of military ROE on hijacks. Unaware of escort and engage order officially, but assumes they have that authority now. FAA could have a role in vectoring military aircraft to target. After 9/11 military and FAA had a lot of "knee jerk" reactions. A lot of general aviation pilots strayed into prohibited areas post 9/11, and this involved military scrambles, which went smoothly. After 9/11 there was a NEADS hotline in the TMU. NEADS would ask "do you deem it necessary to scramble?"”
Peter McCloskey, TMU Traffic Management Coordinator

“Every year as part of refresher program have training on procedures for hijack. Does not know if there were every multiple hijack scenario testing. Prior 9111 no awareness of faa/military/dod exercises here at ZNY. Thought believes there have been some at Kennedy that were simulated as hijack on ground at airport. No knowledge of one with an airborne aircraft.”
Mike McCormick, Air Traffic Manager

“Prior to 9/11 Merced had no experience with a military scramble exercise, but had worked on military exercises in the past through a small piece of airspace at 14,000 feet and below. Merced experienced no difficulty coordinating the use of this airspace for military purposes, besides a few instances in which the military aircraft "spill out" of the airspace assigned to them. He had no practice with the military on hijacking procedures, but felt prepared to vector a military aircraft to a target.”
Mark Merced, controller

“Rosenberg noted to Commission staff that even prior to 9/11, the FAA had telephone lines to
Northeast Air Defense Sector (aka HUNTRESS), and Giant Killer [Commission staff believes Giant Killer is a Navy operation that controls the east coast low altitude airspace]. Rosenberg does not know who answered those lines prior to 9/11, nor does he know if those entities could authorize a fighter scramble.
Rosenberg continued by commenting that prior to 9/11 the FAA centers had very little awareness on how to communicate with the military. His only approach would have been to call the command center at Herndon, Virginia. He also noted that his knowledge of the location of air defense capabilities was limited to Otis AFB, Langley AFB and Atlantic City [Commission staff is aware that Atlantic City was not an active air defense base on 9/11]. Rosenberg further commented regarding military notification that he is not sure who had the direct responsibility for seeking military assistance, but he does not believe it is the responsibility of the center's military operations specialist (MOS).”
Martin Rosenberg, TMU supervisor

“Prior to and on 9-11, concerning NORAD and NEADS, Thumser had reasonable awareness and thought it would take 5 or 6 phone calls to get there and they probably would have called an air force base. He was not familiar with Dynamic Simulation training concerning hijackings and had no computer or other training for hijacking. Operations supervisors do not go through the same training as controllers. Controller were only to a) get information and pass it and b) do what thepilots ask to do.
There were very few hijacks pre-9-11 for a controller to respond to in the real world. He recalled no exercises or drills-there was very little emphasis and drills. He had no knowledge of any exercises or drills sponsored by the FAA or the military and certainly none with multiple hijacking events.”
Paul Thumser, Operations Supervisor
ZBW:

Quote:
“The procedure for active fighter scrambles was coordinated in the "Otis Cape TRACON Letter Agreement", and Bueno had experience in the early 1980s with a scramble to escort an airplane out of Kennedy Airport. Bueno has not participated in any tabletop scramble exercises. Regarding Operation Vigilant Guardian, a command post exercise that was scheduled to take place on September 11th, Bueno believes the military operation specialists may have been briefed, but that Boston Center was not involved beyond a NOP AR (no pass through air defense) order for the airspace involved in the exercise.
Bueno stated that the system "worked absolutely" on 9111. Boston Center was able to shut down the airspace on the east coast in a relatively timely manner, and were able to reroute and land planes successfully. Bueno stated that the Dynamic Simulation Training (DynSim) that ATCs are required to perform yearly serve their purpose, even though they are only simulation. He noted that in the past one of his DynSims might have involved vectoring an aircraft toward a hijack, but if so it is only a loose memory, but that he definitely has not exercised a NORAC hijack with no transponder. Nor had their been a hijack simulation or exercise that included FAA and NORAD co-participation.”
Dan Bueno, Traffic Management Supervisor

“Regarding the military, Hartling has had contact with military flights on a regular basis at the pilot to controller level, but has no knowledge of the relationship at the managerial level. Before 9/11 Hartling did not have much knowledge though on the warning areas and hot areas monitored by the military, and learned much later from 9/11 that Otis could deploy defensive strike fighters. Prior to 9/11 Hartling has no "intercept" training with the military, and was aware that NORAD controls much of the highest altitude airspace. He has had even more contact with military aircraft post-9/11 since military fighters are often running escort for VIP flights. Hartling does not think extensive FAA controller/military training is necessary since he is confident an FAA controller is able to vector an aircraft to a target, and can "break up" flights of between four to six aircraft. Hartling does note that part of his comfortable mindset regarding working with military flights does stem from his training as a controller in the Air Force.”
John Hartling, controller

“Kula was unaware that military radar could find altitude, and she was not involved with the fighter scramble from Otis Air Force Base. Kula did vaguely recall a scramble in the "early 80s" off the eastern coast, but "certainly nothing since 1985." Kula noted the Dynamic Simulation (DynSim) training programs usually have a hijack scenario every year, but those scenarios in her experience have never consisted of multiple hijacks, or in her experience of a single hijack that necessitates a vectored military fighter.“
Shirley Kula, Operations Supervisor

“Schippani roughly recalled what occurred at the watchdesk. [Staff Note: The watch desk is the hub of activity in the Center.] He remembers Dan Bueno attempted to contact Otis AFB for support, but Schippani did not recall the procedure for request a fighter scramble. He guessed that most likely pre-91l1 protocol for the request should have been from Boston Center to the Regional Operation Command (ROC), and the ROC would process the request. He confirmed that prior to 9/11 his understanding of NORAD/NEADS role in a hijacking scenario was cloudy.
To get the closest military asset, Schippani noted he would contact Giant Killer out of the Virginia Capes. Giant Killer monitors low to mid altitudes along the east coast. He had an understanding of how to contact them by phone. [Staff Note: Giant Killer performs the Air Traffic Controller function in designated military warning areas over the ocean. It is a Navy organization with its control center at Oceana, Virgina.] Schippani noted that from his experience Otis Air Force Base was an unknown factor, and he would not know how to contact NEADS (North Atlantic Air Defense). Prior to 9/11 Schippani noted that Air Traffic Controllers (ATC) had no input in the coordination over airspace with the military, unless there was an "aircraft transfer". Schippani was aware of the FAA Command Center at Herndon as a resource, but was not sure of its possible function on 9/11, or in a 9/11 type event.”
Jon Schippani, Operational Supervisor

“At NEADS, Scoggins has experience dealing with Bill Airs, of the Department of Defense (DoD). Scoggins is also aware of a new FAA representative at NEADS, currently a position filled by Steve Colbertson. […] Scoggins noted that he remembers an exercise in 1995 or 1996 that involved a military scramble to escort a hijacked aircraft, and the fighter was unable to intercept. He believes this exercise was joint FAA/military and was done through ATB200.”
Colin Scoggins, Military Operations Spezialist
ZID:

Quote:
“Povinelli knew of NORAD. In hindsight, she would have called NORAD on the morning of 9/11 for a scramble. This would have been coordinated with the front desk. Povinelli has covered the front desk on midnight shifts and could get a phone number for NORAD. Contact with NORAD is beyond Povinelli's rank, but she knows that communication is possible between the Air Traffic Control Centers and the military.”
Linda Povinelli, ATC Supervisor

“Weed noticed a vast difference in reaction to a NORDO situation. If the military were to loose radio contact with an aircraft, they would be on high alert and get ready to scramble. However, if the FAA were faced with a NORDO situation, which happens regularly, they would not panic, and try to regain contact with the aircraft. From Weed's experience, she believes the military did not expect a threat from within the country since none of their large scale training drills took this scenario into account.
Since her experience in Cheyenne Mt, Weed now thinks that the sense of urgency has changed for both the military and the FAA. There is now a relationship between NORAD and the FAA. Before 9/11, Weed would not have thought to call NORAD in the event of a hijack; she would have notified her supervisor, John Thomas, who would have made further notifications.“
Sally Weed, Operations Support Manager
ZOB:

Quote:
“Dukeman described the mil operations position as the coordinator for the airspace around Cleveland Center with the military. "When the military bases want to do their exercises you have to coordinate with the space involved in the release." The person in the military operations position does not actually working any live traffic.
Dukeman said that Selfridge, a military air base, uses air space around the Flint Area. Pittsburg Air National Guard uses an area over Bradford, PA for refueling, etc. The military uses the air space on a daily basis for exercises. He would copy down the information on the exercise, request a time frame from the military contact, and then call that facility requesting the space back and confirm the use of the particular air space. Prior to 9-11, he worked on coordinating use of airspace with Huntress. He does not remember what is in the Military Operations Manual or in any of the other materials provided to him about hijacking, and who to call in the event of one. To his knowledge, there was nothing he was supposed to do in the role of Military Operations Specialist in the TMU in the event of a hijacking. He does not know if he was supposed to call the military. He wouldn't know who to call. There were certain military facilities he came into contact with through his job as coordinator, but he received no training on who to contact in the event of a crisis.”
David Dukeman, Military Operations Specialist

“He thought that it was certainly not clear whose authority it was to call fighters. CC didn't think they had the authority. No one knew who had the authority to get military action started.“
Mark Evans, Supervisor of the Traffic Management Coordinators

“HE develops procedures that are used operationally. He negotiated with his military contacts on training areas (special use airspace) that they wanted to use for routine activities.
Prior to 9/11, he worked with Bill Ayers, his NORAD counterpart. They would communicate regarding changes in the air space (size and shape), on topics such as .Y~stricted air space, and also any problems that may arise with military air craft in Cleveland Center. On average, he would talk to Bill every week if issues were pending. They were only in touch when there was a topic at hand or a problem. It was his understanding that in the event of a hijacking, NORAD would request vectors to the aircraft and they would put a fighter in position behind the airplane to follow it in. He never experienced this situation.
Kerinko did not remember any changes to hijacking policy with regard to the FAA or the military during his time at Cleveland Center. […] He said there haven't been too many changes at the Center since 9-11. Now, the military handbook is signed off on by DOD and FAA. It was updated to cover hijack and scramble procedures; developed more air space for the military's use; the military exercises are much more frequent and FAA involvement has increasingly participated in military exercises.“
Tom Kerinko, Military Operations Spezialist

“Relationship between FAA and NORAD was "less direct" than it is today. What we need is to be able to make one call in the event of a hijack. Don't have the time to make multiple calls, especially when the plane is traversing airspaces. Kettel said he used to deal with NORAD when planning missions; in terms of blocking air space for them and preplanning their route. Kettel thinks Cleveland Center was unable to contact NORAD directly on 9-11, but he thinks they were on the phone bridge.”
Richard Kettel, Air Traffic Manager

“On September 10, 2001, Wernica thought that in the event of a hijacking the controller handling the plane was to tell the supervisor of the area who in tum told the manager. Then the manager would call the regional operations center. She does not know what NORAD is; so she probably would have called the Command Center, too.
The management manual , known as 7210.3, would have provided her with directions. She knew of a military manual but she was not familiar with it before 9-11. "Now the military is part of our world," she said. […] She did not know what sort of communication existed between FAA and NORAD prior to 9-11. She had never heard ofNEADS. An example she offered of normal communications with NORAD was: "when a communist aircraft flies through the airspace, the Center has to call Huntress to give the coordinates."
Wernica said, "You're a controller one day, a supervisor, an operations manager the next. Training for these different positions is nonexistent." As Operations Manager, she received no additional training specific to a crisis situation.”
Kim Wernica, controller

“When asked about NORAD, he said he was aware of it. He knew it was at Cheyenne Mountain and said that he thought is was the "the central command to safeguard all military planes." His experience before 9-11 led him to believe that the military, in the event of a hijack, would "put a tail on the hijack to intercept them." He also thought that the watch commander at the Center would have had direct access to NORAD.“
John Werth, controller
I think this pretty much illustrates that the FAA played no significant role in NORAD wargames before 9/11, echoing the NEADS statements.

Source

NORAD/Military on NORAD wargames before 9/11
This is what NORAD employees told about wargames before 9/11.

(i) Concerning FAA participation:

Quote:
„Aires noted that NEADS has worked with individual FAA En Route Centers on exercises, but not with any national FAA entities. Aires noted that all the military exercises would be in special use airspace. He noted that all the FAA would do was control an aircraft until it reached the military airspace.“
Bill Aires, National Airspace Manager for the Federal Aviation Administration

“They had a cell that would play the FAA in the exercise.”
Dawne Deskins, Lt. Col.

“The first tool Powell would refer to in the case of a hijack would be the hijack checklist. The checklist is for both the Senior Director and the Technician. They coordinate the information they receive with the FAA (Federal Aviation Administration).“
Jeremy Powell, Lt.

“Speicher informed Commission staff that NEADS locally simulated exercises are not coordinated with the actual FAA, but instead NEADS personnel act as the FAA. He continued and noted that in a live exercise there may be some "real" coordination, but most of the live flight exercises took place in the Warning Areas off the coast. There might have been actual participation from the FAA as they controlled aircraft to enter the airspace in which the exercise took place, but that would be the extent of the participation [Commission staff notes that this level of participation is far from substantial, and would not require a high level of inter-agency familiarization]. […] He noted in live flight exercises there might be coordination with the FAA involving receiving a "trusted agent" response from the FAA, but more than likely it was through a simulated FAA operator.”
Clark Speicher, Col., NEADS Vice Commander

“He stated that other agencies - such as the FAA - may have been involved in a NORAD exercise prior to 9/11 at the ARTCC level, but not at the national level. The possible exception to this that he could recall was the Positive Force exercise series, which is a CJCS multi-agency exercise with national players.“
Ken Merchant, Exercise Design Manager for NORAD

“Eberhart commented that prior to 9/11 there was not much interest between the FAA and NORAD to share in exercises. The FAA priority was to serve the economic needs of the air traffic, whereas NORAD at times would be seen by the FAA as infringing on this priority by the use of space in exercises“
Ed Eberhart, Commander in Chief NORAD)

„They at times had joint exercises with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). It depended on the type of exercise as to whether actual FAA employees were involved. Dooley noted to Commission staff that prior to 9/11 she had "worked" the "tail end" of a hijack, but has no recollection of it.”
Huntress ID, Dooley, MSgt.
(ii) Concerning simulated or real planes:

Quote:
“A typical design would include course deviation in which the hijacker forces the pilot to fly to a designated landing point. They would not do these hijacks exercises real world.”
Dawne Deskins, Lt. Col.

“According to Powell, some hijacking practice has involved scenarios in which the hijacked flight is incoming from overseas. One, in Powell's recollection, involved a flight coming out of Canada. Powell noted that mostly these exercises are done in simulation. There were various live exercises; but none that involved hijacks. Powell commented that such live exercises would be extremely difficult to run.”
Jeremy Powell, Lt.

“Speicher noted that in a simulated exercise whether or not a fighter made and completed its intercept would not be a concern at NEADS. The exercise would be considered complete once all of NEADS protocol and procedures were practiced. Speicher noted that he has practiced scenarios, both live and simulated, in which a change in Rules of Engagement (ROE) is passed to pilots. Speicher does not recall any exercises or real world situations in which NEADS was called upon to protect the National Capital Region.”
Clarke Speicher, Col., NEADS Vice Commander
(iii) Concerning hijack exercises:

Quote:
“Bianchi noted that there were hijack suicide exercises but that those aircraft would be intercepted while over water.”
Steve Bianchi, Sgt.

“A typical design would include course deviation in which the hijacker forces the pilot to fly to a designated landing point. They would not do these hijacks exercises real world. […] Deskins noted that there really were not the assets to do a large scale real world exercise to practice hijack response. […] She noted that there are exercised scenarios in which an aircraft is hijacked in France. In this exercise there is a long "lead in" time that involves receiving intelligence and having the crews practice using their hijack checklist. Ifit is a "straight" hijack scenario then it does not involve identification because the aircraft is already identified as hijacked. She states that she does not have a firm recollection of the details of these exercises. ”
Dawne Deskins, Lt. Col.

“Marr noted he participated once with a live exercise for a hijack headed north from St. Louis in the south. They attempted to scramble aircraft internally in this exercise, and Marr commented that it did not work very well.”
Robert Marr, Commander Col.

“He noted that NEADS has practiced scenarios that involved passing the shadow of hijacked flights over Canadian airspace.”
Robert Marr, Commander Col.

“McCain worked a hijacked plane in the Lufthansa aircraft event. It was intercepted and followed by Canadian F18s, and F16s from Burlington escorted the flight at the US coast. NEADS designated the flight a "Special 15", and the flight continued to JFK Airport. McCain was an ill Tech at the time. In this circumstance, all the questions that the ill Tech team needed to answer were asked and answered. It was a "very easy scenario", since they exercised and drilled for this type of event on a weekly basis.
They would have a Fertile (Northeast generated) RICE (large scale - more than seven targets - exercise). The scenario would be varied from over land to over water.”
Joe McCain, MSgt.

“According to Powell, pre-9/11 training in respect to hijacked planes was geared towards NEADS' role as a response agency; it was trained for and a check list for what needed to be done was sequenced. There is an actual SD/SDT Checklist #6 that has a checklist of hijacking procedures. A different checklist exists for scrambling fighters from separate air force bases.
The first tool Powell would refer to in the case of a hijack would be the hijack checklist. The checklist is for both the Senior Director and the Technician. They coordinate the information they receive with the FAA (Federal Aviation Administration). […] According to Powell, some hijacking practice has involved scenarios in which the hijacked flight is incoming from overseas. One, in Powell's recollection, involved a flight coming out of Canada.“
Jeremy Powell, Lt.

“Hijack exercises were conducted several times a year as far as Sanderson recalls; though he cannot remember specific scenarios.”
Ian Sanderson, Col.

“Hijacking scenarios that he conceived were primarily personal views; there was no substantive intelligence.“
Mark Stuart, Lt. Col.

“Prior to 9/11 Richmond dealt with hijack training that postulated the "typical" hijack scenario. The primary responsibility of an AST in that circumstance would be to maintain the track of the aircraft.”
Jeffrey LaMarche, TSgt. & Jeffrey Richmond, TSgt.

“Mr. Merchant cannot remember a time in the last 33 years when NORAD has NOT run a hijack exercise, but stated that they were always resolved peacefully, that is, NORAD did not project shooting down a hijacked aircraft.”
Ken Merchant, Exercise Designs Manager for NORAD

“McKinley referred to the eighties as the "decade of hijacks." He noted that fighters would perform their intercept, identify, and escort the aircraft to a safe landing with routine proficiency.“
Craig McKinley, Maj. General

“Del Toro noted that almost every exercise was built to respond to some type of general aviation event, and in large scale multi-day training exercises there would often be a hijack scenario.
Millovich commented that "at one point" almost every scenario they exercised included a hijack;“
Jim Millovich, Maj., & Robert DelToro, Maj.

“His understanding of the hijack role was to respond to the potential hijack by determining the true nature of the aircraft distress, and thereafter either covertly tailing the aircraft or making the escort presence 'known, depending on the circumstance.”
Timothy Duffy, Lt. Col.

“The crew chiefs both agreed that the hijack exercises, both those prior to and those post 9/11, do not inform and have not changed their responsibilities towards the operation of a fighter scramble. Stiers noted that if a scramble order is given the fighters launch as quickly as they would to investigate "a tuna boat" as they would to intercept a hijacked aircraft. This can be explained by the fact that the reason for a scramble is rarely given to the crew chiefs, and is often not given to the pilots until after they are already airborne. This ensures that the on-ground system launches the military aspect at the same intense pace no matter what the circumstance. Ng note that on 9/11 there was an exception since Major Nash and Lt. Col. Duffy had heard of the hijack from the Operations Desk due to the call to the SoF desk from Cape TRACON. Stiers noted that the base does have "spade" exercises with a designated target. These non-real world events are not, in an operations sense, the prevue of the crew chiefs. Some exercises have been performed to simulate the reaction to an in air situation involving an aircraft that is in distress for reasons other than hijack. In those exercises the
fighters are scrambled and help guide the participating aircraft to an airport for an emergency landing.“
Wing Ng & Stiers, 102th Fighter Wing Chiefs
(iv) Concerning suicide exercises:

Quote:
“Bianchi noted that there were hijack suicide exercises but that those aircraft would be intercepted while over water. Bianchi noted that in these training episodes the suicide bombers were threatening to use a bomb to destroy the aircraft, and that these were not threats on infrastructure.“
Steve Bianchi, Sgt.

„At this point in the interview Deskins noted to Commission staff that she does believe NEADS exercised scenarios in which a terrorist would take a "small airplane that would run into something", or was full of chemicals, or would be a ground event.”
Dawne Deskins, Lt. Col.

“He envisioned terrorists taking over planes and piloting them at the last possible moment as they crashed.“
Mark Stuart, Lt. Col.

„Millovich commented that "at one point" almost every scenario they exercised included a hijack; but never in his knowledge was a scenario of a suicide hijack event.
Del Toro explained that there was once a testing of a force protection ground-based air defense capability that built into an exercise including a general aviation threat to the outheast Air Defense Sector (SEADS), but that event was built to test the force protection capacity of the base.“
Jim Millovich, Maj., & Robert DelToro, Maj.
(v) Concerning planes being used as weapon:

Quote:
“She recalled an exercise in which an aircraft was used to release chemicals, but not a hijacked plane. She does not remember participating in an exercise in which a hijacked aircraft crashed into infrastructure. […] At this point in the interview Deskins noted to Commission staff that she does believe NEADS exercised scenarios in which a terrorist would take a "small airplane that would run into something", or was full of chemicals, or would be a ground event.”
Dawne Deskins, Lt. Col.

“He can not specifically remember […] a scenario in which an airplane would be used as a weapon.”
Ian Sanderson, Col.

“Speicher noted there is a "liability" period before the Battle Cab staff forms for twenty- four hour operations when an exercise is about to begin. He continued and noted that there is a distinction in exercise objectives between having weapons "on board" an aircraft and "using the aircraft" as a weapon.”
Clark Speicher, Col.

“Documents on his hard drive will substantiate that on March 24, 1999 Stuart drafted a briefing on the threat of terrorist use of aircraft to crash into buildings. He briefed, over time in 1999, 2000 and 2001 the logical progression that linked hijackings to the use of explosives in vehicles [probable reference to Embassy bombings] and then, logically, to the use of aircraft. He recalled briefing his scenario at annual intelligence conferences at both CONR and NORAD. At CONR the receiving official was Col Tom Glenn, now retired; at NORAD it was the J2, Navy Captain Kuhn. […] Specifically, Stuart said we should ask Col Glenn what happened to Lt Col Stuart's concerns on terrorist activity, e. g. using planes as weapons.”
Mark Stuart, Lt. Col.

“Prior to 9/11 Richmond dealt with hijack training that postulated the "typical" hijack scenario. The primary responsibility of an AST in that circumstance would be to maintain the track of the aircraft. They had never been trained in circumstance that the plane would be hijacked and used as a weapon.”
Jeffrey LaMarche, TSgt., & Jeffrey Richmond, TSgt.

„McKinley noted that if exercises did take place that can be compared to the 9/11 hijack attacks then there were no intelligence warnings that drove these exercises. He noted that "the exercise kids probably put on their creative hats" and developed interesting scenarios to test the operations capabilities of their sectors but there was no indication that the scenarios paralleled a credible threat.
McKinley noted that to his knowledge before he left for the Pentagon there were no 9/11 type scenarios built into their exercises. The hijack scenarios that were exercised involved a successful escort to landing and negotiation with the hijackers.”
Craig McKinley, Maj. General

„Millovich commented that "at one point" almost every scenario they exercised included a hijack; but never in his knowledge was a scenario of a suicide hijack event.
Del Toro explained that there was once a testing of a force protection ground-based air defense capability that built into an exercise including a general aviation threat to the outheast Air Defense Sector (SEADS), but that event was built to test the force protection capacity of the base.“
Jim Millovich, Maj., & Robert DelToro, Maj.

“Hawley mentioned the pre-inaugural tabletop exercises, including exercises regarding the use of planes as a weapon. Hawley noted that this issue was raised by Lee Hamilton with Mike Canavan during the Commission's hearing. Hawley thought that in December 2000 some scenarios that were "pretty damn close to 9-11 plot" were practiced. Canavan was definitely in charge of that. Hawley said that one of the scenarios may have had something to do with a chartered flight out of Ohio that had turned the transponder off. Mike Wiechert ran a lot of these exercises. It really forced you to think outside the box. The topic was in the FAA's thoughts, the discussions.”
John Hawley, TSA, former FAA

„Duffy noted that he definitively never heard of a hijack scenario in which terrorists would use a plane as a weapon.”
Timothy Duffy, Lt. Col.

“According to Worcester, and evidenced by the contents of the Alert Package, hijacking scenarios pre-9/ll were classically discussed and trained for within air defense planning, but Worcester also noted that these plans did not address a 9/11 type scenario. Normally the response would entail an escort procedure. Worcester commented regarding the purpose for a fighter escort of a hijacked aircraft that military personnel "always joked that it was plotting the wreckage ... you would mark the debris circle ... the Egyptian air loss comes to mind similarly the TWA Air crash."“
Paul Worcester, Col.

(vi) Concerning the possibility of multiple hijackings:

“She does not personally recall the design of a hijack with multiple hijacks or terrorist take over.”
Dawne Deskins, Lt. Col.

“Multiple hijack scenarios were not addressed in the training.“
Joe McCain, MSgt.

“He can not specifically remember […] a scenario that involve multiple hijacks”
Ian Sanderson, Col.

“He never imagined multiple hijackings in any scenario.”
Mark Stuart, Lt. Col.
(vii) Concerning exercises involving planes from and in the interior:

Quote:
“Bianchi does not recall any training exercises that were planned to address an air threat to the National Capital Area that involved an intercept of an aircraft after it crossed into national land borders. Bianchi noted that there were hijack suicide exercises but that those aircraft would be intercepted while over water.“
Steve Bianchi, Sgt.

“Marr noted he participated once with a live exercise for a hijack headed north from St. Louis in the south. They attempted to scramble aircraft internally in this exercise, and Marr commented that it did not work very well.”
Robert Marr, Commander Col.

“Marr noted that he did not recall any specific exercises that included direct defense of the National Capital Area. He noted that NEADS and NORAD had training and scenarios that called for protection of large scale areas.”
Robert Marr, Commander Col.

“"Occasionally" in exercises aircrafts take off internally (from US over-land airspace). Often the aircraft would leave from Chicago, and instead of going where it was flight planned, would go to Toronto.”
Joe McCain, MSgt.

“He can not specifically remember a scenario practiced of a hijack within US airspace;”
Ian Sanderson, Col.

“Speicher does not recall any exercises or real world situations in which NEADS was called upon to protect the National Capital Region.”
Clark Speicher, Col.

„In all cases he briefed that a hijacking would originate overseas, inbound to the U.S. He never imagined it could happen inside the U.S. Stuart thought that security vulnerabilities overseas made it far more likely that hijackings would come from without.”
Mark Stuart, Lt. Col.

“Prior to 9/11 NORAD did not run an exercise involving a hijacking over the National Capital Region (NCR), but there were events within exercises that involved the NCR.”
Ken Merchant, Exercise Designs Manager for NORAD

„Scott commented that despite the notice of the terrorist events that were analyzed in the RAM report they still looked at the NORAD mission as a direct mission to protect the continental United States (CONUS) from external threats, and that it was a firm and Constitutionally sound line between what was a NORAD responsibility and what was a FBI/law enforcement responsibility.
He also commented that the exercises that accounted for threats from aircraft headed from outside CONUS that entered into CONUS qualified as a NORAD responsibility strictly because threats that originate outside CONUS are DoD events. He explained that hijackings prior to 9/11 were not scene as a national emergency, and that once hijackings became a national emergency the DoD took some responsibility for the response.“
William Scott, Col.

„Huntress ID noted to Commission staff that they have participated in hijack training scenarios - mostly for flights inbound from overseas - but had never exercised a hijack overland. The procedure for response that they were familiar with in the case of a hijack entailed establishing a visual identification of the target by a fighter. The time they had to do so would depend on whether or not the target was squawking. If there are multiple mode 3s, or ifit was a primary target only, then the time frame to establish a positive identification would be complicated. If the flight is over water the time limit is roughly 2 minutes to 5 minutes once the flight passes the "core line" (a specific distance from the coast at which the priority of the event is escalated). There is no time limit overland. The scenarios practiced before 9/11 most frequently that involved finding an aircraft that was a primary target were practiced; but most of those scenarios would be over water. Even in the drug interdiction context they were not allowed to take military action with anything over domestic airspace.“
Huntress ID, Dooley, MSgt.
(viii) Concerning loss of transponder signal:

Quote:
“McCain states to his knowledge it was never exercised that the target would stop squeaking its transponder.“
Joe McCain, MSgt.

“He noted that prior to September 11, 2001 (9/11) they practiced locating primary targets inbound as live flights over water. But a live flight over land would be too difficult to coordinate.“
Clark Speicher, Col.

„Huntress ID noted to Commission staff that they have participated in hijack training scenarios - mostly for flights inbound from overseas - but had never exercised a hijack overland. The procedure for response that they were familiar with in the case of a hijack entailed establishing a visual identification of the target by a fighter. The time they had to do so would depend on whether or not the target was squawking. If there are multiple mode 3s, or if it was a primary target only, then the time frame to establish a positive identification would be complicated. If the flight is over water the time limit is roughly 2 minutes to 5 minutes once the flight passes the "core line" (a specific distance from the coast at which the priority of the event is escalated). There is no time limit overland. The scenarios practiced before 9/11 most frequently that involved finding an aircraft that was a primary target were practiced; but most of those scenarios would be over water. Even in the drug interdiction context they were not allowed to take military action with anything over domestic airspace.”
Huntress ID, Dooley, MSgt.
Summarization:

(i) NORAD exercises either didn’t involve any FAA facilities at all, but a FAA cell which was played by NORAD employees, or involved individual FAA centers. The latter would be rare, and there was no FAA participation on a national level.
(ii) Live Fly hijack exercises were rare, if they happened at all.
(iii) Hijack exercises are standard, routine etc.
(iv) Suicide exercises were rare. Bianchi remembers a blow-up threat; Deskins has an unsure memory about a plane-as-weapon-like or suicide or crash exercise.
(v) Plane-as-weapon exercises are denied by most NORAD people. They never participated in one and they believe that no such exercises took place. Stuart claims he anticipated such events and briefed about them, Hawley thinks that in the FAA it was hold to be a real possibility, too. The only one remembering a plane-as-weapon exercise is Deskins with the unsure memory mentioned in (iv).
(vi) No multiple hijack events were practiced.
(vii) Most scenarios would be over water. No defense scenario took place in the National Capital Area. Marr remembers a hijacking scenario in the interior US, but it went bad.
(viii) Loss of transponder was practiced, but if, then mostly/always over water.

Source

Originally Posted by bill smith View Post
http://nl.youtube.com/watch?v=J36k8r...com/node/19181 Call 1
Link broken.
Originally Posted by bill smith View Post
http://nl.youtube.com/watch?v=JgjnTq...com/node/19181 Call 2
Link broken.
Originally Posted by bill smith View Post
http://nl.youtube.com/watch?v=EkGBE0...com/node/19181 Call 3
Link broken.
Originally Posted by bill smith View Post
This 4th NEADS tape is also very interesting not to say revealing. Why do they need to be careful what they say ?
You seem to suggest you know the answer, why don’t you give it to us?
I for my part found even more revealing evidence! DRM1 DAT2 Channel 2 MCC Op, min1:04:25, a guy says “Hey, just remember everything you say is being recorded.“
Isn’t that interesting, not to say revealing?
Unfortunately, it is neither the one nor the other, since this comment is a reaction to Nasypany railing “I’m gonna choke that guy.“
And so the comment you refer to may have one of many different reasons, too, while none of us can say which one’s the right. And you should know this, because you’ve been told about it, twice.
Therefore, your evidence “reveals” exactly nothing, and isn’t even interesting.

Originally Posted by bill smith View Post
See how ridiculously calm they all are ?
Yawn. I wonder if you take yourself seriously while presenting such, um, evidence.
Apart from that, please post your objections in the appropriate threads.

NORAD hijacking scenarios 1998-9/11, Introductory comments
Back again. Next I’ll try to take a look at this document:
http://www.scribd.com/doc/16411947/N...Hijack-Summary

A few comments to put this document and my comments on it in perspective:
It is not a NORAD document. It was prepared by 9/11 commission staffer Miles Kara (visit his excellent website here) before the commission’s Team 8 staff travelled to NORAD HQ. NORAD had forwarded a bunch of documents about wargames which had taken place before 9/11, and Mr. Kara selected interesting features.
Therefore, this document is a selection, twice:
1. It presents hijacking scenarios only, which were part of larger scaled exercises.
2. It presents these hijacking scenarios in an incomplete fashion. The whole purpose of an exercise might have been very different from what the work paper from Mr. Kara indicates, and in some cases it was indeed very different, i.e. the snippet this documents presents were just by-the-way-injects, or for some NORAD members only etc. (detailed examples will be given below).
The primary source materials for this are NORAD papers on their exercises. These papers are not available at the moment, even not to Mr. Kara.

Re: “Truthers” vs. “debunkers” on wargames. AFAIK, truthers often state that NORAD/DoD/US-Government anticipated much more than the 9/11 commission outlined with the “failure of imagination” comment, and the NORAD people themselves stated. In this dissent, truthers - in some way - have an advantage with Mr. Kara’s wargames document, because of its 9/11-related selection of exercise features, and the missing context to the selection. To rebuild the context, the primary source material should be checked someday. Before this happens, this document does not tell us whether the 9/11 commission or NORAD got it right or not.
Consequently, this document - at the present stage and without knowledge of the primary source material - should not be treated as an equivalent to what NORAD members said they hold to be realistic threats - to check their claims, so to speak. It’s an addendum, at the most.

I’ll go through this document in two steps. First step will be a pure quantitative analysis. The purpose of this analysis is first to isolate a body of interesting exercises for future qualitative review, and second to put the NORAD wargames in perspective. For this purpose, I’m using the eight-feature framework which I already established in my first posting in this thread. The quantitative analysis will be somewhat over the top, since it is based on an incomplete data set. Bear this in mind while reading.
Second step will be qualitative analysis. I’ll evaluate the selected body of interesting exercises, taking as a basis for comparison the comments from the people at NORAD. I give the NORAD statements a slightly higher value for the sake of producing conclusions, and everyone is invited to switch values. I’ll sort of guess in many cases, and again everyone is invited to guess otherwise – but remember: Don’t forget what you’re doing, it’s just guessing. The qualitative analysis also is intended to differ between exercise features which can be easily explained in terms of what NORAD told, and exercises about which we need more information.
On occasion, I’ll refer to this MFR, which is not included in the above compilation of NORAD statements (my bad, I just forgot it). The MFR contains Ken Merchant’s and Paul Goddard’s comments on some of the wargames from Mr. Kara’s work paper, and is different from the Ken Merchant MFR on the NARA website.
As the Exercise Design Manager, Ken Merchant knows more about NORAD exercises than anyone else. Everyone here should read the interviews with him, if any. I’ll refer to the particular MFR at scribd.com as “Paul Goddard, Maj., & Ken Merchant, Exercise Design Manager for NORAD”.
All citations will be from the work paper of Mr. Kara, although stated otherwise.
This low level analysis effort, again, will be about wargames before 9/11. For wargames on 9/11, enjoy this piece from gumboot.

NORAD hijacking scenarios 1998-9/11, Quantitative Review
1. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
1.1 MATERIAL & METHOD

NORAD hijacking scenarios between 1998 and 2001.

Before, I presented eight selected features of the situation NORAD had to react to on 9/11:
(i) FAA participation
(ii) No simulated, but real planes
(iii) Hijack mission
(iv) Suicide mission
(v) Plane being used as weapon
(vi) Multiple hijackings
(vii) Planes from the interior and in the interior
(viii) No transponder signal
I will apply these features to the scenarios presented in the above document.
Note 1: With respect to (i), it’s not clear whether there was a real FAA participation or a staged FAA participation. I won’t differ between both in quantitative analysis.
Note 2: I count every bomb threat as (iv).
Note 3: I do not differ between inside-outside and inside-inside, both counts as (vii).
Note 4: I write “perhaps” in some cases because of ambiguity with respect to 9/11; e.g.: Does blowing up a plane over NYC mean using the plane as a weapon? In some broad sense yes, but it’s nonetheless not the 9/11 case. The ambiguous cases are cited below*, and will be discussed later. Every ambiguous case counts as ½ case for the sake of quantitative analysis.

1.2 APPLICATION
10/25/1998, Vigilant Guardian 99, Deviation HIJCK: (i), (iii)
10/25/1998, Vigilant Guardian 99, HIJACK A/C: (i), (iii)
10/26/1998: Vigilant Guardian 99, HIJACK HK to LAX: (i), (iii), (iv), (v)
10/27/1998, Vigilant Guardian 99, HIJACK Europe to East Coast: (i), (iii)
10/27/1998: Vigilant Guardian 99, HIJACK JUNTA JUBBA: (i), (iii)
1/21/1999: Coronet White 99, Live AST Hijack from JFK to Miami: (i), (ii), (iii), (vii)
1/22/1999: Coronet White 99, Hijack Miami to Oklahoma City: (iii), (vii)
1/23/1999: Coronet White 99, Hijack San Diego to Anchorage: (iii), (vii)
4/11/1999: Amazon Condor 00-1, Hijack diverted to unknown US location: perhaps (i), (iii)
9/30/1999: VFFI 99-1, Hijacked Aircraft with Demands: (iii), (iv)
10/21/1999: Amazon Condor 00-1, Hijack with WMD on board: (iii)
2/16/2000: Fencing Indian 00-2, Hijacked Aircraft with WMD (Sarin) on board: (iii), (iv), perhaps (v)
4/12/2000: VO 00, HIJACK DAL: (i), (iii)
4/14/2000: Amalgam Warrior 00-2, Hijack by an armed crew member: (iii), (vii)
4/16/2000: VO 00, HIJACK seized by terrorists: (iii), (viii)
4/19/2000: VO 00, Crop Custer Chemical Incident: (iii), (vii)
10/20/2000: Vigilant Guardian I, HIJACK London to Cairo: (i), (iii)
10/21/2000: Vigilant Guardian I, HIJACK WADS/CANR/ANR: (i), (iii)
6/2/2001: Amalgam Virgo 01-02, Suicide Mission: (iii), (iv), (v), (vii)
9/6/2001: Vigilant Guardian I, ANR ROE HIJACK 1/6: (i), (iii)
9/6/2001: Vigilant Guardian I, ANR ROE HIJACK 2/6: (i), (iii)
9/6/2001: Vigilant Guardian I, ANR ROE HIJACK 3/6: (i), (iii)
9/6/2001: Vigilant Guardian I, HIJACK of KAL 357 1/6: (iii), (iv)
9/6/2001: Vigilant Guardian I, HIJACK of KAL 357 2/6: (iii)
9/6/2001: Vigilant Guardian I, HIJACK of KAL 357 3/6: (iii)
9/6/2001: Vigilant Guardian I, HIJACK of KAL 357 4/6: (iii)
9/9/2001: Vigilant Guardian I, Hijack: (iii), (iv), perhaps (v)
9/10/2001: Vigilant Guardian I, Special 23-Hijack (Cuba): (i), (iii)

I bolded some exercises which might be of particular interest for their sheer volume of features.

1.3 ANALYSIS
There are at least three methods of counting the exercises:
Count the trained scenarios as one per line, which would be 28**. Best method, IMO, because names don’t matter, scenarios do.
However, I will also count the scenarios by name, which would be 12*** or 10****; 12 if you count every disruption with another scenario/exercise (or multiple other scenarios/scenarios) as the end of the old scenario, and 10 if you don’t and just go by name.

1.3.1 COUNTED AS 28
Analysis of features:
14 out of 28 for (i) = FAA participation: 50%
1 out of 28 for (ii) = Live Fly exercise: 3.57%
5 out of 28 for (iv) = Suicide: 17.85%
3 out of 28 for (v) = Plane as Weapon: 10.7%
0 out of 28 for (vi) = Multiple hijackings: 0%
6 out of 28 for (vii) = Planes from/in the interior: 21.4%
1 out of 28 for (viii) = Primary signal only: 3.57%

Numerical analysis:
28 out of 28 scenarios held at least one of the eight 9/11 features: 100%
25 out of 28 scenarios held at least two of the eight 9/11 features: 89%.
3.5 out of 28 scenarios held at least three of the eight 9/11 features: 12.5%
3 out of 28 scenarios held at least four of the eight 9/11 features: 10.71%
0 out of 28 scenarios held at least five of the eight 9/11 features: 0%
0 out of 28 scenarios held at least six of the eight 9/11 features: 0%
0 out of 28 scenarios held at least seven of the eight 9/11 features: 0%
0 out of 28 scenarios held all eight 9/11 features: 0%.

Bolded are the ones which should be subject of further review in the future.

1.3.2 COUNTED AS 12
Analysis of features:
Note 5: Every hit within an accumulation of different scenarios under one name counts as a hit for the whole accumulation.

6 out of 12 for (i) = FAA participation: 50%
1 out of 12 for (ii) = Live Fly exercise: 8.3%
5 out of 12 for (iv) = Suicide Mission: 41.6%
3 out of 12 for (v) = Plane as Weapon: 25%
0 out of 12 for (vi) = Multiple hijackings: 0%
4 out of 12 for (vii) = Planes from/in the interior: 33.3%
1 out of 12 for (viii) = Primary signal only: 8.3%

Numerical analysis:
Note 6: The highest number within an accumulation will be counted as a hit for the whole accumulation.

12 out of 12 scenarios held at least one of the eight 9/11 features: 100%
11 out of 12 scenarios held at least two of the eight 9/11 features: 91.6%
3.5 out of 12 scenarios held at least three of the eight 9/11 features: 12.5%
3 out of 12 scenarios held at least four of the eight 9/11 features: 10.71%
0 out of 12 scenarios held at least five of the eight 9/11 features: 0%
0 out of 12 scenarios held at least six of the eight 9/11 features: 0%
0 out of 12 scenarios held at least seven of the eight 9/11 features: 0%
0 out of 12 scenarios held all of the eight 9/11 features: 0%

Bolded are the ones which should be subject of further review in the future.

1.3.3 COUNTED AS 10
Analysis of features:
Note 7: Every hit within an accumulation of different scenarios under one name counts as a hit for the whole accumulation.

6 out of 10 for (i) = FAA participation: 60%
1 out of 10 for (ii) = Live Fly exercise: 10%
5 out of 10 for (iv) = Suicide Mission: 50%
3 out of 10 for (v) = Plane as Weapon: 30%
0 out of 8 for (vi) = Multiple Hijackings: 0%
4 out of 10 for (vii) = Planes from/in the interior: 40%
1 out of 10 for (viii) = Primary signal only: 10%

Numerical analysis:
Note 8: The highest number within an accumulation will be counted as a hit for the whole accumulation.

10 out of 10 scenarios held at least one of the eight 9/11 features: 100%
9 out of 10 scenarios held at least two of the eight 9/11 features: 90%
4 out of 10 scenarios held at least three of the eight 9/11 features: 40%
3 out of 10 scenarios held at least four of the eight 9/11 features: 30%
0 out of 10 scenarios held at least five of the eight 9/11 features: 0%
0 out of 10 scenarios held at least six of the eight 9/11 features: 0%
0 out of 10 scenarios held at least seven of the eight 9/11 features: 0%
0 out of 10 scenarios held all of the eight 9/11 features: 0%

Bolded are the ones which should be subject of further review in the future.


1.4 FIRST RESULTS
1.4.1 ANALYSIS OF FEATURES
Whatever method of counting you choose:
- No anticipation of multiple plane hijackings between 1998 and 9/11.
- Almost no anticipation of primary only hijackings between 1998 and 9/11.
- Almost no Live Fly hijacking scenarios between 1998 and 9/11.

On the other hand:
- Some degree of anticipation of plane-as-weapon or plane-as-weapon-like events. Needs to be carefully evaluated and then compared to the statements from NEADS personnel.
- Some degree of anticipation of interior US happenings. Needs to be carefully compared to the statements from NEADS personnel.
- Big degree of FAA participation (50%-60%), at least staged. Needs to be carefully compared to the statements from NEADS personnel.
- Some degree of suicide missions, usually as a bomb-on-board/blow-up threat.

1.4.2 NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
Whatever method of counting you choose:
- No matches above half of the 9/11 features
- Most matches share only two of the 9/11 features, usually hijacking and FAA participation.

The three/four-matches should be subject to further review.

Footnotes to 1:
*Ambiguous parts:

- 4/11/1999: Amazon Condor 00-1, Hijack diverted to unknown US location: perhaps (i), (iii)
„A Significant Events Conference should result. State Department decision to contact SECDEF/CJCS and NMCC and request NORAD assistance and surveillance. FBI JOC and FAA EAC/ATCSCC are contacted. CJCS is informed by ATCSCC about approximate route information. NORAD tasking is covert shadow. Track monitor is to fly down the airway as though it might be going to Washington DC. Air crew will regain control.“

- 2/16/2000: Fencing Indian 00-2, Hijacked Aircraft with WMD (Sarin) on board: (iii), (iv), perhaps (v)
“Terrorists will blow up this aircraft in a populated area of Alaska if there are military actions taken.”

- 9/9/2001: Vigilant Guardian I, Hijack: (iii), (iv), perhaps (v):
“Terrorists with explosives who plan to detonate them over NYC.”
“Blue Force diverts the aircraft, when terrorists realize they are not near NYC they detonate explosives over land near the divert location. No survivors.”

**Exercises, counted as 28:
[1]: 10/25/1998, Vigilant Guardian 99, Deviation HIJCK
[2]: 10/25/1998, Vigilant Guardian 99, HIJACK A/C
[3]: 10/26/1998: Vigilant Guardian 99, HIJACK HK to LAX
[4]: 10/27/1998, Vigilant Guardian 99, HIJACK Europe to East Coast
[5]: 10/27/1998: Vigilant Guardian 99, HIJACK JUNTA JUBBA
[6]: 1/21/1999: Coronet White 99, Live AST Hijack from JFK to Miami
[7]: 1/22/1999: Coronet White 99, Hijack Miami to Oklahoma City
[8]: 1/23/1999: Coronet White 99, Hijack San Diego to Anchorage
[9]: 4/11/1999: Amazon Condor 00-1, Hijack diverted to unknown US location
[10]: 9/30/1999: VFFI 99-1, Hijacked Aircraft with Demands
[11]: 10/21/1999: Amazon Condor 00-1, Hijack with WMD on board
[12]: 2/16/2000: Fencing Indian 00-2, Hijacked Aircraft with WMD (Sarin) on board
[13]: 4/12/2000: VO 00, HIJACK DAL
[14]: 4/14/2000: Amalgam Warrior 00-2, Hijack by an armed crew member
[15]: 4/16/2000: VO 00, HIJACK seized by terrorists
[16]: 4/19/2000: VO 00, Crop Custer Chemical Incident
[17]: 10/20/2000: Vigilant Guardian I, HIJACK London to Cairo
[18]: 10/21/2000: Vigilant Guardian I, HIJACK WADS/CANR/ANR
[19]: 6/2/2001: Amalgam Virgo 01-02, Suicide Mission
[20]: 9/6/2001: Vigilant Guardian I, ANR ROE HIJACK 1/6
[21]: 9/6/2001: Vigilant Guardian I, ANR ROE HIJACK 2/6
[22]: 9/6/2001: Vigilant Guardian I, ANR ROE HIJACK 3/6
[23]: 9/6/2001: Vigilant Guardian I, HIJACK of KAL 357 1/6
[24]: 9/6/2001: Vigilant Guardian I, HIJACK of KAL 357 2/6
[25]: 9/6/2001: Vigilant Guardian I, HIJACK of KAL 357 3/6
[26]: 9/6/2001: Vigilant Guardian I, HIJACK of KAL 357 4/6
[27]: 9/9/2001: Vigilant Guardian I, Hijack
[28]: 9/10/2001: Vigilant Guardian I, Special 23-Hijack (Cuba)

***Exercises, counted as 12:
[1]:
10/25/1998, Vigilant Guardian 99, Deviation HIJCK
10/25/1998, Vigilant Guardian 99, HIJACK A/C
10/26/1998: Vigilant Guardian 99, HIJACK HK to LAX
10/27/1998, Vigilant Guardian 99, HIJACK Europe to East Coast
10/27/1998: Vigilant Guardian 99, HIJACK JUNTA JUBBA
[2]:
1/21/1999: Coronet White 99, Live AST Hijack from JFK to Miami
1/22/1999: Coronet White 99, Hijack Miami to Oklahoma City
1/23/1999: Coronet White 99, Hijack San Diego to Anchorage
[3]:
4/11/1999: Amazon Condor 00-1, Hijack diverted to unknown US location
[4]:
9/30/1999: VFFI 99-1, Hijacked Aircraft with Demands
[5]:
10/21/1999: Amazon Condor 00-1, Hijack with WMD on board
[6]:
2/16/2000: Fencing Indian 00-2, Hijacked Aircraft with WMD (Sarin) on board
[7]:
4/12/2000: VO 00, HIJACK DAL
[8]:
4/14/2000: Amalgam Warrior 00-2, Hijack by an armed crew member
[9]:
4/16/2000: VO 00, HIJACK seized by terrorists
4/19/2000: VO 00, Crop Custer Chemical Incident
[10]:
10/20/2000: Vigilant Guardian I, HIJACK London to Cairo
10/21/2000: Vigilant Guardian I, HIJACK WADS/CANR/ANR
[11]:
6/2/2001: Amalgam Virgo 01-02, Suicide Mission
[12]:
9/6/2001: Vigilant Guardian I, ANR ROE HIJACK 1/6
9/6/2001: Vigilant Guardian I, ANR ROE HIJACK 2/6
9/6/2001: Vigilant Guardian I, ANR ROE HIJACK 3/6
9/6/2001: Vigilant Guardian I, HIJACK of KAL 357 1/6
9/6/2001: Vigilant Guardian I, HIJACK of KAL 357 2/6
9/6/2001: Vigilant Guardian I, HIJACK of KAL 357 3/6
9/6/2001: Vigilant Guardian I, HIJACK of KAL 357 4/6
9/9/2001: Vigilant Guardian I, Hijack
9/10/2001: Vigilant Guardian I, Special 23-Hijack (Cuba)

****Exercises, counted as 10:
Note 12: Chronological order not followed.
[1]:
10/25/1998, Vigilant Guardian 99, Deviation HIJCK
10/25/1998, Vigilant Guardian 99, HIJACK A/C
10/26/1998: Vigilant Guardian 99, HIJACK HK to LAX
10/27/1998, Vigilant Guardian 99, HIJACK Europe to East Coast
10/27/1998: Vigilant Guardian 99, HIJACK JUNTA JUBBA
[2]:
1/21/1999: Coronet White 99, Live AST Hijack from JFK to Miami
1/22/1999: Coronet White 99, Hijack Miami to Oklahoma City
1/23/1999: Coronet White 99, Hijack San Diego to Anchorage
[3]:
4/11/1999: Amazon Condor 00-1, Hijack diverted to unknown US location
10/21/1999: Amazon Condor 00-1, Hijack with WMD on board
[5]:
9/30/1999: VFFI 99-1, Hijacked Aircraft with Demands
[6]:
2/16/2000: Fencing Indian 00-2, Hijacked Aircraft with WMD (Sarin) on board
[7]:
4/12/2000: VO 00, HIJACK DAL
4/16/2000: VO 00, HIJACK seized by terrorists
4/19/2000: VO 00, Crop Custer Chemical Incident
[8]:
4/14/2000: Amalgam Warrior 00-2, Hijack by an armed crew member
[9]:
10/20/2000: Vigilant Guardian I, HIJACK London to Cairo
10/21/2000: Vigilant Guardian I, HIJACK WADS/CANR/ANR
9/6/2001: Vigilant Guardian I, ANR ROE HIJACK 1/6
9/6/2001: Vigilant Guardian I, ANR ROE HIJACK 2/6
9/6/2001: Vigilant Guardian I, ANR ROE HIJACK 3/6
9/6/2001: Vigilant Guardian I, HIJACK of KAL 357 1/6
9/6/2001: Vigilant Guardian I, HIJACK of KAL 357 2/6
9/6/2001: Vigilant Guardian I, HIJACK of KAL 357 3/6
9/6/2001: Vigilant Guardian I, HIJACK of KAL 357 4/6
9/9/2001: Vigilant Guardian I, Hijack
9/10/2001: Vigilant Guardian I, Special 23-Hijack (Cuba)
[10]:
6/2/2001: Amalgam Virgo 01-02, Suicide Mission

NORAD hijacking scenarios 1998-9/11, Qualitative Review
2. QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS
2.1 AMBIGUOUS PARTS
4/11/1999: Amazon Condor 00-1, Hijack diverted to unknown US location: perhaps (i), (iii)

Quote:
A Significant Events Conference should result. State Department decision to contact SECDEF/CJCS and NMCC and request NORAD assistance and surveillance. FBI JOC and FAA EAC/ATCSCC are contacted. CJCS is informed by ATCSCC about approximate route information. NORAD tasking is covert shadow. Track monitor is to fly down the airway as though it might be going to Washington DC. Air crew will regain control.
Ambiguous part: “[…] FAA […] are contacted.” By whom, State Department or NORAD?
It doesn’t matter, for reasons explained below (2.2).

2/16/2000: Fencing Indian 00-2, Hijacked Aircraft with WMD (Sarin) on board: (iii), (iv), perhaps (v)

Quote:
Terrorists will blow up this aircraft in a populated area of Alaska if there are military actions taken.
Should this count as a plane as weapon?
In some sense, yes: The plane is claimed not “only” to blow up, but to blow up in a populated area; i.e. the blowing up of the plane is used to murder not only people inside, but also outside the plane.
In some sense, no: The whole scenario is not about deliberately flying a plane into a building full of human beings, and this is what “plane as weapon” usually is meant to say.
Therefore, I do not count this as a contradiction to what NEADS told.

9/9/2001: Vigilant Guardian I, Hijack: (iii), (iv), perhaps (v)

Quote:
Terrorists with explosives who plan to detonate them over NYC.
Blue Force diverts the aircraft, when terrorists realize they are not near NYC they detonate explosives over land near the divert location. No survivors.
Same case as Fencing Indian. Further comments on this exercise scenario in 2.3.

2.2 FAA PARTICIPATION
On the first glance, there was a big degree of FAA participation in NORAD wargames before 9/11, whatever method of counting you choose; also, there was participation from NMCC and DoD. However, I do not count this as a contradiction to what NEADS told for three reasons:
1. I assume the FAA participation was mostly staged by NEADS people (cf. Deskins, Speicher), or real, but on a regional basis and only to watch over military planes until they reach military airspace (cf. Aires, Merchant). I do so to bring the NEADS statements to account.
2. Often the FAA participation reads as “FAA contacts NORAD/SEADS/NMCC” – compare this to the FAA statements: E.g. no controller remembers exercises with NORAD, and in Cleveland Center even the Military Operations Specialist wouldn’t have known whom to call at NORAD. To bring this to account, I again assume the exercise procedure must have been either restricted to very few well selected people within the FAA, or it must have been completely staged by NORAD people.
3. Paul Goddard, Maj., & Ken Merchant, Exercise Design Manager for NORAD:
Quote:
Merchant noted that if the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) determined there was a hijack, they would contact NMCC with a request for a fighter shadow of the hijacked aircraft. NMCC would then contact NORAD to use their aircraft for a covert shadow. NORAD's direction would be taken specifically from the FAA. Merchant noted that they did not have "national play" on a "mundane" exercise like a hijack, but it would be simulated.
Goddard noted that the FAA generated a "Twin Star" hijack exercise in 1995. They invited NORAD to participate since a real commercial airliner was to be shadowed by a fighter intercept. Goddard's understanding is that it involved the entire FAA system, as well as the NMCC. […] Goddard recalls that pre-9/11 there was no vision of ROE escalation being involved in the exercise design. The technical aspects to be exercised were mid-air fueling and lighter wing handoffs. The Battle Staff element involved inter-agency cooperation and planning. The initial planning was to decide who theoretically would be involved in a hijack - including the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), the FAA, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as a participant in the FAA conference. The planning did was not specific enough to identify a FAA hijack coordinator. […] Goddard commented that from a live perspective the exercises were built upon Sector and Region responsibilities. They go through a five year planning cycle. Based on the missions they were required to do, it was logical to plan in that manner. FAA would be involved to the point of de-conflicting airspace, but no further.
(Cf. also Amalgam Virgo on staging of other agencies, covered in 2.4.)

2.3 SUICIDE MISSIONS
2.3.1 MATERIAL
10/26/1998: Vigilant Guardian 99, HIJACK HK to LAX: (i), (iii), (iv), (v)
9/30/1999: VFFI 99-1, Hijacked Aircraft with Demands: (iii), (iv)
2/16/2000: Fencing Indian 00-2, Hijacked Aircraft with WMD (Sarin) on board: (iii), (iv), perhaps (v)
6/2/2001: Amalgam Virgo 01-02, Suicide Mission: (iii), (iv), (v), (vii)
9/6/2001: Vigilant Guardian I, HIJACK of KAL 357 1/6: (iii), (iv)
9/9/2001: Vigilant Guardian I, Hijack: (iii), (iv), perhaps (v)

2.3.2 COMMENTS
10/26/1998: Vigilant Guardian 99, HIJACK HK to LAX: (i), (iii), (iv), (v)

Will be covered later (2.4).

9/30/1999: VFFI 99-1, Hijacked Aircraft with Demands: (iii), (iv)

Quote:
Terrorists on board with sarin and weapons, threatened to blow up plane.
More information is needed for evaluation. Till then, it kind of fits with what Bianchi told:

Quote:
Bianchi noted that there were hijack suicide exercises but that those aircraft would be intercepted while over water. Bianchi noted that in these training episodes the suicide bombers were threatening to use a bomb to destroy the aircraft, and that these were not threats on infrastructure.
It might also well be something Deskins remembers:

Quote:
At this point in the interview Deskins noted to Commission staff that she does believe NEADS exercised scenarios in which a terrorist would take a "small airplane that would run into something", or was full of chemicals, or would be a ground event.
The general purpose of this exercise might have been a chemical attack.

2/16/2000: Fencing Indian 00-2, Hijacked Aircraft with WMD (Sarin) on board: (iii), (iv), perhaps (v)

Quote:
Terrorists will blow up this aircraft in a populated area of Alaska if there are military actions taken.
This is a flight from Tokyo to Anchorage, and therefore another candidate for the Bianchi case:

Quote:
Bianchi noted that there were hijack suicide exercises but that those aircraft would be intercepted while over water. Bianchi noted that in these training episodes the suicide bombers were threatening to use a bomb to destroy the aircraft, and that these were not threats on infrastructure.
The purpose of this exercise also seems not to be suicide hijack; it’s an exercise about WMD.

Quote:
Hijacked Aircraft with WMD on Board
And, finally, NORAD wasn’t that involved in this particular exercise, according to Paul Goddard, Maj., & Ken Merchant, Exercise Design Manager for NORAD:

Quote:
Regarding Fencing Indian '00, Merchant commented that it is an Alaskan Region built exercise, not full NORAD integrated, so he has "no visibility" on the exercise.
Merchant commented that the Sectors and the Region have their own exercise program designed to exercise their own Battle Staff. Merchant is responsible specifically for training at the NORAD level. The two can be cooperative, but the shops are clearly separated.
6/2/2001: Amalgam Virgo 01-02, Suicide Mission: (iii), (iv), (v), (vii)

Will be covered later (4).

9/6/2001: Vigilant Guardian I, HIJACK of KAL 357 1/6: (iii), (iv)

Quote:
10 members of terrorist org "UN PO" seize airliner and issue demands, threaten to blow up plane if demands not met.
More information is needed for evaluation. This is a flight from Seoul to Anchorage, and therefore another candidate for the Bianchi case:

Quote:
Bianchi noted that there were hijack suicide exercises but that those aircraft would be intercepted while over water. Bianchi noted that in these training episodes the suicide bombers were threatening to use a bomb to destroy the aircraft, and that these were not threats on infrastructure.
But it may also be that NEADS hadn’t anything to do with this, because of:

9/9/2001: Vigilant Guardian I, Hijack: (iii), (iv), perhaps (v)

Quote:
Terrorists with explosives who plan to detonate them over NYC.
Blue Force diverts the aircraft, when terrorists realize they are not near NYC they detonate explosives over land near the divert location. No survivors.
Interestingly, no one at NEADS mentions this particular exercise scenario, although it took place just two days before 9/11, and was a NEADS scenario. Cover-up or just not what it seems to be? A pure tabletop, paper “exercise” maybe? Maybe the whole purpose of this exercise was a Blue Force testing exercise, and the detonation near NYC was an imaginative addition without relevance for the purpose of this exercise. Cf. Vigilant Guardian 99 (covered in 4).
Also, one has to put this scenario in the context of the whole exercise: There are nine VG I items in Mr. Kara’s work paper. Alaska, Canada, and CONR are performing the same scenario (or two variations of this scenario), seven of the nine VG I items describe this scenario, which is an aggressive hijacking, but without suicide or a plane being used as weapon; arguably, this scenario seems to be the main purpose of the exercise. And apparently, NEADS didn’t have anything to do with it, but did its one thing, and, like SEADS, performed a smaller scenario. Did they just need something to do?
Whatever possibility and explanation, more information on this particular exercise is needed for evaluation.

In general, I do not find the suicide exercises (= blow up threats) revealing in any interesting sense, if not combined with a plane-as-weapon feature. There are some NEADS people remembering no suicide exercises, and some who have memories. It was a case for NORAD, sometimes, but apparently not central. The work paper of Mr. Kara doesn’t prove that anything about the NEADS memories is suspicious, concerning this feature.
Vigilant Guardian I, Hijack is worth to further look into, though.

2.4 PLANE AS WEAPON SCENARIOS
2.4.1 MATERIAL
10/26/1998: Vigilant Guardian 99, HIJACK HK to LAX: (i), (iii), (iv), (v)
6/2/2001: Amalgam Virgo 01-02, Suicide Mission: (iii), (iv), (v), (vii)
2/16/2000: Fencing Indian 00-2, Hijacked Aircraft with WMD (Sarin) on board: (iii), (iv), perhaps (v)
9/9/2001: Vigilant Guardian I, Hijack: (iii), (iv), perhaps (v)

2.4.2 COMMENTS
10/26/1998: Vigilant Guardian 99, HIJACK HK to LAX: (i), (iii), (iv), (v)

This is the plane-as-weapon mission involved:

Quote:
Terrorists plan on using plane to commit suicide run into metropolitan area of SF.
This is the purpose of the scenario:

Quote:
Shoot or not shoot" that is the question that needs to be answered. Either way, the alc will be shot down or explode over water. AlC will never reach land. Need NORAD intel to support event. Objective: Hijack Procedures/shootdown.
This is what NORAD officials Paul Goddard, Maj., & Ken Merchant, Exercise Design Manager for NORAD, told about the exercise, and apparently this particular scenario:

Quote:
Vigilant Guardian '99 was conducted in October of 1998. From Goddard's perspective, procedurally NORAD would not be able to make the decision to fire upon the aircraft. It was only designed to "push the players", but it was not considered to be based on a threat. This applies to all "out of the box" training scenarios. Goddard and Merchant both agreed that it is a serious misrepresentation to think that the scenario was built on any type of intelligence.
So we have a shoot down exercise, they needed a reason and therefore stated the plane would be used as a weapon, but not even the shoot-down itself was not considered to be based on a real threat.
No reason to believe this? At least, it fits very well with all other things established already. And this is an official statement on this particular exercise.
But, of course, this – at the present stage – is a question of belief.

6/2/2001: Amalgam Virgo 01-02, Suicide Mission: (iii), (iv), (v), (vii)

Quote:
SEADS to launch with intent to intercept and turn target away. Target remains on course and situation will become an ROE drill that will challenge the battle staff as they work to keep aircraft from impacting SEADS. NORAD leadership is cued by simulated FBI notification of individual with intent to be a martyr. Target aircraft will not answer any calls. Scenario fruition is "up to Blue Forces."
Fortunately, more information on this particular exercise is declassified. There is no hijack, no commercial airliner, no FAA involvement, no multiple planes, but instead a “martyr” suffering from AIDS, and making a deal with some Colombian drug dealers to fly a small Cessna into Tyndall AFB. He writes a wacky goodbye letter, the FBI notes his scramble and tells SEADS that this guy wants to fly his Cessna into a SEADS building (every agency other than NORAD staged).
The goal of this scenario, according to the exercise description:
Quote:
NOTE: The scenario intention is for SEADS to launch PAM fighters to intercept the target aircraft and after intercept and ID, attempt to turn the target aircraft away from the coastline of Florida. Target aircraft will remain on course to SEADS and will not make the turns.
This will develop into an ROE drill that will challenge the battlestaff as they work to keep the target aircraft from impacting SEADS.
Other features:

Quote:
The suicide target aircraft will not answer any radio calls from SEADS and fighter. Target will remain on course to KPAM throughout scenario or until simulated shot down. The friendly ASA aircraft flying the similar course will answer all radio calls by SEADS or the fighters. Scenario fruition is now up to Blue Forces.
More NOARD comments on this exercise here.

Quote:
Exercise Amalgam Virgo took place June 1-2, 2001. The goal of the exercise was to increase the capability to detect, track, and intercept CM and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) threats, using forces under NORAD Control. All simulated CM and UAV launches occurred June 2, 2001. Overall, eight MQM-107 drone CM surrogates were launched during the exercise and four BD-5 (UAV surrogate) sorties were flown. Simulated engagements occurred against all drone and BD-5 sorties. JCMD participation included continuing data collection and risk-reduction efforts for the FT-1/JCIET activity as well as the observation of JIADS system performance.
And here.

Quote:
MR. BEN-VENISTE: That was Operation Amalgam Virgo.
MR. SCOTT: Yes, sir. Specifically Operation Amalgam Virgo, which I was involved in before I retired, was a scenario using a Third World united -- not united -- uninhabited aerial vehicle launched off a rogue freighter in the Gulf of Mexico. General Arnold can back me up -- at the time one of our greatest concerns was the proliferation of cruise missile technology and the ability for terrorist groups to get that technology, get it close enough to our shores to launch it. In fact, this exercise -- in this exercise we used actual drone -- NQM-107 drones, which are about the size of a cruise missile, to exercise our fighters and our radars in a Gulf of Mexico scenario.
MR. BEN-VENISTE: You are referring to Amalgam 01, are you not?
MR. SCOTT: Yes, sir, Amalgam 01.
Also, check out this somewhat spacy NORAD brochure.
According to these sources,
(i) Amalgam Virgo 01 was about detecting, tracking and intercepting “CM and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) threats”.
(ii) For SEADS, this meant they had to intercept a small aircraft directed to fly into a SEADS building, and the aircraft wouldn’t respond to them, and wouldn’t change course.
(iii) Interestingly, this aircraft wouldn’t be a CM or UAV, though, but a Cessna with a random person, suffering from AIDS and wanting to fly into a SEADS building after being wooed by drug dealers.
I think we can all agree that the scenario with the fatally ill Cessna guy is really far out, and probably no NORADian feared something like that. Therefore, it’s more likely that the scenario was built on other fears. Truthers might want to argue that it was built on fears of manned planes being used as weapons in general, whatever motive of the murderers, and whatever building, and whatever type of aircraft. Debunkers might want to argue that it was about detecting, tracking and intercepting aircraft with some common characteristics of CM or UAV (like NORDO, the missing course change after interception efforts, and the direction at military targets), and a bizarre narrative was built around that task. IMO, debunkers are in advantage here for two reasons:
First, in (iii) nothing is added to the task of the exercise described in general in (i), and in detail in (ii).
Second, this interpretation fits with what NORAD told.
But then, this exercise isn’t particularly interesting anymore, and doesn’t contradict NEADS statements.

2/16/2000: Fencing Indian 00-2, Hijacked Aircraft with WMD (Sarin) on board: (iii), (iv), perhaps (v)

Covered in 1 & 3.

9/9/2001: Vigilant Guardian I, Hijack: (iii), (iv), perhaps (v)

Covered in 1 & 3.

5. INTERIOR HAPPENINGS
5.1 MATERIAL
1/21/1999: Coronet White 99, Live AST Hijack from JFK to Miami: (i), (ii), (iii), (vii)
1/22/1999: Coronet White 99, Hijack Miami to Oklahoma City: (iii), (vii)
1/23/1999: Coronet White 99, Hijack San Diego to Anchorage: (iii), (vii)
4/14/2000: Amalgam Warrior 00-2, Hijack by an armed crew member: (iii), (vii)
4/19/2000: VO 00, Crop Custer Chemical Incident: (iii), (vii)
6/2/2001: Amalgam Virgo 01-02, Suicide Mission: (iii), (iv), (v), (vii)

5.2 COMMENTS
Not many comments needed. These were all “ordinary” hijacking scenarios - no suicide, no plane as weapon -, except Amalgam Virgo (which is covered in 4). Apparently no protection of the National Capital Region (NCR) missions for NORAD, like the NORADians claimed. Coronet White 99 involves the most interesting hijacking scenario here - it not only happened in the interior US, but also is the only live fly scenario in the worksheet, and was worked out by NEADS.
Cf. Col. Marr to this:
Quote:
Marr noted he participated once with a live exercise for a hijack headed north from St. Louis in the south. They attempted to scramble aircraft internally in this exercise, and Marr commented that it did not work very well.
However, the Coronet White plane wasn’t flying from St. Louis to the south, but from JFK Airport to the south (Miami), so the exercise Marr remembers might have been a different exercise.
Two scenarios explicitly involve fighters scrambling to the interior US: Amalgam Virgo (which is covered in 4), and Amalgam Warrior 00-2:

Quote:
F-15s from Portland and F-16s from McChord will shadow.
Amalgam Warrior was an “ordinary” hijacking scenario, nevertheless, the hijacker would give up sometime, and the whole thing would be handled by WADS (and local/staged FAA entities on the civilian side), not NEADS.
No real contradiction to any NORAD statements visible to me, but check this out for yourselves.

6. CONCLUSIONS
It’s hard to definitely judge on this matter, but at first glance (well, and second, too) it’s possible to evaluate this document in the light of the manifold NORAD statements documented here and here.
Most of the exercises can be easily explained in terms of what is already public knowledge – this also needs some guessing (but no stretching), though.
Amalgam Virgo 01 sounds interesting at the first glance, but more context to the exercise supports the assumption that this exercise just isn’t that revealing it seems to be. Questions remain with respect to Vigilant Guardian I, Hijack and Vigilant Guardian 99.


Disclaimer: This work represents the views of the author alone, no agency etc. Appreciation to Mr. Kara for PM communication about his work paper and helpful background information. On my head be any remaining mistakes in this work.

Graham2001

Originally Posted by progge View Post
Debunkers might want to argue that it was about detecting, tracking and intercepting aircraft with some common characteristics of CM or UAV (like NORDO, the missing course change after interception efforts, and the direction at military targets), and a bizarre narrative was built around that task.
While not directly related to the hijacking scenario above, there is a document on an NRO command post exercise that exhibits the same characteristics. The plotline is that an aircraft has come down in a carpark and exploded (Not a terrorist act BTW.)

The strange thing is that the scenario document provides details such as the names of the pilots and CVR transcript of the accident flight which does not seem relevant to the exercise planned.

I'm guessing that providing background information like this, even if it does not form part of the scenario itself is standard procedure.

Sam.I.Am

I can't speak on how NORAD or the Air Force schedules their drills but I might give you some insight into how they are scheduled based upon my time on submarines. These insights might help you focus in on some aspects of when and why drills are scheduled.

Your 28 drills conducted over 45 months (assuming that you started on January 1st 1998) seems to me more like mandatory scenarios proscribed in a manual somewhere. I highly doubt that NORAD did only those 28 drills in 3.75 years. I do think that they were drilled on many other, more likely scenarios, much more often.

We had some mandatory drills and they had a lifetime of +/- 24 hours from the previous drills end until the next one started. Security drills (essentially how quickly we could arm people) were no more than 7 days apart, these were almost always done just before field day commenced and you could set a clock to them. Missile emergency drills were 30 days apart (they were usually spread as far apart as possible because they took about 1/2 of the days drilling time in setup, execution and critique). Torpedo emergencies were the same as far as time spacing goes but were much quicker because it was always a few drops of fuel from a faulty relief valve and not a flood of fuel because the manual also said that you will suck rubber until you hit port if that happens.

With that being said we had well over a dozen drills per week more (on top of what I just mentioned) about real concerns. Fire first and flooding second and then reactor casualties third. (Not OMFG we are melting, but instead the bad chemistry in the primary loop is corroding the pipes which will lead to a shorter reactor life kind of casualties).

And maybe later I'll get into inspection cycles within the military...

gumboot

Originally Posted by Graham2001 View Post
I'm guessing that providing background information like this, even if it does not form part of the scenario itself is standard procedure.
Exercise scripters are always expected to flesh out the scenario with colourful and mostly irrelevant details to add a sense of realism. We had a major exercise here which involved the military deploying in a "foreign island state" to conduct various peace keeping and humanitarian missions. The scripters went to the extent of providing a whole history and even a national flag for this fictional country.

gumboot

One thing I noted from the first post:

Quote:
"Aires noted that NEADS has worked with individual FAA En Route Centers on exercises, but not with any national FAA entities. Aires noted that all the military exercises would be in special use airspace. He noted that all the FAA would do was control an aircraft until it reached the military airspace."
I don't think this can qualify as "FAA participation". What this is talking about is FAA handling of military aircraft in civil airspace, while enroute to an exercise (which would be conducted in military airspace). The FAA basically always handle military aircraft in civil airspace. Even on 9/11 when AFIO was declared for the fighters scrambled to Washington DC, they were still handled by the FAA, not the military. The only time the military handles aircraft in national airspace is when an Air Defense Emergency is declared and SCATANA is activated.

Thanks for additional insight, Graham, Sam, gumboot.

Originally Posted by Sam.I.Am View Post
I can't speak on how NORAD or the Air Force schedules their drills [...]
Here’s some general information for the USAF (doesn´t tell about specific scenarios). NORTHCOM exercise schedule for five years (2008), pp. 6 et seq.
Looks like a tight schedule to me. This is after 9/11, of course.

Originally Posted by Sam.I.Am View Post
I highly doubt that NORAD did only those 28 drills in 3.75 years. I do think that they were drilled on many other, more likely scenarios, much more often.
Yes, sure. The 28 exercises are just a selection of all hijacking scenarios.
One can compare this Vigilant Overview & Unified Defense description from 2004 to put such a selection in perspective.

Originally Posted by gumboot View Post
I don't think this can qualify as "FAA participation". What this is talking about is FAA handling of military aircraft in civil airspace, while enroute to an exercise (which would be conducted in military airspace). The FAA basically always handle military aircraft in civil airspace.
It counts as FAA participation only in a broad and sort of trivial sense, yes. I included it nevertheless to avoid cherry picking accusations.

Graham2001

Originally Posted by progge View Post
5. INTERIOR HAPPENINGS
4/14/2000: Amalgam Warrior 00-2, Hijack by an armed crew member: (iii), (vii)

Amalgam Warrior was an “ordinary” hijacking scenario, nevertheless, the hijacker would give up sometime, and the whole thing would be handled by WADS (and local/staged FAA entities on the civilian side), not NEADS.
Amalgam Warrior, is also the only one of those scenarios even loosely based on an actual event.

In 1994 an attempt was made to hijack FedEx fight 705 by an employee as part of an insurance scam, according to wikipedia (the usual warnings apply), he planned to crash the plane into FedEx Headquarters...