

BEGPRODNO
BEGBATES
DATE
FBIDESCR
FULLTEXT

: M-INT-00001473
: 265A-NY-280350-302-1032
= 09/16/2001
: GRANT BESLEY - INTERVIEW
: 09/16/01

Grant Besley, date of birth [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] called in to the Denver Division complaint line. Besley was informed of the identity of the duty Agent and provided the following information:

9/11
Personal
Privacy

Besley is employed as a pilot for United Airlines UAL and piloted UAL Flight 815 on September 10, 2001 from Los Angeles to Sydney, Australia. The plane was diverted to land in Brisbane, Australia. UAL flight attendant Margaret Gearhart informed Besley during the flight that she saw a middle Eastern male passenger in seat 60E looking at a United 747 plane on his laptop screen. She watched the passenger hit "Enter" and a message popped up which stated, "Mission Failed." Upon learning this information from Gearhart, Besley contacted the UAL "war room" and discussed the passenger with the laptop. Besley and UAL personnel agreed to land the plane in Brisbane, Australia. He instructed his crew that the plane was ordered to divert. Besley estimated this diversion occurred at 1830 Zulu time on September 11, 2001.

Within thirty minutes of the decision to divert, Besley received communication from UAL through the ACARS data satellite that airliners had hit the towers in New York. Besley decided not to inform the crew of the bombings because they had already diverted and he did not want to further stress them.

Some of the flight attendants were upset with Besley for not communicating to them the information regarding the bombings. Two days later, one of the flight attendants who had been upset, Edith McCree, spoke with Besley. McCree informed Besley that on the diverted flight which landed in Brisbane, she noticed a different group of Arab males who seemed concerned about the plane being diverted. These men huddled together and looked nervous when the "all call" bell sounded. McCree noticed that one of the these men had circled the following cities in the in-flight magazine: Boston, New York, Washington, San Francisco, Seattle and Los Angeles.

Besley stated that the passenger in 60E was flying under the name of Ricardo Whidman. McCree and Gearhart can be

09/16/01 Denver, Colorado telephonically

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SA [REDACTED]

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Enforcement
Privacy

Grant Besley 09/16/01 2

contacted through the UAL personnel office to determine where the additional passengers were seated.

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BEGPRODNO : M-INT-00009542
BEGBATES : 265A-NY-280350-302-45834
DATE : 09/16/2001
FBIDESCR : CONTROL #BA1163 GARY P GAMBARANI
FULLTEXT : FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 09/16/2001

RAPID START CONTROL #BA-1163

GARY P. GAMBARANI was telephonically contacted at his residence [redacted] regarding his participation in retrieving evidence from ACARS. This system is run by ARINC, GAMBARANI's employer in Annapolis. ARINC is a corporation which maintains the aeronautical radio contact points for airlines throughout the United States. GAMBARANI was referenced in Baltimore RAPID START 1163 as the point of contact for obtaining any text messages sent by the four hijacked aircrafts in captioned investigation. GAMBARANI advised all text data messages retrieved from the four hijacked aircraft were stored without being analyzed by ARINC. These were e-mailed on Friday, September 14, to [redacted] of the Federal Aviation Administration FAA, whose position there is identified as A.A.T. 210. [redacted] can be contacted at 202-[redacted]

9/11
Personal
Privacy

GAMBARANI advised the text messages from aircraft through ARINC usually contain information such as time away from the gate, time of take off, time of landing and time to the gate. Any administrative messages supplied by the airline to ARINC can be uploaded to the aircraft. Occasionally, companies will monitor engine instruments and performance through the ARINC system automatically. GAMBARANI is not sure what monitoring status was maintained by American or United Airlines, the two companies involved in the hijacking.

9/11
Working-level
Employee

Investigation on 9/16/01 at Baltimore, MD
File # 256D-NY-280350-BA Date dictated 9/16/01
by [redacted] FBI [redacted] ATF

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Privacy

BEGPRODNO : M-INT-00072042
BEGBATES : 265A-NY-280350-302~22910
DATE = 09/11/2001
FBIDESC : FRANK P. PASCALE
FULLTEXT : FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 09/12/2001

FRANK P. PASCALE PASCALE, born [redacted]

[redacted] serving as First Vice President, Local 542, Flight Dispatchers, Meteorologists, and Operation Specialists Union, 1201 Airport Freeway, Suite 386, Euless, Texas 76040. [redacted] was interviewed at AMERICAN AIRLINES AA, Flight Academy, System Operation Control SOC, 4601 Highway 360, Fort Worth, Texas 76155. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the purpose of the interview, PASCALE provided the following information:

9/11
Personal
Privacy

PASCALE has been employed as a Flight Dispatcher with AA for approximately fourteen years, with twenty years total experience in aviation. PASCALE was the union representative for AA Flight Dispatchers PEGGY HOUCK HOUCK and DON ROBINSON ROBINSON. HOUCK was the dispatcher for AA Flight 11, and ROBINSON was the dispatcher for AA Flight 77. On September 11, 2001, both dispatchers started their shifts at 6:00 a.m., and their involvement in the pre-flight planning for Flights 11 and 77 was unknown. PASCALE had no personal knowledge regarding their contact with these flights, with PASCALE serving in an employee assistance capacity and providing the information below as background for help in understanding the duties of a dispatcher. From what he understood, neither HOUCK nor ROBINSON had any contact with the captain or crew of Flight 11 and Flight 77.

The flight dispatcher and the captain were jointly responsible for the safe, legal operation of a flight, with both approving the flight plan. The flight dispatcher was involved in pre-flight planning, consisting of the "highway in the sky," the aircraft's fuel load, weather updates, navigational aids, and other aspects of the flight plan. If the captain agreed with the flight plan, he or she signed off on it, with the flight dispatcher then releasing the flight. After the flight plan was approved by the flight dispatcher and the captain, neither individual could unilaterally deviate from the flight plan. If a problem arose after the joint approval, any changes had to be authorized by both

Investigation on 09/11/2001 at Fort Worth, Texas
File # 265A-NY-280350-302 Date dictated 09/12/2001
by SA [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of Frank P. Pascale , On 09/11/2001 , Page 2

the flight dispatcher and the captain. These procedures were governed by regulations of the FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION.

After the flight plan was approved, the flight dispatcher primarily reacted to any issues or problems that arose during the flight, such as inclement weather, runway closures, etc. A captain would sometimes call with questions or might want a weather update; however, if there were no problems or questions, a captain would not need to contact the dispatcher. For routine flights, the dispatcher and captain were oftentimes not in direct contact with one another. Regarding Flights 11 and 77, neither HOUCK nor ROBINSON spoke with the respective crews prior to take-off, apparently because there were no problems or questions with the flight plans. Both HOUCK and ROBINSON were on duty when these flights departed.

Dispatchers could communicate with aircraft through the following methods: radio transmissions, a text messaging system called ACARS, and a third party communication network. Among other things, the ACARS unit allowed a captain to punch in a code for various actions, with the universal code for hijacking being [redacted] or [redacted]. This hijack code was like a panic button, and the dispatcher could send a series of yes or no questions back to the cockpit to verify the hijacking and obtain additional information. If any messages were sent to the flight, the ACARS system would track the message, and details and times would be available through the flight log. Besides the communication with the dispatcher, there were multiple levels of air traffic control ATC, such as individual airport towers, regional ATC centers, and twenty-six in-route centers; as a result, the ATC communication network ranged from local to regional to national. These different levels of ATC handled the aircraft at different altitudes and locations, ensured that two or more aircraft were not flying along the same altitude and flight path, and responded to emergency situations. The third party communication for AA was administered by AERONAUTICAL RADIO, a separate company that contacted flights when no other communication system could reach the flight.

9/11 Closed
by Statute

BEGPRODNO : M-INT-00072051
BEGBATES : 265A-NY-280350-302~22915
DATE = 09/11/2001
FBIDESCR : PEGGY JEAN HOUCK, DISPATCHER, AMERICAN AIRLINES
FULLTEXT : FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 09/12/2001

PEGGY JEAN HOUCK HOUCK, born [redacted]

[redacted] employed as a Dispatcher, AMERICAN AIRLINES AA, 4601 Highway 360, Fort Worth, Texas 76155, was interviewed at her place of employment. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the purpose of the interview, HOUCK provided the following information:

9/11
Personal
Privacy

HOUCK has worked for AA for approximately ten years, with five years of this time spent as a dispatcher. As a dispatcher, HOUCK was licensed with the FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION. This license looked like a pilot's license and required passing a written examination, an oral examination, and a practical application. The license number corresponded to the licensee's social security number, and the license was commonly referred to as a dispatch license.

On September 11, 2001, HOUCK began her shift at 6:00 a.m., working the desk responsible for the transcontinental flights. Regarding AA Flights 11 and 77, HOUCK was not involved in the pre-flight planning, which consisted of the flight path, fuel load, and other aspects of the flight plan. Because of the early morning departures for these flights, AA Dispatcher CHRIS RECK RECK preplanned the flights, with RECK working the night shift until 6:00 a.m. It was unknown whether RECK communicated directly with the captain or crew of either flight; however, HOUCK doubted the occurrence of any such contact because the weather was good all across the country and because there was nothing unusual that would have prompted questions from the flight crews. The departure time for Flight 11 was 7:40 a.m. Eastern Standard time, or 6:40 a.m. local time, and the pre-planning would have started approximately two to three hours before departure. If there were questions or issues, the captain would have contacted the dispatcher about forty-five minutes to an hour prior to departure, depending upon how early the captain arrived.

HOUCK initially was the dispatcher for Flights 11, 77, and other transcontinental flights when she started her shift; however, HOUCK was isolated only to Flight 11 after indications of

Investigation on 09/11/2001

at Fort Worth, Texas

9/11 Law
Enforcement
Privacy

File # 265A-NY-280350-302
by SA [redacted]

Date dictated 09/12/2001

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Continuation of FD-302 of Peggy Jean Houck , On 09/11/2001 , Page 2

a problem on board. At approximately 7:20 a.m. local time, another Boston flight attempted to relay a message to Flight 11, stating that air traffic control ATC was trying to reach the aircraft. The message was something to the effect of "Good morning, ATC wants you on [a certain radio frequency] and requests an acknowledgment." There was no acknowledgment to this message, and HOUCK had not had any direct contact with Flight 11 by this time. At some point, another AA dispatcher sent an ACARS message to Flight 11, with ACARS being a text messaging system. This dispatcher sent the message based upon ATC's attempts to contact Flight 11; however, there was no acknowledgment to this message either. By this time, no one had been able to reach the crew of Flight 11.

Soon after this loss of contact, HOUCK's manager, CRAIG MARQUIS MARQUIS, stated that there was a possible breach of security on Flight 11 and that two flight attendants might have been stabbed, with these flight attendants being the number 1 and number 5 flight attendants. HOUCK did not know the names of the flight attendants and access to the computer data regarding the flight was currently denied. There were nine flight attendants total on this flight, with their numbers indicated their particular assignment on board. The number 1 flight attendant would have been in first class and usually had a key to the cockpit. MARQUIS ordered HOUCK to contact her flight; however, HOUCK was still unable to get any acknowledgment to her messages. Although HOUCK was unsure, MARQUIS must have talked to one of the flight attendants by telephone. HOUCK also called ARINC, a company providing a patch service that contacted flights through an alternate communication network. ARINC was a backup form of communication for AA; however, there were some airlines that did not have the ACARS system. HOUCK could not recall the full name for the acronym, ARINC; however, she contacted the company in San Francisco, California, by dialing their 800 number. This company was able to ring a bell in the cockpit to alert the crew to pick up their radio. For AA, this service helped when flights were out of radio contact or were not responding to ACARS messages for whatever reason.

At approximately 7:30 a.m. local time, Flight 11 was isolated, with HOUCK maintaining her duties as dispatcher for this flight only. HOUCK was moved to another desk, and another dispatcher took over her duties at the transcontinental desk. By this time, MARQUIS had confirmed a breach of security, and there was still no communications acknowledgment from the crew. ARINC called HOUCK to inform her that they could not raise Flight 11 and

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asked if they should keep trying, with HOUCK responding to this question in the affirmative. By this time, HOUCK had received no messages or other communications from Flight 11 and had received nothing from the crew to indicate any trouble on board. At MARQUIS's request, HOUCK performed an analysis of the fuel capacity of the aircraft, figuring that the aircraft had an approximate range of six hours. HOUCK was later told that Flight 11 might have crashed into the World Trade Center.

After Flight 11 departed Boston, it initially proceeded according to its flight plan but turned south a little more sharply than was dictated by the flight plan. At the time, this turn seemed strange because it appeared as if the flight was heading toward New York, New York. After hearing about the stabbings on board, HOUCK had wondered whether the aircraft had been hijacked and was heading toward Cuba or South America. The aircraft never got any higher than 29,000 feet, and someone on board switched off the transponder, a device that helped ATC track the altitude and position of aircraft through a unique code. The transponder was controlled by some kind of knob or switch in the cockpit, and this action would have required someone with knowledge of aviation.

HOUCK was unsure of the exact times mentioned above, with the flight log documenting this information. HOUCK and the other AA dispatchers were currently unable to obtain the flight log information because access to the computer data for Flight 11 and Flight 77 was denied. The flight logs would have documented the times of various events, who signed onto the system, any communications, ATC clearances, and other flight data. Despite repeated attempts, HOUCK was never able to get any acknowledgment from Flight 11; as a result, with the exception of MARQUIS's telephone conversation, neither HOUCK nor anyone else was able to contact the crew on Flight 11.

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BEGPRODNO
BEGBATES
DATE
FBIDESC
FULLTEXT

: M-INT-00072057
: 265A-NY-280350-302-22925
= 09/11/2001
: CHRISTOPHER JENNINGS RECK, DISPATCHER, AMERICAN AIRLINES
: FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 12/31/1998

CHRISTOPHER JENNINGS RECK RECK, born [REDACTED]

9/11
Personal
Privacy

[REDACTED]
employed as a Dispatcher, AMERICAN AIRLINES, Flight Academy, 4601 Highway 360, Fort Worth, Texas, was interviewed at his place of employment. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the purpose of the interview, RECK provided the following information:

RECK has been employed by AA as a dispatcher for approximately five years and was employed as an AMERICAN EAGLE dispatcher for approximately 2 ½ years prior to his AA employment. He was currently licensed by the FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION as an aircraft dispatcher.

RECK was the dispatcher working transcontinental flights from 10:00 p.m. on September 10, 2001, to 6:00 a.m. on September 11, 2001. Most of these flights departed after 6:00 a.m., but RECK was involved in the pre-flight planning approximately two to three hours prior to the scheduled departures. About 75 minutes before departure, the computer generated the flight plan based upon the dispatcher's calculations. This flight plan included such things as wind data, weight and balance data, fuel load, weather reports, and so forth. After the flight plan was complete and approved by the dispatcher and the captain, the dispatcher would release the flight for departure. If there was some disagreement between the dispatcher and the captain about some aspect of the flight plan, the captain would call the dispatcher to discuss the issue. After the flight plan was approved, both dispatcher and captain had to agree in order to make any changes.

RECK could remember nothing out of the ordinary about the flight planning for Flight 11 and Flight 77. The weather across the country was great, and there was little reason for the flight crews to be calling with questions or problems. RECK did not talk with either crew during his shift, and everything was normal for Flight 11, Flight 77, and all other flights handled by RECK. There were also no ACARS messages from either Flight 11 or Flight 77 because both aircraft would have been parked with the engines off

Investigation on 09/11/2001

at Fort Worth, Texas

9/11 Law
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File # 265A-NY-280350-302
by SA [REDACTED]

Date dictated 09/16/2001

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Continuation of FD-302 of Christopher Jennings Reck , On 09/11/2001 , Page 2

until about the time that RECK's shift ended. The ACARS system would not have been active until the captain arrived to initialize it, and there would have been no reason for RECK to use a separate communications system called AERONAUTICAL RADIO, INC., ARINC because both aircraft were still on the ground during his shift. RECK's shift was over by the time Flight 11 and Flight 77 departed.

Nothing unusual happened on RECK's shift, except for maybe some late flights caused by a weather system on the east coast. When RECK arrived for work, he dealt with issues arising from these late flights; however, all of these problems were resolved by about 2:00 a.m. or 3:00 a.m. There were very few calls from flight crews overnight, and about the only unusual event was the fact that it was abnormally quiet. There were few weather problems across the country after the above weather system passed through the east coast.

The captains generally arrived in the aircraft about an hour prior to departure, signing into the Dispatch Environmental Control System DECS upon arrival. DECS was a computer system that housed all of the data regarding flight planning and communications during the flight. The captain often arrived at the airport about 1 1/2 to 2 hours prior to departure. If the captain made any calls to dispatch, these calls would be made after signing onto DECS and looking at the flight plan. These calls often consisted of a weather briefing or some question about the flight plan. The telephone calls were recorded, but not through DECS. As was mentioned above, RECK did not recall having any conversations with the captains of Flight 11 and Flight 77.

RECK recalled having a few conversations with other captains on the morning of September 11, 2001. There were one or two captains requesting a weather briefing, and one captain had an issue about the fuel load; however, these conversations concerned flights other than Flight 11 and Flight 77. The flight numbers corresponding to the above captains were unknown, and these calls were so routine that RECK did not make a note of them. For the most part, RECK remembered the calls about maintenance problems and would have noted any such calls had these occurred.

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BEGPRODNO : M-INT-00003921
BEGBATES : 265A-NY-280350-302~30911
DATE = 09/18/2001
FBIDESCR : WADE BLAUFUSS, PILOT FOR NORTHWEST AIRLINES, SOCIAL
FULLTEXT : FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 09/19/2001

Wade Blaufuss, pilot for Northwest Airlines, social security number [redacted] was interviewed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI, Washington Field Office WFO. Also assisting in this interview was Federal Aviation Administration FAA Special Agent [redacted]. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, Blaufuss provided the following information:

9/11
Personal
Privacy

Blaufuss has been a pilot with Northwest Airlines for approximately five and one half years. Prior to Northwest he was a pilot for Atlantic Coast Airways for seven years. Blaufuss was the flight navigator/pilot on Flight #36 leaving from gate B15 bound for Amsterdam with a final destination of New Delhi, India, on 9/18/2001.

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Blaufuss admitted that due to recent events that the security was high for this flight. After the boarding of passengers on this flight, a manifest had been shown to the captain of Flight #36 by the lead flight attendant, Penny. It was noted by the flight crew that there was a substantial number of middle eastern passengers on this flight. The flight crew, along with the lead flight attendant, then proceeded to discuss what they would do in the event of a hijacking. They discussed defending themselves and maneuvering the plane so as to disrupt the plane. Also, lowering cabin pressure. The cockpit flight crew retrieved an ax from the fire closet and placed it in the cockpit.

Flight #36 left the gate and began to proceed down the taxiway. Flight #36 then stopped at the end of the taxiway and waited for the call from the tower to proceed. Blaufuss's first indication something was "wrong" was a call from the Dulles tower asking are you "squawking [redacted]"? The response in the cockpit was "no, we are not squawking [redacted]". The Captain then advised the tower that they needed to provide more information than just asking if they were squawking [redacted]. The tower advised that they were unable to give then any more information.

9/11 Closed
by Statute

09/18/2001
Investigation on

Dulles, VA
at

File #
265A-NY-280350-302
SA [redacted]
by SA [redacted]

Date dictated
09/19/2001

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Continuation of FD-302 of Wade Blaufuss , On 09/18/2001 , Page 2

At the same time, the copilot was communicating through the Automated Communication and Response System ACARS with the Northwest Airlines communications center in Minneapolis, Minnesota. Flight #36 was then advised to return to the gate ASAP (as soon as possible). Blaufuss recalled that the tower advised the flight crew not to move the aircraft.

The tower was unable to provide any additional information. A decision was made by the captain to exit the aircraft from the cockpit. The auxiliary engines were shut down and the flight crew proceeded to exit the cockpit. Blaufuss did not feel comfortable leaving the aircraft and the flight attendants behind, but was following orders from the captain.

During this communication from the tower, Blaufuss observed the lead flight attendant, Penny, on the phone to what he believed to be the flight attendants advising them of the situation.

Blaufuss also noted that during this situation, an unidentified flight attendant advised the cockpit that a passenger was acting "funny".

In a discussion Blaufuss had with the captain after the above incident, it was thought it might have been something a flight attendant said that started this situation.

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BEGPRODNO : M-INT-00004184
BEGBATES : 265A-NY-280350-302~31224
DATE : 09/18/2001
FBIDESC : HEATHER DIANE WADSWORTH, DATE OF BIRTH [redacted] SOCIAL
FULLTEXT : FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

9/11
Personal
Privacy

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 09/19/2001

HEATHER DIANE WADSWORTH, Date of Birth [redacted] Social

[redacted] Social

[redacted] was interviewed at the Customs Office, Dulles International Airport, Dulles, Virginia. FAA Special Agent [redacted] was also in attendance. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview, the following information was provided:

WADSWORTH is a flight attendant and was working on NORTHWEST AIRLINES NW Flight #36, leaving Dulles International Airport for Amsterdam, Holland. At approximately 4:30pm, the flight crew had its safety briefing. The captain told the crew to keep an eye open in case there was a situation in the air, and let him know if he sees someone you don't like. During this meeting an unknown individual said that two guys who were on the FBI list were on the flight. RENE LNU said that she didn't like the sound of these guys being on the plane. WADSWORTH asked PENNY LNU, the lead attendant if this was true, to which PENNY replied that she did not know. Later, The flight crew was talking, and seemed excited about going to Amsterdam and having a chance to party and drink beer. No one was talking about last weeks plane crashes.

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WADSWORTH was responsible for the First Class area and Business and was seated at jumpseat 3A. COLLEEN LNU was the other flight attendant in her section. Her personal bags, which included her cell phone were wedged underneath her jumpseat. The flight attendants were in the following locations:

PENNY LNU
KIMBERLY LNU
SCOTT LNU
FEMALE WITH DARK HAIR, RED SWEATER NU
WADSWORTH
COLLEEN LNU
BEVERLY LNU
RENE LNU

Jumpseat 1A
Jumpseat 1D
Jumpseat 2A
Jumpseat 2D
Jumpseat 3A
Jumpseat 3D
Jumpseat 4A
Jumpseat 4D

Investigation on 09/18/2001 at Dulles, Virginia

File # 265D-NY-280350-302

Date dictated 09/19/2001

by SA's [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of Heather Diane Wadsworth , On 09/18/2001 , Page 2

WADSWORTH had been flying with NW since 05/18/2001, and only knew KIMBERLY from a past flight. This was her first time flying with the other crew members.

No passengers appeared to be a threat and nothing appeared unusual. WADSWORTH was sitting in her jumpseat ready for takeoff when the captain said over the plane's intercom that there was an air-traffic control delay. A short time later, PENNY went to check with the captain, then contacted the flight attendants. PENNY told the flight attendants that no one should panic, to stay in your jumpseat, keep passengers in their seats, and that she was in the flight deck and the pilots were gone. WADSWORTH asked PENNY what she meant, to which she responded that the pilot opened the windows and jumped out of the plane. WADSWORTH later asked SCOTT LNU what was going on, to which he replied that he knew as much as she did. PENNY later said that the pilots are ok, everything is fine, and that they should stay by their doors. WADSWORTH asked if there was a warning signal that they should know about, to which PENNY replied that she did not know.

The passengers started becoming nervous. Only one passenger appeared angry and, "wanted to know what was going on." After awhile the passengers started making cell phone calls. RENE came over to WADSWORTH and said, "if the passengers are on the phone, it's ok, because if we need help, we can get the fuck out."

WADSWORTH had mentioned to RENE that she was becoming scared and RENE offered to switch jumpseats with her. They switched for approximately ten 10 minutes while WADSWORTH went to the back to compose herself.

WADSWORTH later saw RENE talking to one of the German military males, seated on the left aisle somewhere around rows 25 to 30. There were approximately six 6 German military officers. When asked later, RENE explained that she told them that she didn't know what was going on, but if there was a problem, she would want their help. The German military officer agreed to help and would attack if necessary. During this time no passengers appeared to be a threat and nothing appeared unusual.

Approximately 15 minutes before the staircase was placed next to the plane, SCOTT called all the flight attendants together to the front of the plane. WADSWORTH then called her mother, and told her to not panic, she is ok, she did not know what's going on,

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but the plane is surrounded by the police. WADSWORTH also tried to call her boyfriend, BEN FRADKIN, and left a voicemail message.

While WADSWORTH was waiting she received an incoming call from the Washington Metropolitan Police (703-585-22956 based on the cell phones call log.) An unknown female asked her what was happening, to which WADSWORTH asked PENNY how she should reply. PENNY said to tell her that everything is under control, and that she should turn her phone off. The unknown female asked if WADSWORTH could leave the phone on vibrate mode and call her back, to which PENNY told her to hang up and turn the phone off, which she did. WADSWORTH contacted her mother after she was disembarked from the flight and learned that her mother had called the airport police and gave them her cell phone number.

WADSWORTH did not see other crew members using their cell phones, although she recalls COLLEEN wanting to call her husband but only getting his voicemail.

WADSWORTH mentioned that she had only learned two days ago about the ACARS message which was used to tell pilots to abandon the plane if it was hijacked. WADSWORTH remembered being upset about hearing this because it seemed unfair to the flight attendants that they were not going to be alerted if there was an emergency. WADSWORTH was not told what to do if this situation ever occurs. WADSWORTH added that she had no concerns prior to the flight and was not overly concerned about flying.

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Personal
Privacy

The following is a list of phone calls in and out made from WADSWORTH cell phone:

Calls In: 7:29P 09/18/2001 1:28 703-585-22956 Metro Police
Calls Out: 8:25P 09/18/2001 4:45 HOME
7:22P 09/18/2001 :37 [redacted] Ben Friedkin
4:20P 09/18/2001 :04 [redacted]

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BEGPRODNO : M-INT-00004203
BEGBATES : 265A-NY-280350-302~31278
DATE : 09/18/2001
FBIDESCR : JAY STUART SPENCER, CAPTAIN OF NORTHWEST FLIGHT 36, DULLES
FULLTEXT : FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 09/19/2001

On September 18, 2001, JAY STUART SPENCER, Captain of Northwest Flight 36, Dulles to Amsterdam was interviewed at Dulles Int'l Airport, Dulles, VA 20166-7628. Also present during the interview was MARK A. RANDOL, Manager Federal Aviation Administration, telephone number [REDACTED]. After being advised of the purpose of the interview and the identity of interviewing agent, SPENCER provided the following information:

SPENCER provided a brief to his flight crew in the business class of the airplane. SPENCER did not notice anything unusual in the passenger screening or boarding. SPENCER stated that there was a heightened level of security at Gate B-15 for Northwest. U.S. Marshals, U.S. Customs, and INS were checking passengers identifications before boarding the plane. SPENCER told the Flight Attendants during his briefing to keep their eyes on people. If the attendants had any concerns they were to make sure the concerns were taken care of before the door closed and left the terminal. SPENCER did not want any passenger in the forward galley area and told the Flight Attendants to make sure they had communication with each other. SPENCER became aware that Flight 36 was unusual with the heightened security at the gate. Gate Agent had stated to some of the Flight Attendants that there was additional security concerning Flight 36. SPENCER confirmed in the cockpit area of the plane with Customs and INS agents that there were some name hits that they were looking for on flights, but the people were not on Flight 36. SPENCER said he never heard that Flight 36 was targeted for a possible hijacking.

Flight 36 was scheduled depart at 5:30pm from Dulles to Amsterdam. The flight was pushed back approximately fifteen minutes and taxied out of B-15 terminal at approximately 5:47pm. Flight 36 approached the run up area for 19R. SPENCER received clearance to take the runway from tower control and started to roll toward 19R. SPENCER received a call from tower to stop immediately. Flight 36 sat for a minute in the run up area for 19R and then received a call from tower to confirm that Flight 36 was still in the run up area. Tower asked SPENCER to confirm Flight 36 was squawking [REDACTED] emergency code. SPENCER confirmed that Flight 36 was squawking the appropriate code of [REDACTED] in the standby

9/11 Closed
by Statute

Investigation on 09/18/2001 at Dulles, Virginia

File # 265D-NY-280350-302 Date dictated
by SA [REDACTED]

9/11 Law
Enforcement
Privacy

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Continuation of FD-302 of JAY STUART SPENCER , On 09/19/2001 , Page 2

mode. SPENCER immediately contacted tower and said Flight 36 was not squawking code [REDACTED]. SPENCER contacted the tower and asked if they could tell him what was going on. Tower told SPENCER that they could not tell him. SPENCER looked at the ACARS (Automated Communications and Response) box for a nonverbal message in the cockpit. Dispatcher for Northwest out of Minneapolis had typed in a message to ACARS which SPENCER received and stated return to the gate ASAP. SPENCER got back on the radio with tower on a secure radio frequency and asked for permission from tower for an immediate return to gate B-15. SPENCER stated that the new emergency procedures as of 9/11/01 require the Captain to call PETRONILA SUTIKA, Lead Flight Attendant, up to the cockpit and conduct a conference call on the plane with all the Flight Attendants to see if there is a disturbance. SUTIKA reported to the pilot that one of the flight attendants, who SPENCER thought was RENEE, had reported that a Middle Eastern male was becoming nervous on the plane. SPENCER had made up his mind to vacate the plane along with HENRY WNUK, First Officer and WADE BLAUFUSS, Second Officer. SPENCER made an announcement to the Flight Attendants and passengers that he had to go through an emergency checklist and to conserve fuel for the long flight to Amsterdam, the planes engines would be shutting down. SPENCER, WNUK, and BLAUFUSS exited the plane through the window of the cockpit and the only person who was aware the flight crew had left the plane was SUTIKA. Once SPENCER was on the ground he contacted his dispatcher in Minneapolis and was told another message was sent through ACARS which said evacuate the aircraft. SPENCER stated he did not see the message since the flight crew was already out of the aircraft. No passenger had access or were in direct contact with the flight crew in the cockpit. SPENCER estimated he and the flight crew evacuated Flight 36 at sometime between 6:05 and 6:10pm.

9/11 Closed
by Statute

SPENCER said he spoke with JEFF CARLSON, Vice President of Flight Operations for Northwest, once SPENCER was out of the plane, and CARLSON told SPENCER that a Flight Attendant had called a police station about a possible situation on Flight 36.

Five of the Flight Attendants had flown with SPENCER since Saturday, 9/15/01 from Detroit to Amsterdam and Amsterdam to Dulles. One of the Flight Attendants name was not on the general declaration for Flight 36 and new general declaration had to be prepared. SPENCER also stated that three Flight Attendants were added to the general declaration from Dulles. The Flight Attendants were NICOLE SUIDAN, KIMBERLY DANIELE MELODY, and COLLEEN SWEAZY-QUICK.

SPENCER stated that on the inbound flight from Amsterdam to Dulles one of the flight attendants had an incident with a passenger in which the passenger, a Middle Eastern male, became upset SUTIKA, the Lead Flight Attendant had to step in. SPENCER believed the incident was between the passenger and RENEE, Flight Attendant.

SPENCER provided the following personal information:

NAME: JAY STUART SPENCER

DOB: [REDACTED]

SSAN: [REDACTED]

NORTHWEST #: [REDACTED]

ADDRESS: [REDACTED]

HOME TELEPHONE: [REDACTED]

POINT OF CONTACT: [REDACTED]

NORTHWEST AIRLINES

PRESIDENT: [REDACTED]

9/11
Personal
Privacy

[PDF page 3]

BEGPRODNO : M-INT-00062517
BEGBATES : 265A-NY-280350-302-46554
DATE = 10/08/2001
FBIDESC : TROY PIRO
FULLTEXT : FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/09/2001

TROY PIRO PIRO, born [redacted] employed by U.S. AIRWAYS, employee number [redacted] was interviewed at the Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport DFW, on the aircraft and in the area of gate B21. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the purpose of the interview, PIRO provided the following information:

9/11
Personal
Privacy

PIRO was the flight attendant working in first class on board U.S. AIRWAYS flight 1674, from Philadelphia to DFW, with the aircraft having tail number N728UW. It was unknown where the aircraft originated on today's date; however, it had been sitting at the gate in Philadelphia when PIRO boarded. The flight departed at approximately 1:50 p.m. Eastern Standard Time. Approximately thirty-five minutes after take-off, PIRO found a boxcutter on one of the first class catering carts.

PIRO found the boxcutter as he began preparing for the first food and beverage service. When trying to extend the top tray on first class cart number 000178, PIRO encountered unusual resistance. He forced it open and noticed that something was stuck between the sliding tray and the top of the cart's storage bin. Using his pen to reach into the narrow space, PIRO dislodged what appeared to be a boxcutter with a retractable razor blade. As PIRO described these events, he demonstrated using the actual cart. This cart was located between the first class section and the cockpit, on the far right side of the aircraft. PIRO was the only flight attendant present in this area when the above events occurred.

After dislodging the boxcutter, PIRO picked it up in his hand and placed it into his pants pocket. PIRO walked to the back of the aircraft to where the other flight attendants were located. He informed them of what he found and asked them to look in their carts in order to ensure that there were no more boxcutters. PIRO and the other flight attendants located no boxcutters or other suspicious objects in any of the other carts. PIRO first went to the other flight attendants because the crew tried to keep each

Investigation on 10/08/2001 at DFW Airport, Texas

File # 265A-NY-280350-302
by SA [redacted]

Date dictated 10/09/2001

9/11 Law
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[PDF page 1]

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265A-NY-280350-302

Continuation of FD-302 of Troy Piro , On 10/08/2001 , Page 2

other informed and because he wanted to ascertain whether there were any more suspicious items.

After briefly talking with the flight crew, PIRO took the boxcutter to the front of the aircraft and called the captain. The captain took custody of the boxcutter in the cockpit and sent an ACARS message to the U.S. AIRWAYS flight dispatcher in order to notify the dispatcher of the breach of security. The passengers were not informed of what happened, and no one acted as if they had any knowledge of the boxcutter. The flight was not diverted and proceeded normally to DFW.

Employees of U.S. AIRWAYS were responsible for loading and exchanging the carts for the food and beverage service. The relevant cart described above was not a cart that was used in the aisle of the aircraft; rather, it was a storage cart used to hold items that would be placed onto the aisle cart. U.S. AIRWAYS was currently serving first class passengers a snack along with beverages, with this snack being a single package. The employees who loaded the carts generally used a boxcutter or other knife to open the cardboard boxes that contained these snacks. In order to make it more convenient for the flight attendants, the catering employees frequently cut the boxes down the middle.

First class cart number 000178 was placed on board flight 1674 in Philadelphia by two U.S. AIRWAYS employees described as follows: a white female, blonde hair tied in pigtails, short, thin build, ruddy complexion; and an Hispanic male, unshaven, average height and build, with either black or grey hair. PIRO had seen the female on quite a few prior occasions and remembered her a little better because it was more unusual to see a woman performing the loading work. PIRO did not pay much attention to the male and was unable to give any further physical description beyond that listed above. PIRO believed that U.S. AIRWAYS security would be able to identify the employees who performed this work in Philadelphia.

PIRO did not observe the above male and female using a boxcutter for this flight; however, he has seen numerous other employees performing this same job while using boxcutters. When asked how the boxcutter would have gotten under the sliding tray, PIRO has seen the catering employees extending the trays in their work as well. When extended, the tray formed a larger tabletop on which to work. It was possible that the above male and female, or some other employee, accidentally left the boxcutter on cart 000178

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Continuation of FD-302 of Troy Piro , On 10/08/2001 , Page 3

either while it was on the aircraft or prior to it being loaded
onto the aircraft.

[PDF page 3]

BEGPRODNO
BEGBATES
DATE
FBIDESC
FULLTEXT

: M-INT-00088665
: 265A-NY-280350-302-73518
= 09/19/2001
: ELIZABETH ANN ANDERSON, DOB [redacted]
: FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

9/11
Personal
Privacy

Date of transcription 09/20/2001

Elizabeth Ann Anderson, date of birth [redacted]

[redacted] was advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the nature of the interview. Anderson provided the following information:

Anderson is a flight attendant for United Airlines and has been employed as such for 18 years. Her current route is the flight from Los Angeles International Airport to the International Airport at Dulles. She has been working five years on this same route. Anderson also works in the first class section on this route.

On September 11, 2001, Anderson, and the other flight attendants, Elizabeth Henley, and David Schmittke were working this same flight from Los Angeles to Dulles, Flight #962 on an Airbus A320. Flight #962 was scheduled to depart at 6:45am from Gate #69B. Check-in for the flight began at 5:45am so she and the other flight attendants boarded the airplane to get things ready. This flight was originally scheduled to have 12 passengers in first class and 126 coach passengers. When Anderson received the Individual Briefing Sheet IBS there were 12 passengers scheduled for first class and 74 passengers in coach.

Anderson never received a manifest for this flight. At boarding time there were 12 passengers in first class and 54 passengers in coach. As the passengers were boarding a notice came over the computer ACARS in the cockpit. The first officer had a printout from the computer which said that a plane had hit the World Trade Center and that United Airlines Flight #175 was unaccounted for. Anderson informed the first class passengers and her crew of this information.

Five minutes before their departure, she began to close the overhead bins. On Row #4 or #5 on the DEF side of the plane there was a very large, very heavy nylon cordura bag which was sticking out. She could not figure out how it got through security. Anderson asked who the bag belonged to. A man in Seat #1A jumped up and said it was his. She told him she was going to

Investigation on 09/19/01 at Colton, CA
File # 265A-NY-280350-302
by SA [redacted]

Date dictated

9/11 Law
Enforcement
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265A-NY-280350-302

Continuation of FD-302 of Elizabeth Ann Anderson , On 09/19/01 , Page 2

have to check his bag because it was too big to fit in the overhead compartment. He was very annoyed and told her that it would fit and shoved it in the compartment and closed the bin door.

Anderson noticed there were a lot of olive-skinned people in first class on this flight which is unusual and they all knew each other. There were at least eight people in this group. The seats she recalled they were sitting in were #1A, #2A, #2B, #3A, #3B possibly, #2D, #3D. They were standing and talking in the aisle. The passenger in #2B was on a cell phone with a headset and he and #3A were both on laptop computers. The male in #2B seemed to be the one talking to each one. She thought they must be going to a business meeting and he was the leader of the group. Anderson could not recall whether they were speaking English or another language. She felt their behavior was unusual because at that time in the morning passengers are usually sitting down and very calm. These people were on cell phones and computers, standing up and talking.

When Anderson told the first class passengers about the airplane hitting the World Trade Center, the other passengers were asking questions and all these people in this group seemed very non-chalant about what was happening. Anderson said they were then notified that all flights were grounded. The customer service agents boarded the plane and the first officer and Anderson made announcements that all flights were grounded. They told everyone to exit the aircraft with all of their belongings and to stay in the boarding area. Anderson and the other flight attendants had to wait for a wheelchair so when the cabin crew finally exited the aircraft there were no passengers left in the boarding area because they had closed the airport.

Later that day, one of the other flight attendant, David Schmittke called Anderson and told Anderson about a passenger in coach who was acting unusual when they were exiting the aircraft. Schmittke said this passenger looked Middle Eastern and when he described the man to Anderson she remembered him when he boarded the plane. During boarding, this man changed seats and sat all the way in the back which Anderson said was not unusual because the flight was not full and people move around to sit in their own row. When they were exiting the plane, this passenger kept looking toward the back of the plane. He also had a large heavy bag which took two hands to carry off the plane. Elizabeth Henley also remembered him because of his behavior when he was exiting the

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Continuation of FD-302 of Elizabeth Ann Anderson , On 09/19/01 , Page 3

plane. David Schmittke and Elizabeth Henley both notified supervisors about this passenger.

[PDF page 3]

BEGPRODNO : M-INT-00088670
BEGBATES : 265A-NY-280350-302-73521
DATE = 09/19/2001
FBIDESCR : EIZABETH MARY HENLEY, DOB [REDACTED]
FULLTEXT : FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 09/20/2001

9/11
Personal
Privacy

Elizabeth Mary Henley, date of birth [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the nature of the interview. Henley provided the following information:

Henley was a flight attendant on United Airlines Flight #962 from Los Angeles to Dulles Airport on September 11, 2001. The flight was scheduled to depart at 6:45am. During boarding, Henley was approached by a Garden Grove Police Officer Roosevelt LNU (last name unknown) who had a mutual friend with Henley. The police officer was flying on her flight, so he introduced himself and showed her his badge in private. He told her that the World Trade Center had just blown up. She told him she would check with the captain of the airplane on this information which she did and there was no news.

A few minutes later a message came up on the airplane computer ACARS that two American Airlines planes had crashed. She went to tell the police officer this information and she heard the captain say that two United Airlines jets were missing. Henley called her sister on her cell phone. Henley's sister told her about the two airplanes crashing into the World Trade Center. Henley relayed this information to the police officer; the police officer spoke with the captain and told him that his cousin worked in Operations for United Airlines and he would call her to find out what was going on. The police officer called his cousin and she told him that a plane had crashed into the Pentagon. Henley called her sister again and while she was on the phone with her sister the captain announced that two American Airline jets had crashed into the World Trade Center. The captain told the passengers to get their belongings and to leave the airplane.

While the passengers were exiting the plane, a male approximately 25-30 years old, clean shaven, black hair, dressed very nicely, shorter, small build, who Henley felt looked Middle Eastern was grinning and kept turning around and looking back toward the back of the airplane. She thought it was very odd behavior. This male was originally sitting somewhere around Row

Investigation on 09/19/01 at Ontario, CA

File # 265A-NY-280350-302 Date dictated
by SA [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of Elizabeth Mary Henley , On 09/19/01 , Page 2

#15DEF and he moved to the row across the airplane from the police officer somewhere around Row #20DEF. He was the last person to get off the airplane. Henley could not recall if he had any carry-on luggage.

Not only did Henley feel his behavior was odd but the other flight attendant, David Schmittke felt it was strange. Schmittke lives in Ventura and can be reached at telephone [REDACTED] They both reported this passenger to supervisors.

9/11
Personal
Privacy

[PDF page 2]

BEGPRODNO : M-INT-00091041
BEGBATES : 265A-NY-280350-302~75070
DATE = 09/13/2001
FBIDESCR : ON SEPTEMBER 13, 2001, BRIAN MONIEA, UNITED AIRLINES (UAL)
FULLTEXT : FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 09/14/2001

On September 13, 2001, Brian Moniea, United Airlines UAL, Flight Dispatch, World Headquarters, Elk Grove Village, IL provided the following information regarding a passenger on UAL flight 955.

Mr. Moniea was contacted by the captain, via Acars and radio communication, of UAL flight 955 which was scheduled to fly from London, United Kingdom to Chicago, IL and diverted to Edmonton, Canada. The flight crew noticed that upon departure from Edmonton to Chicago, IL on 09-13-2001, approximately 7:00 PM CST the flight crew noticed a passenger identified as [redacted] was not on the flight. The flight crew confirmed the luggage of [redacted] was not on the aircraft upon departure from Edmonton.

A flight attendant, identified as Eric Lerasle, overheard [redacted] make a telephone call, possibly to Saudi Arabia, upon the flights arrival/diversion in Edmonton, Canada.

On September 14, 2001, UAL Information Services provided records for the passenger name record for [redacted] made the reservation on August 4, 2001 thru American Airlines reservatin system. The reservations were booked in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia at Kanoo Travel in care of [redacted] at telephone [redacted]. Two additional telephone numbers in the reservation were [redacted].

9/11
Personal
Privacy

Investigation on 09-14-2001 at Elk Grove Village, IL

File # 265A-NY-280350
by SA [redacted]

Date dictated 09-14-2001

9/11 Law
Enforcement
Privacy

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[PDF page 1]

BEGPRODNO : M-INT-00103731
BEGBATES : 265A-NY-280350-302-86822
DATE : 09/18/2001
FBIDESCR : HENRY J WNUK INTERVIEW
FULLTEXT : FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 09/19/2001

Henry J. Wnuk, pilot for Northwest Airlines, social security account number SSAN [redacted]

9/11
Personal
Privacy

[redacted] was interviewed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI, Washington Field Office WFO and the Federal Aviation Administration FAA at Dulles International Airport. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents, Wnuk provided the following information.

Wnuk was the co-pilot for Northwest Airlines flight #36 that originated in Detroit, Michigan, bound for Amsterdam continuing on to New Delhi, India. Wnuk recalled the pilots boarded the aircraft at approximately 6:05 p.m. and had a 6:30 p.m. take off time. While in the cockpit, the pilots conducted routine start-up procedures and routine ground communications. The plane was pushed back from Northwest Airlines gate B-15 and proceeded to taxi to the assigned runway for take off. The pilots had normal ground control communications while they taxied to the runway. The pilots were instructed by ground communications to switch air traffic control ATC tower frequency. Wnuk stated this request to switch frequencies came a little early than normal, but was not out of the ordinary.

The captain continued to the end of the runway and was instructed by the ATC tower to wait for an incoming flight to land. The cockpit crew continued to conduct checks of the instruments while they waited. The captain informed the tower flight #36 was ready for take off. The tower responded to the captain to wait. The tower contacted the captain and instructed him to get into position and hold. The aircraft moved approximately five feet and the tower instructed the captain to "hold short" [of the runway]. The cockpit crew looked around and did not see any incoming flights and they were unsure why they were instructed to "hold short." The captain waited a minute or two before he contacted the ATC tower for an update. The ATC responded and told the captain to wait.

9/11 Closed
by Statute

The tower contacted the captain and stated, "We understand you are squawking [redacted]?" Wnuk explained [redacted] is the emergency code for a hijacking. Wnuk stated the ATC tower assigned

Investigation on 09/18/2001 at Dulles, Virginia

File # 265A-NY-280350 - 302

Date dictated 09/19/2001

9/11 Law
Enforcement
Privacy

by SA [redacted]

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FD-302a (Rev. 10-6-95)

265D-NY-280350

Continuation of FD-302 of Henry J. Wnuk , On 09/18/2001 , Page 2

9/11 Closed
by Statute

Northwest Airlines flight #36 a squawk code of [REDACTED]. The assigned squawk code is the code put in the aircraft transponder, and the transponder sends the flight information to ATC towers. The captain told the other cockpit members the tower indicated there is something wrong. The captain insisted the tower knew something they did not know.

Wnuk called the tower about flight #36 squawking [REDACTED] while captain contacted the lead flight attendant. Wnuk sent a message to the Northwest Airlines communications center in Minneapolis, Minnesota, through the Automated Communication and Response System ACARS. Wnuk sent a message that stated, "The ATC held us short and if we are squawking [REDACTED] which we are not."

The captain contacted the tower and asked what was going on and the tower knew something they did not. The tower responded negative. Wnuk received a message from ACARS instructing the captain to return the aircraft back to the gate as soon as possible ASAP, the captain then remarked, "Something is wrong." The tower contacted the captain and instructed him not to return to the gate. The tower then asked the captain if he has a discreet frequency to communicate on.

The cockpit crew discussed evacuating the aircraft. The captain decided they would evacuate the aircraft utilizing ropes located in the aircraft cockpit. Just before the cockpit crew evacuated made an announcement to the passengers there was an ATC delay and to save fuel the aircraft engines will be shut down. The cockpit crew then reviewed an evacuation check list. The captain contacted Penny and informed her the pilots will evacuate the aircraft and Penny informed the flight attendants of the captain's decision. After the pilots evacuated, they remained in front of the aircraft for airport authorities.

Penny remained in the cockpit after she assisted the pilots out of the plane. Penny received a call from one of the flight attendants in the rear of the plane. Penny was informed there was a male passenger that appeared to be agitated.

Approximately five to ten minutes after the pilots got out of the plane airport authorities, FBI agents, and a fire truck arrived at the plane. Approximately 30 minutes later the flight crew was loaded on a mobile lounge, the entire crew was accounted for with the exception of two flight attendants that remained on the plane. Wnuk stated he did not make any cellular telephone

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FD-302a (Rev. 10-6-95)

265D-NY-280350

Continuation of FD-302 of Henry J. Wnuk , On 09/18/2001 , Page 3

calls while on the plane. Wnuk did make two cellular telephone calls afterwards to his parents and girlfriend. Wnuk informed them he would not be going to Amsterdam and would stay in Washington, D.C. for that night. Wnuk did not discuss the incident with his parents or girlfriend.

[PDF page 3]

BEGPRODNO : M-INT-00151381
BEGBATES : 265A-NY-280350-302~90747
DATE = 12/10/2001
FBIDESCR : THERESA ANNE RIZZUTO
FULLTEXT : FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 12/10/2001

On 12/06/2001, Detective II [redacted] New Jersey State Police, and Special Agent [redacted] Newark Division, interviewed THERESA ANNE RIZZUTO, at her place of employment, UNITED AIRLINES UAL, Terminal A, NEWARK INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, Newark, New Jersey 07114, 973-961-5085. After the identities of the interviewing investigators was made known, RIZZUTO provided the following information.

9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy

RIZZUTO is the General Manager for UAL AT Newark Airport and is responsible for the daily oversight of UAL operations there. RIZZUTO provided a general understanding of the boarding procedures that were in place on 09-11-2001 for UAL FLIGHT 93. She identified the location of check-in as well as the UAL employee who conducted such on each of the four hijackers. RIZZUTO did this by comparing the issuing agent's identification number that was listed on each of the hijackers' boarding passes with the record of where the agent was assigned on 09-11-2001.

RIZZUTO advised that all of the suspected hijackers checked in at the front ticket counter of UAL. ZIAD JARRAH was checked in by [redacted] AHMAD AL HAZNAWI was checked in by [redacted] AHMED ALNAMI and SAEED ALGHAMDI were checked in by [redacted] RIZZUTO advised that [redacted] had recently retired subsequent to 09-11-2001. RIZZUTO could not provide the times of the check-ins. She claimed that they would be listed on the Passenger Name Records PNR, which are available through UAL corporate office.

9/11 Personal Privacy

RIZZUTO also advised that the following reports, available through the UAL corporate office, could also provide detailed times for check-in, "doors closed" and "push back" times related to UAL 93. These reports are as follows; ACI printout, Gate reader report, and the ACARS report.

In addition, RIZZUTO advised that UAL FLIGHT 93 was a "turn around" flight for UAL FLIGHT 78 which departed San Francisco at 7:01 p.m. on 09-10-2001.

Upon the conclusion of the interview RIZZUTO provided

Investigation on 12/06/2001 at Newark, New Jersey
File # 265A-NY-280350-NK Date dictated
SA [redacted]
by DETECTIVE II [redacted]

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265A-NY-280350-NK

Continuation of FD-302 of THERESA ANNE RIZZUTO , On 12/06/2001 , Page 2

copies of the following:

- a) a fuel receipt (F 359507) for UAL FLIGHT 93 indicating that 6,097 gallons of fuel was delivered at 0800 hrs. on 09-11-2001
- b) a United States Postal Service Air Contract Transportation Manifest
- c) a report indicating weight and freight distribution for UAL FLIGHT 93
- d) a dispatch flight plan for UAL FLIGHT 93
- e) a multiple container receipt for EWRFF USPS dated 09-11-2001
- f) a receipt for a battery powered wheelchair that was loaded on board UAL FLIGHT 93

These reports will be retained as evidence and will be stored in the 1A section of this file.

[PDF page 2]

BEGPRODNO
BEGBATES
DATE
FBIDESCR
FULLTEXT

: M-INT-00152817
: 265A-NY-280350-30011
= 01/22/2002
: TARA M CAMPBELL
: 1/22/2002

TARA M. CAMPBELL, born [REDACTED]

9/11
Personal
Privacy

[REDACTED] Work of 265 East
Beach Street, Long Beach, New York 11561 was interviewed at
United Airlines UAL Flight Operations in building 22A at John
F. Kennedy International Airport JFKIA. After being advised of
the identities of the interviewing agent and detective and the
nature of the interview she provided the following information:

CAMPBELL has been employed by United Airlines as a
Flight Operations Service Representative FOSR since June of
1999.

CAMPBELL recalled sending a ACARS message on 9/11/2001
to First Officer Leroy Homer on UAL 93.

CAMPBELL advised that the message she sent on 9/11/2001
was sent to the printer on UAL 93 and she further stated that is
the only way she can send a message. She advised that she does
not have the capability of sending a message to a display screen
on the aircraft.

CAMPBELL advised that she received a phone call from
Melody Homer on 9/11/2001 several minutes after the first plane
hit the World Trade Center WTC. Melody Homer wanted to know if
her husband Leroy was alright. CAMPBELL told Melody Homer that
she would send Leroy Homer an ACARS message to make sure he was
alright.

Campbell advised that she sent the ACARS message and
received no response from the cockpit. CAMPBELL advised that she
attempted to send the message two more times and on the third
attempt the word "SECURE" started flashing on her computer
screen. CAMPBELL advised that this was right after the second
plane hit the WTC.

CAMPBELL advised that she did not use any security or
safety codes in the ACARS message she sent to UAL 93. CAMPBELL
said that she did not send any other ACARS messages to UAL 93 on
9/11/2001.

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1/22/2002 Jamaica, New York

265A-NY-280350

SA [REDACTED]

[PDF page 1]

not use any code words in this message, and he did not receive any confirmation of receipt from the flight crew. PRICE also contacted the UAL facility in London, England, and advised them to try and contact flight 75. PRICE subsequently heard reports that flight 75 had crashed, and did not send any more messages to that flight.

At approximately 6:30 or 6:45 a.m., RICH BELME, another systems maintenance controller, received a call from a flight attendant on board UAL flight 93 via a GTE air phone. This flight attendant advised BELME that flight 93 had been hijacked. Upon hearing this, PRICE again advised his manager, then sent an ACARS message to the computer screen in the cockpit of flight 93. When PRICE was shown the text of this message, contained in the log of ACARS messages to flight 93, PRICE recognized it as the message he sent. He specifically remembered that he asked the aircrew to confirm reports of an "incident," and did not use the word "hijacking." PRICE did not use any code words in this message, and did not receive any confirmation of receipt from the flight crew. He subsequently heard reports that flight 93 had crashed, and did not send any more messages to that flight.

PRICE believes that BELME was interviewed by FBI agents immediately after the hijackings in September.

[PDF page 2]

BEGPRODNO
BEGBATES
DATE
FBIDESC
FULLTEXT


: M-INT-00131960
: 265A-NY-280350-302~103771
= 02/17/2002
: 1/21-INFORMATION PROVIDED BY [REDACTED]
: FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 02/17/2002

GRAND JURY MATERIAL - DISSEMINATE PURSUANT TO RULE 6e



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Investigation on 02/14/2002 at Chicago, IL

File # 265A-NY-280350

SA [REDACTED]

Date dictated

9/11 Law
Enforcement
Privacy

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
[PDF page 1]

FD-302a (Rev. 10-6-95)

265A-NY-280350

Continuation of FD-302 of

, On 02/14/2002 , Page 2



9/11 Closed by
Statute
9/11 Personal
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[PDF page 2]

BEGPRODNO
BEGBATES
DATE
FBIDESC
FULLTEXT

: M-INT-00122203
: 265A-NY-280350-302-104048
= 02/18/2002
: INTERVIEW OF DAVID KNERR RE UA FLT 93
: FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 02/18/2002

On 02/15/2002, Detective II [redacted] NEW JERSEY
STATE POLICE, and Special Agent SA [redacted] FBI
Newark Division, interviewed DAVID KNERR, Manager, Dispatch Automation,
located at UA's World Headquarters
at 1200 East Algonquin Road, Elk Grove Village, Illinois 60007,
telephone 847 700-3010. Present during the interview were SA [redacted]
[redacted] FBI Chicago Division, and JEFF PLANTZ, Senior Investigator
Flight Safety for UA. After the identity of the interviewing agents
and the nature of the interview was made known, KNERR provided the
following information.

KNERR provided information related to the printout of text
messages transmitted to and from UA FLIGHT 93 on 09/11/2001 through
the AIRCRAFT COMMUNICATION ADDRESSING AND REPORTING SYSTEM (ACARS).
KNERR identified this system as one means of communication that is
utilized between aircraft and commercial carriers, like UA, to
transmit text data. KNERR related that data is either uplinked to the
aircraft from fixed communication centers or downlinked from the
aircraft to receiving communication centers. KNERR explained the
uplink and downlink references on an ACARS message. DLBLK refers to
downlink while ULBLK refers to uplink.

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These references also identify that a ACARS message has
been received by its sender, either ground communications or the
aircraft. In the final moments, at 10:12 AM EST, of UA FLIGHT 93's
flight, ACARS messages were being sent from ground communications
but were not being received. This was causing the ACARS messages to
be rejected. KNERR advised that FLIGHT 93's low altitude may have
caused this dilemma or the fact that FLIGHT 93 had already crashed
at the time the messages were sent.

KNERR further advised that AERONAUTICAL RADIO INCORPORATED
ARINC serves as the network administrator for the communication
data. According to KNERR, this is important to remember when
reviewing data messages because uplink and downlink times may show a
time delay when compared. This is caused by the processing of multiple
ACARS messages through the ARINC network at the same time. ARINC
serves a substantial portion of the commercial airline industry
operating within the United States. Depending on the time of day or

Investigation on 02/15/2002 at Chicago, IL
File # 265A-NY-280350-NK Date dictated
by SA [redacted] DET II [redacted]

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265A-NY-280350-NK

Continuation of FD-302 of DAVID KNERR , On 02/15/2002 , Page 2

region of the country that an aircraft may be operating over, ACARS traffic can be delayed.

KNERR advised that when an aircraft downlinks data to communication towers it does so by sending out messages over a large geographic area that it is flying. Depending on the area of the country, more than one communication tower may receive the aircraft's message. KNERR pointed this out to be the case during FLIGHT 93's flight over New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Ohio on 09/11/2001.

In addition, KNERR pointed out that on two separate instances during FLIGHT 93's flight on 09/11/2001, prior to crashing in Pennsylvania, two alphanumeric messages were sent from the aircraft to ground communication. These messages were routine maintenance messages that are sent in order to identify the current state of mechanical operations onboard an aircraft during flight. It allows for specialists to view specific mechanical data onboard an aircraft while it is in operation. KNERR advised that these messages, once deciphered, may contain information that would demonstrate that the aircraft was being operated in a manner that was adversely affecting the performance of the aircraft. The analysis of these messages is forthcoming.

The ACARS report provided by KNERR will be maintained in the 1A section of this file. Moreover, this data will also be included in the Newark Investigative Summary, Flight Operations Time Line.

[PDF page 2]


BEGPRODNO : M-INT-00153514
BEGBATES : 265A-NY-280350-302~104799
DATE = 02/16/2002
FBIDESCR : INTERVIEW OF [REDACTED]
FULLTEXT : FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 02/16/2002

GRAND JURY MATERIAL - DISSEMINATE PURSUANT TO RULE 6e



Investigation on 02/14/2002 at Chicago, IL

File # 265A-NY-280350-NK Date dictated

by SA [REDACTED]
Det [REDACTED]

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
[PDF page 1]

FD-302a (Rev. 10-6-95)

265A-NY-280350-NK

Continuation of FD-302 of

, On 02/14/2002 , Page 2



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
[PDF page 2]

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265A-NY-280350-NK

Continuation of FD-302 of

, On 02/14/2002 , Page 3



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Continuation of FD-302 of

, On 02/14/2002 , Page 4

The items provided by [redacted] will be maintained in

separate 1As.

[PDF page 4]

BEGPRODNO : M-INT-00125731
BEGBATES : 265A-NY-280350-302-107780
DATE = 12/19/2001
FBIDESCR : INTERVIEW
FULLTEXT : FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 12/19/2001

[redacted] Special Investigator and Firearms Instructor, Firearms Training Unit, FBI Academy, was interviewed at the Dulles International Airport. Also present for initial part of the interview were Assistant United States Attorneys ROBERT SPENCER, Eastern District of Virginia, KENNETH KARAS, Southern District of New York, and DAVID J. NOVAK, EDVA, Richmond Division. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing and observation Agents, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted] escorted the interviewing Agents aboard a United Airlines UA Boeing 757 for the purpose of a familiarization exercise. [redacted] pointed out and described the functionality of the Aircraft Communication and Reporting System ACARS, the Flight Management Computers FMCs, the Inertial Reference Units IRUs, the VOR, autopilot and communications systems of the plane.

Regarding the FMC, the flight path is programmed in the FMC by either entering latitude and longitude coordinates or the three letter identifier for a specific navigation aid navaid or airport. After the initial flight path has been entered in the GPS, anyone with some familiarity with the FMC system can easily modify the initial flight plan with only a few keystrokes. The commercial Boeing 737-300 series possesses an FMC which is similar to the 757 but commercial Boeing 727s do not have an FMC.

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Regarding the VOR, a plane must be within approximately 200 miles of the tower site to receive the radial beacon signal. The VOR is an older navigational aid and is typically used as a

Investigation on 12/18/2001 at Dulles International Airport
File # 265A-NY-280350-302 Date dictated 12/19/2001
by [redacted] 9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy

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[PDF page 1]

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265A-NY-280350-302

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 12/18/2001, Page 2

back up to land the plane in the event the electronic GPS aids are not functioning.

[redacted] pointed out the microphones from which records sounds on the Cockpit Voice Recorder CVR. These microphones are located above the Captain's head, in the Pilot's and First Officer's radio headset, the Captain and First Officer's handheld radio and in the Captain's and First Officer's oxygen masks. Federal Aviation Administration FAA regulations dictate oxygen mask usage by the Pilot or the First Officer in the event the Pilot or First Officer is alone in the cockpit at altitudes greater than 25,000 feet. FAA regulations further dictate that when a commercial airliner is flying at altitudes greater than 41,000 feet, both the Captain and the First Officer are required to wear an oxygen mask when in the cockpit. [redacted] noted that oxygen mask usage results in muffled voices and speculated that the occurrence of muffled voices on the CVR could be indicative of oxygen mask usage. [redacted] demonstrated the functionality of the aircraft's radio and public address PA buttons. These buttons control with whom the Captain or the First Officer speaks. Only one of the buttons can be selected at a time. There are two sets of the buttons. One set is for the Captain and the other is for the First Officer. [redacted] did not believe that the hijacker pilot used the Captain's headset because the headset probably would not have fit him properly and would have been tossed aside. If the headset were tossed aside, the CVR may reflect banging noises if the headset impacted the walls of the cockpit.

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A fire axe is located behind the seat of the First Officer near the floor. The First Officer sits on the right of the cockpit while the Captain sits on the left. The fire axe is used to break through panels to aid in the extinguishing of on-board fires and is also used as an extrication tool for escape. Some Boeing 757s have two jumpseats in the cockpit while others only have one.

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Cockpit keys are maintained by the Captain, the First Officer and some Flight Attendants. Some Flight Attendants used to carry the cockpit key on their security badge neck chains. Prior to September 11, 2001, a cockpit key was also maintained outside the cockpit in the forward galley area.

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[redacted] demonstrated the use of the ACARS system by retrieving and displaying several weather reports which had been sent earlier in the day. The ACARS system is a VHF-based radio system which is synchronized with Coordinated Universal Time UTC. ACARS messages are received on either the ACARS display screen or a small printer. [redacted] printed out an example of a printed ACARS message. This message was placed in a 1A envelope. A visual indicator on the ACARS screen labeled "MSG" flashes when a message is received. This indicator is difficult to see. Because the indicator is difficult to see, critical messages are typically forwarded to the printer which is more obvious to the Captain or First Officer rather than to the display screen.

[redacted] was provided access to the preliminary National Traffic Safety Board NTSB UA 93 Flight Profile, Flight Data Recorder FDR narrative, Altitude Profile graph and FDR graphs. The full flight FDR graph reflected that at about 09:40, the altitude of the aircraft increased to over 40,000 feet while the speed decreased to less than 200 knots. [redacted] noted that a potential stall of the aircraft might have occurred if the aircraft speed had decreased to less than 190 knots at this altitude. [redacted] clarified that a stall in the engines would not have occurred, however, "the wings would have stopped flying."

The NTSB Final 6-minute FDR graph, Flight Profile and FDR narrative reflect that at about 10:00, a "series of control column inputs caused the aircraft to pitch nose-up and nose-down aggressively" which caused the gravitational pull to range from +4 to -1 G. [redacted] noted that the FDR graph only reflected the negative G force to -1 G and questioned whether the negative G force was even measurable at a level greater than -1 G. [redacted] speculated that UA flight 93 might have experienced negative G force greater than -1 G. The Boeing 757 is rated for negative G force up to -1 G. Any negative G force greater than -1 would have unpredictable and potentially detrimental effects on the integrity of the aircraft's structure. [redacted] speculated that the UA flight 93 was probably "coming apart" if the negative G force of the aircraft was greater than -1 G.

The Flight Plan Forecast contains weather briefings and might also contain previous pilot reports.

[redacted] reviewed the UA ACARS log for UA flight 93 on 9/11/2001. The abbreviation EWR is the three letter identifier for Newark International Airport. The abbreviation CHIDD represents

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the UA Dispatch in Chicago, IL. The abbreviation DTW is the three letter identifier for Detroit International Airport. The abbreviation JFKFOUA refers to the UA Flight Operations Office at JFK International Airport. [redacted] commented that the message sent from UA flight 93 at 13:21 9:21 Eastern Time indicated that the Captain had encountered occasional light chop and the wind was 290/50. [redacted] surmised that the Captain could have delayed allowing cabin movement due to the occasional light chop.

Regarding the message stating "Leroy, Melody wants to make sure you are o.k. send me back a message" which was sent to UA 93 from JFKFOUA at 13:22 9:22 ET, [redacted] commented that it is unusual for messages of a personal nature to be forwarded on the ACARS system. [redacted] opined that it was suspicious that Leroy did not acknowledge receipt of that message because if he [redacted] were piloting an aircraft and received such a message, he would immediately respond.

Regarding the ACARS message stating "HOW'S THE WX. CAN DISPATCH BE OF ANY ASSISTANCE?" sent by Chicago Dispatch at 13:36 9:36 ET, [redacted] stated that this message which appeared to be inquiring about the weather was not a standard UA code, but that it appeared to be an attempt by the dispatcher to ascertain the status of UA flight 93.

[redacted] reviewed the FAA radio communications transcript for UA flight 93. [redacted] explained Liberty West, Franklin-R, and Lorain-R are names given to aircraft control towers that have responsibility for a specific geographic flight area. The controllers operating under the given names could be at the same physical location sitting side by side.

Of particular interest on the FAA radio communications transcript was a transmission at 9:35:36 in which Cleveland Tower directed UA flight 93 "if able ah squawk trip please." The word trip is an old codeword to identify a hijacking in progress and squawk is a codeword to instruct the Captain to turn the transponder to [redacted].

[redacted] reviewed the VCR transcript of ExecuJet 956.

The Aeronautical Radio Incorporated ARINC relays radio transmissions from aircraft to its respective home company counterpart. ARINC allows United pilots and pilots of other airlines to communicate via radio transmissions with their

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[PDF page 4]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 12/18/2001, Page 5

respective corporate offices even though the aircraft is physically located on the other side of the world.

The UA e-mail system is called UNIMATIC.

Robert Spielman is the UA Chief Pilot for the New York Pilot domicile. Spielman could identify the First Officers who

have flown with UA 93 Captain Jason Dahl. These First Officers could provide information regarding Dahl's in-flight habits including when he allowed Flight Attendants to begin food service, when he allowed passengers to move around the cabin, his food and beverage habits and if and where he allowed cockpit keys to be located outside the cockpit.

A representative of UA In-Flight Services can provide specifics regarding UA 93's in-flight service routines.

Several photographs were taken of the cockpit and First Class and Coach sections of the plane. These photographs were placed in 1A envelopes.

Copies of the preliminary NTSB UA 93 Flight Profile, NTSB FDR narrative, NTSB Altitude Profile graph, NTSB FDR graphs, the FAA Tower communications transcript and the ExecuJet 956 CVR transcript were placed in a 1A envelope.

[PDF page 5]

BEGPRODNO : M-INT-00137324
BEGBATES : 265A-NY-280350-302~110931
DATE = 02/21/2002
FBIDESCR : INTERVIEW
FULLTEXT : FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 02/23/2002

JIM RITTER, Chief, Vehicle Performance Division, Office of Research and Engineering, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD NTSB, 490 L'Enfant Plaza East S.W., furnished the following items to the interviewing Agents:

1. ACARS message traffic printouts for AA 11 and AA 77, dated 9/11/2001
2. ACARS message traffic printouts for UA 175, dated 9/11/2001.
3. ACARS message traffic printouts for UA 93, dated 9/11/2001.
4. NTSB Specialist's Report and Transcripts containing ATC Transmissions in printed and electronic format, for AA 11, UA 175, AA 77 and UA 93.
5. Autopilot, Navigation Equipment and Fuel Consumption Reports and Graphs in printed and electronic format for AA 77 and UA 93.
6. Flight Data Recorder FDR Factual Report in printed and electronic format for AA 77.
7. Flight Data Recorder FDR Factual Report in printed and electronic format for UA 93.
8. Flight Path Study Reports for AA 11, UAL 175, AA 77 and UA 93.
9. Radar Data Impact Speed Study Report for AA 11 and UA 175.
10. Impact Speed Study Video Data and Debris Trajectory Studies Reports for UA 175.
11. Photographs of the WTC and Pentagon Crash sites in electronic format.

Investigation on 02/21/2002 at Washington, D.C.

File # 265A-NY-280350-302

Date dictated 02/23/2002

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by SA [redacted]
SA [redacted]

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[PDF page 1]

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Continuation of FD-302 of Jim Ritter , On 02/21/2002 , Page 2

12. Radar Data Study in printed and electronic format
for AA 11, UA 175, AA 77 and UA 93.

13. Radar Data All Collected in electronic format.

14. AA 77 Animation in VHS, DVD and DVCAM formats.

15. WTC News Footage in Beta and VHS formats.

These items were placed in bulky evidence storage
1B4734.

[PDF page 2]

BEGPRODNO : M-INT-00154741
BEGBATES : 265A-NY-280350-302~111882
DATE = 01/29/2002
FBIDESC : ON JANUARY 29, 2002 EDWARD D. BALLINGER WAS CONTACTE
FULLTEXT : FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 02/14/2002

On January 29, 2002, EDWARD D. BALLINGER was contacted at his residence, [REDACTED]. The interviewing Agent identified himself to Mr. BALLINGER and told him the interview concerned his employment with UNITED AIRLINES UAL as an aircraft dispatcher on September 11, 2001. Mr. BALLINGER voluntarily provided the following information:

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He retired from UAL in October 2001 after approximately 42 years in flight dispatch.

On September 11, 2001, he started work at approximately 7:00am as a commercial aircraft dispatcher. He was assigned 16 flights that were flying from the east coast to the west coast and originated from Boston, Massachusetts, JOHN F. KENNEDY, New York, LA GUARDIA, New York, and Newark, New Jersey.

He first became aware of the incident from UAL Manager MIKE BARBER who worked in line maintenance. From his understanding, a flight attendant who was possibly on UAL Flight 175, telephoned UAL line maintenance at approximately 7:50am. A representative from line maintenance contacted Flight 175 to determine what the flight attendant had informed them, that the aircraft was hijacked. He was notified by BARBER at approximately 8:01am CST, 1301 Zulu time, that there may be some problems on several of the flights.

At approximately 9:24am CST, 1324 Zulu time, he sent a message to all 16 UAL flights that were his responsibility. The message said "Beware any cockpit intrusion..Two aircraft in NY hit trade center builds." He explained these Aircraft Condition and Reporting System ACARS messages are often sent in abbreviated form that is familiar to the cockpit crew and flight dispatch. When he sent this message, he was unaware UA Flight 175 had been hijacked.

When he sent the messages, he would have sent one message to activate an internal chime in the cockpit which would alert the pilots audibly that there was a message. He also sent a message that would activate a light that the pilots would see to alert them

Investigation on 1/29/2002 at Arlington Heights, IL
File # 265A-NY-280350 Date dictated 2/6/2002
by SA [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of EDWARD D. BALLINGER , On 1/29/2002 , Page 2

that there was a message on the ACARS printer. He does not recall activating the printer in the cockpit but believed the printer would have been activated with the audible chime.

Assisting him during this time were SANDY ROGERS, BOB BRITAIN, and CHAD MCCURDY. ROGERS was on the ATC desk and BRITAIN and MCCURDY were on the dispatch desk.

In regards to the other messages that he had sent, the purpose was to continue to alert the 16 flights, that he was responsible for, regarding the cockpit intrusion and aircraft disasters. He did not use any safety and/or security wording in the messages to the aircraft.

Regarding any other messages that may be significant, he said that at approximately 1259 Zulu time, San Francisco line maintenance employee JERRY TSEN sent a message stating "I heard of a reported incident aboard your aircraft. Please verify all is normal thanks 777SAM". This message was directed to UA Flight 175. He explained the letters SAM stand for Systems Aircraft Maintenance. The following was obtained from interview and observation:

Name: EDWARD D. BALLINGER
Sex: Male
Race: White
DOB:
Residence:
Home Telephone:
Employment: Retired October 2001 from UA as commercial aircraft dispatcher

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Privacy

BEGPRODNO : M-INT-00154742
BEGBATES : 265A-NY-280350-302-111884
DATE = 02/25/2002
FBIDESCRIPTION : ON FEBRUARY 25, 2002, ROBERT R. BRITTAIN WAS CONTACT
FULLTEXT : FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 02/28/2002

On February 25, 2002, ROBERT R. BRITTAIN was contacted and interviewed at his place of employment UNITED AIRLINES UA, Elk Grove Village, Illinois. The interviewing Agent identified himself to Mr. BRITTAIN and told him the interview concerned his employment activities with UA on September 11, 2001. Mr. BRITTAIN voluntarily provided the following information:

He started work that day at approximately 6:45 a.m., as an aircraft dispatcher at UA Operations Center. He was assigned Desk 14 that day and his responsibilities included the arrival of UA Flights into LaGuardia Airport, New York, New York. Most of the flights originated in Denver, Colorado, and Miami, Florida. His normal job duties would not have included any contact with UA Flight 93.

He did have contact via the Aircraft Condition and Reporting System ACARS with UA Flight 93. This was a result of UA Flight 1523 contacting him at UA Dispatch by an ACARS message. UA Flight 1523, enroute from LaGuardia to Denver, Colorado, sent a message "LGADEN have 93 call 133.37." He explained that as aircraft travel across the country, the FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION FAA, Air Traffic Control Center ATC, maintains radio contact with the aircraft. Often times an aircraft does not tune to a radio frequency as directed by the FAA ATC. When the FAA ATC attempts to contact a particular flight, another flight will hear the radio contact and send an ACARS message to UA dispatch notifying them of the FAA ATC radio traffic. UA dispatch will then send an ACARS message to the flight that the FAA ATC is attempting to contact. This message from UA 1523 appeared on his computer screen and on a printer at his desk.

On receipt of the ACARS message from UA Flight 1523 regarding UA Flight 93, he sent a message to UA Flight 93, "Call 133.37." At the time of this message he was unaware of UA Flight 93 being hijacked. He was only responding to what is a routine matter that an FAA ATC is unable to contact a particular flight. To the best of his knowledge, the message that he sent to UA Flight 93 would have appeared on the ACARS screen in the aircraft and he did not activate the audible alarm inside the aircraft.

Investigation on 2/25/02 at Elk Grove Village, Illinois
File # 265A-NY-280350 Date dictated 2/26/02
by 9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy

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265A-NY-280350

Continuation of FD-302 of ROBERT R. BRITTAIN

, On 2/25/02 , Page 2

The following was obtained from interview and observation:

Name: Robert R. Brittain
Race: White
Sex: Male
DOB: [REDACTED]
Employment: UNITED AIRLINES WORLD
HEADQUARTERS
1200 E. Algonquin Rd
Elk Grove Village, IL
Job Title: UA Employee [REDACTED]
Aircraft Dispatcher
Since 9/90
Work Telephone: [REDACTED]
Residence: [REDACTED]

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Mr. Brittain provided a copy of the message from UA Flight 1523 and the message that he sent to UA Flight 93 on September 11, 2001.

[PDF page 2]

BEGPRODNO : M-INT-00154745
BEGBATES : 265A-NY-280350-302~111887
DATE = 02/25/2002
FBIDESCR : ON FEBRUARY 25, 2002, ALLESSANDRO (SANDY) D. ROGERS
FULLTEXT : FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 02/28/2002

On February 25, 2002, ALESSANDRO SANDY D. ROGERS was interviewed at his place of employment, UNITED AIRLINES UA, Elk Grove Village, Illinois. The interviewing Agent identified himself to Mr. ROGERS and told him that the interviewed concerned his employment activities with UA on September 11, 2001. Mr. ROGERS voluntarily provided the following information:

On September 11, 2001, he began work at approximately 7:00 a.m., as an Air Traffic Coordinator for the west section of the country. In his job responsibilities for that day he was assigned any air traffic issues at the UA Hubs west of Chicago in the United States. There is a separate position for all air traffic issues to the east of Chicago.

He was aware of the crashes on September 11, from watching a television in the UA Operations Center.

One of the problems on September 11, was some of the UA flights had lost radio contact, referred to as Nordn, with FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION FAA AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL CENTERS ATC. When an aircraft loses radio contact with the FAA ATC, the ATC will often contact UA and request a message be sent up via the Aircraft Condition and Reporting System ACARS to have that particular flight contact the ATC on a specific radio frequency.

In regard to the ACARS message he sent to UA Flight 93, he recalled receiving a call from the ATC that was handling UA Flight 93 requesting the ACARS message be sent requesting UA Flight 93 contact the ATC. The procedure at the time was the message would be sent to the aircraft on ACARS screen and that an audible alarm would not be activated. The reason that he put the words "ASAP" in the ACARS message was that he was aware of the crashes into the World Trade Center.

He also sent an additional message to all dispatchers at the UAL Operations Center which stated "There may be addnl hijackings in progress you may want to advise your flts to stay on alert and shut down all cockpit access inflt, SANDY per MGMT." This was sent at the request of UA management after the two

Investigation on 2/25/02 at Elk Grove Village, Illinois
File # 265A-NY-280350 Date dictated 2/26/02
by [9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy]

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aircraft crashed into the World Trade Center. He provided a copy of this message.

The following information was obtained from interview and observation:

Name: ALESSANDRO "SANDY" D. ROGERS
Sex: Male
Race: White
DOB: [REDACTED]
Employment: UNITED AIRLINES WORLD

HEADQUARTERS
1200 EAST ALGONQUIN ROAD
ELK GROVE VILLAGE, IL

Work Telephone: [REDACTED]
UA Employee Number: [REDACTED]
Job Title: [REDACTED]
Residence: [REDACTED]

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BEGPRODNO : M-INT-00154752
BEGBATES : 265A-NY-280350-302~111892
DATE = 01/28/2002
FBIDESCR : ON JANUARY 28, 2002, MICHAEL J. WINTER WAS INTERVIEW
FULLTEXT : FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 02/08/2002

On January 28, 2002, Michael J. Winter was interviewed at United Airlines UAL, World Headquarters, 1200 E. Algonquin Road, Elk Grove Village, IL. The interviewing Agent identified himself to Mr. Winter and told him the interview concerned UAL flight 93 on September 11, 2001 and the communications between UAL flight 93 and the flight dispatchers. Mr. Winter voluntarily provided the following information regarding these communications.

In reviewing the Sanitized Time and Text of ACARS messages as provided by the FBI, Mr. Winter said Message #1 was from the aircraft to UAL Dispatch. Message #2 was to the aircraft from UAL Dispatch at John F. Kennedy International Airport, New York, NY and Message #3 was to the aircraft from UAL flight dispatcher ED BALLINGER. Message #4 was from the aircraft to UAL flight dispatcher BALLINGER. Message #5, listed as unreadable, was engine data advisory information. Message #6 was from UAL flight dispatcher A.D. "Sandy" ROGERS to the aircraft and Message #7 was from UAL flight dispatcher ROBERT BRITTAIN to the aircraft. Message #8 was to the aircraft from BALLINGER and Message #9, listed as unreadable, was the engine data advisory information. Message #10 was from UAL flight Dispatcher CHAD McCURDY to the aircraft. Except for Message #13, which was to the aircraft from UAL San Francisco Maintenance, DAVID PRICE, all of the other messages listed were from UAL flight dispatcher BALLINGER.

Mr. Winter explained the Aircraft Condition and Reporting System ACARS uses radio ground stations RGS at various locations throughout the United States for communication. The messages from the aircraft utilize the RGS in a downlink operating system. A central router determines the strongest signal received from the aircraft and routes the signal/message to UAL flight dispatch.

Message #1 was routed from the aircraft through the RGS near Pittsburgh, PA PIT as designated in the line "DT DDL PIT.....". Message #2, to the aircraft, was also routed through the RGS near Pittsburgh, PA and was directed to the ACARS printer on the aircraft. The routing to the printer is designated by the letters "AGM" following "Smi=AGM" and "<STX=AGM..".

Investigation on 01-28-2002 at Elk Grove Village, IL
File # 265A-NY-280350 Date dictated 02-04-2002
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Message #3 was a message to the aircraft from Chicago Dispatch CHIDD listed as a Command Response CMD type message. The CMD message, designated in the line "Smi=CMD Agy/Num=65535", was sent to the ACARS screen and utilized the RGS near Pittsburgh, PA. In this type of message, the flight dispatcher can also activate an audible signal to alert the flight crew of the sent message but this was not done.

Message #4 was sent from the aircraft to UAL flight dispatch using the RGS near Pittsburgh, PA. The designation "C4" appears just before the sentence "EWRSFO...." indicating the message was from the aircraft.

Message #5 was an engine data message which was sent automatically to UAL Chicago dispatch and a UAL maintenance computer. The information in the message as "N41.20 W080.5" was the latitude and longitude of the aircraft when the data was sent.

Message #6 was a message to the aircraft from CHIDD using a RGS near Akron/Canton, OH CAK and was sent to the ACARS screen. The designation for Akron/Canton, OH CAK appears in the line beginning "AN N591UA/GL CAK....".

Message #7 was sent to the aircraft from CHIDD using a RGS near Akron/Canton, OH. The message was sent to the ACARS screen and was a CMD type message.

Message #8 was sent to the aircraft from CHIDD using the RGS near Akron/Canton, OH. This message was a CMD message and also activated the audible signal. The audible signal designated as "BEL" in the line "QUCHIAKUA-1-BEL>UA93....".

Message #9 was an engine data message. The latitude and longitude was also listed in the message as "N41.31 W081.6".

Message #10 was sent to the aircraft from CHIDD and was sent to the ACARS screen only. The RGS in this instance was near Cleveland, OH CLE from the line "AN N591UA/GL CLE...".

Messages #11 and #12 were sent to the aircraft from CHIDD using the RGS near Cleveland, OH. These messages also activated the audible signal in the aircraft.

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Message #13 was sent to the aircraft from UAL San Francisco, CA line maintenance to the ACARS screen and also activated the audible signal. The RGS for the message was near Toledo, OH as designated "TOL" in the line "AN N591UA/GL TOL...".

Messages #14 and #15 were sent to the aircraft from CHIDD using the RGS near Toledo, OH. The messages were sent to the ACARS printer.

Messages #16 and #17 were sent to the aircraft from CHIDD using the RGS near Ft. Wayne, IN FWA as designated in the line "AN N591UA/GL FWA...". The messages were sent to the ACARS printer.

Messages #18 and #19 were sent to the aircraft from CHIDD using the RGS near Champaign, IL CMI as designated in the line "AN N591UA/GL CMI...". Both messages were sent to the printer and Message #19 also activated an audible signal in the aircraft.

Messages #20 to #24 were sent to the aircraft from CHIDD. However, all of the messages were rejected indicating the aircraft did not receive them.

Also present during part of this interview was David Knerr, Manager Flight Dispatch Automation, UAL WHQ.

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