

BEGPRODNO : M-INT-00017133
 BEGBATES : 265A-NY-280350-CI-125
 DATE = 09/12/2001
 FBIDESC : WILLIAM P. MCNEER
 INPUTBATCH : NCTA_004 (1st Batch of unredacted 302's delivered in August)
 FULLTEXT : FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 09/13/2001

WILLIAM P. MCNEER, Vice President Safety-Security,
 Executive Jet, Inc., 4111 Bridgeway Avenue, Columbus, Ohio, 43219,
 telephone [REDACTED] was advised of the identities of the
 interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview. MCNEER then
 provided the following information:

After MCNEER learned that Executive Jet 956 may have been
 in the vicinity of United 93 during a hijacking, MCNEER ordered
 the removal of the cockpit voice recorder CVR from 956. The
 recorder was removed from the jet on September 11, 2001 at the
 Columbus, Ohio base of Executive Jet, by MARK MOBERLY at
 approximately 12:00 noon. MOBERLY then gave the recorder to JOE
 BOCSY, Director of Avionics, who then secured the recorder in his
 office over night. At 11:00 a.m. on September 12, 2001, MCNEER
 took custody of the CVR from MOBERLY, then gave the same to the
 undersigned agents.

Prior to giving the CVR to the undersigned agents, MCNEER
 downloaded the recorded information from the CVR and made two audio
 tapes of the information. MCNEER gave one of these tapes to
 Special Agents [REDACTED] on September
 11, 2001. He gave the other tape to the undersigned agents at the
 same time he released custody of the CVR.

9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy

Investigation on 09/12/2001 at Columbus, Ohio

File # 265D-NY-280350-CI 265D-NY-280350-302 Date dictated N/A
 by SA [REDACTED]
 SA [REDACTED]

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[PDF page 1]

BEGPRODNO : M-INT-00017134
BEGBATES : 265A-NY-280350-CI-126
DATE : 09/12/2001
FBIDESC : TODD SHERWOOD EDGAR
INPUTBATCH : NCTA_004 (1st Batch of unredacted 302's delivered in August)
FULLTEXT : FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

93 - EXECUTIVE
JET SEES
93
HEAR

9/11 Personal Privacy

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 09/13/2001

TODD SHERWOOD EDGAR, date of birth [redacted] Social
Security Account Number [redacted] met with
the interviewing agents at EXECUTIVE JET, INCORPORATED 4111
Bridgeway Avenue, Columbus, Ohio 43219. EDGAR was advised of the
identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the
interview. During the interview, the agents played a cassette tape
containing approximately 20 minutes of aircraft communications.
This tape was duplicated from the Voice Cockpit Recorder from the
flight of EXECUTIVE JET 956 on September 11, 2001. EDGAR provided
the following information:

EDGAR has been employed as a pilot by EXECUTIVE JET, INC.
since February 15, 2000. He recently became a captain, however, on
September 11, 2001, EDGAR was flying as the co-pilot onboard
EXECUTIVE JET's Cessna Citation 10, which was referred to as
"EXECUTIVE JET 956", for purposes of communicating via the aircraft
radio on that day. The Pilot-in-Command on the flight was ROGER
LAMPMAN. The flight departed the airport at Teterboro, New Jersey
at 8:36 a.m. and was en-route to Chicago Midway airport. During
the flight, EXECUTIVE JET 956 was in radio communication with two
different Air Traffic Control centers, New York and then Cleveland.

Approximately fifteen minutes into the flight, EXECUTIVE
JET 956 was at an altitude of 39,000 feet. While monitoring the
aircraft radio, EDGAR and LAMPMAN heard a pilot from FRONTIER
AIRLINES inquire about a plane crash. The Frontier Airlines' pilot
was advised of the incident at the WORLD TRADE CENTER.

EDGAR explained that while in flight, a commercial radio
was turned on in order to gain more news. EDGAR also explained
that there was conversation with their two passengers who were
aboard to make them aware of what was taking place with regard to
United flight 93 and what had transpired at the WORLD TRADE CENTER.

While listening to the tape, EDGAR identified portions
which he and LAMPMAN believed to be from United flight 93. These
included sounds of fighting and mention of a bomb being onboard the
aircraft. EDGAR also advised that their EDGAR's and LAMPMAN's

Investigation on 09/12/2001 at Columbus, Ohio

File # 265D-NY-280350-CI 265D-NY-280350-302 Date dictated N/A
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Continuation of FD-302 of Todd Sherwood Edgar , On 09/12/2001 , Page 2

best view of United Flight 93 was when United Flight 93 was at a 2:00 - 3:00 position from them and was climbing. The altitude of United flight 93 varied during their observation of it and Cleveland Center was keeping them and other aircraft away from it since they lost radio contact with it. EDGAR was unsure of EXECUTIVE JET's exact location during the time that he and LAMPMAN had a "visual" on the plane since he is not as familiar with the area as LAMPMAN is. United flight 93 was last observed by EDGAR in level flight and eastbound. Shortly after this, EXECUTIVE JET 956 landed at Port Columbus.

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BEGPRODNO : M-INT-00113238
BEGBATES : 265A-NY-280350-302-96843
DATE = 01/08/2002
FBIDESCR : JOHN WERTH
INPUTBATCH : NCTA_004 (1st Batch of unredacted 302's delivered in August)
FULLTEXT : FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

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9/11 Personal Privacy

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 01/09/2002

JOHN WERTH, Social Security Number [redacted] date of birth [redacted]
[redacted] telephone number [redacted] was interviewed at his place of employment, Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center ARTCC, 326 E. Lorain St., Oberlin, Ohio, telephone number [redacted]
After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, he provided the following information:

WERTH stated that he has worked for ARTCC as an Air Traffic Control Specialist ATCS for 31½ years. He advised that on the morning of September 11, 2001 he was working the 6:00 A.M. to 2:00 P.M. shift, controlling airline traffic in the Lorain sector of Cleveland Center airspace when United Airlines Flight 93 UAL Flight 93 checked in by radio at approximately 9:25 A.M.

WERTH recalls UAL Flight 93 was south of Youngstown, OH along the Pennsylvania border flying at an altitude of 35,000 feet when the pilot checked in with him at Cleveland Center. WERTH stated that he called out traffic advisories to UAL Flight 93 upon initial contact. Within a few minutes of the initial contact he heard something unintelligible over the radio. WERTH advised that he made several general calls over his frequency of 133.37 MHz, to asked if someone was trying to contact Cleveland Center. WERTH said that approximately twenty seconds later, he heard a muffled radio transmission sounding like a struggle in which someone said something like "get out of here." UAL Flight 93 immediately dropped 700 feet and increased its airspeed by 50 to 60 knots. WERTH indicated that by this time the air traffic controllers have been made aware of the attacks on the World Trade Center. He said that based upon his inability to re-establish radio communications UAL Flight 93, along with the UAL Flight 93's erratic maneuvers, he strongly believe UAL Flight 93 had been hijacked.

WERTH advised that he also heard radio transmissions in which someone said there was a bomb on the aircraft. He continued to attempted to contact UAL Flight 93 several more times, without success. WERTH indicated that as other airliners checked in with Cleveland Center on his frequency, it appeared as if UAL Flight 93 would change direction and altitude in an attempt to intercept the

Investigation on 01/08/2002 at Oberlin

File # 265A-NY-280350 Date dictated 01/09/2002
by [redacted] 9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy

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FD-302a (Rev. 10-6-95)

265A-NY-280350

Continuation of FD-302 of John Werth , On 01/08/2002 , Page 2

newly announced airliners. WERTH stated that in order to avoid any possible in-flight collisions, he vectored all other aircraft out of the airspace and away from any possible course that UAL Flight 93 could use to intercept them.

WERTH stated that when UAL Flight 93 passed west of Cleveland, OH, the aircraft turned southeast toward Pittsburgh, PA. It was during this time that Cleveland Center stopped receiving transmissions from UAL Flight 93's transponder. WERTH advised that he turned on the "primary return" on his radar scope in order to continue tracking UAL Flight 93. WERTH said that the primary return used ground based radar to track aircraft, but that it is unable to provide altitude readouts. WERTH advised that he was able to continued tracking UAL Flight 93 using the primary return, until it went under the radar southeast of Pittsburgh.

WERTH stated that based upon his knowledge and experience as an air traffic controller, he believes one of the hijackers had impersonated himself as a pilot from another airline company in order to gain access to one of the available jump seats located in the cockpit of UAL Flight 93, allowing the UNSUB to execute the hijacking with minimal resistance. WERTH advised that he was the only controller at Cleveland Center to handle UAL Flight 93 on September 11, 2001. He said Cleveland Center never received any emergency communications from the pilots of UAL Flight 93, leading him to believe that the hijackers must have gained access to the cockpit without prior warning to the pilots of UAL Flight 93.

WERTH stated that he has not talked with the media. He advised that his home phone number is unlisted, and that is why he believes the media has not contacted him.

[PDF page 2]

BEGPRODNO : M-INT-00124732
 BEGBATES : 265A-NY-280350-302~106714
 DATE = 09/11/2001
 FBIDESC : RICHARD J KETTELL
 INPUTBAT : NCTA_004 (1st Batch of unredacted 302's delivered in August)
 FULLTEXT : FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 09/11/2001

RICHARD J. KETTELL, Air Traffic Manager, Federal Aviation Administration FAA, Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center, 326 E. Lorain Street, Route 511, Oberlin, Ohio 44074, telephone number [REDACTED] cell phone [REDACTED] e-mail [REDACTED] was interviewed at his place of employment. KETTELL, after having been apprised of the official identity of the interviewing agents and that the nature of the interview concerned FAA recordings and flight data for a 9/11/2001, United Airlines UA Flight FLT. #93, en route from Newark, NJ to San Francisco, CA, KETTELL provided the following information:

KETTELL advised that BOB HERAK, Air Traffic Control Facility was compiling the flight recordings for United Airline Flight 93. The interviewing agents reviewed along with HERAK the flight recordings and radar data for UA FLT. 93.

The flight data recordings, maintained in Greenwich Mean Time GMT, indicate that there were the following voice transmissions:

	TIME	AUDIO
1.	9:28:19 a.m. GMT 13.28.19	Brief noise in <u>cockpit</u> of hollering, inaudible
2.	9:28:53 a.m. GMT 13.28.53	Screaming sounds in <u>cockpit</u>
3.	9:32:02 a.m. GMT 13.32.02	Male voice; the word "bomb" is heard
4.	9:39:15 a.m. GMT 13:39:15	Male with Middle Eastern accent heard saying, "The captain would like you to remain seated. We have a bomb on board. We are going back to the airport until our demands are met. Remain quiet."

Investigation on 9/11/2001 at Oberlin, Ohio

File # 265D-NY-280350-CV
 by [REDACTED] 9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy

Date dictated 9/11/2001

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265D-NY-280350

Continuation of FD-302 of RICHARD J. KETTELL

, On 9/11/2001 , Page 2

In addition to the voice recordings information from the
flight data indicated the following:

TIME	ACTION/COMMENT
9:36:05 GMT 13:36:05	UA FLT. <u>93</u> begins to turn from its assigned flight path to San Francisco. The airline begins to turnaround.
9:39:00 GMT 13:39:00	UA FLT. <u>93</u> completes turnaround and is flying eastbound.
9:40:56 GMT 13:40:56	UA FLT. <u>93</u> , the aircraft's transponder is turned off.
10:02:15 GMT 14:02:15	UA FLT. <u>93</u> , alters easternly flight path, turns due south/easterly.
10:02:50 GMT 14:02:50	UA FLT. <u>93</u> , transponder is reactivated for approximately 20 seconds. The aircraft reports an altitude of 8,200 feet.
10:03:59 GMT 14:03:59	UA FLT. <u>93</u> , flight goes into a "coast" pattern on control screen. Radar contact is lost. A subsequent report was received by the control facility from a military C-130 aircraft screen identifier GOFER06 of seeing smoke in the area where the plane was last tracked.

[PDF page 2]

BEGPRODNO : M-INT-00154745
 BEGBATES : 265A-NY-280350-302~111887
 DATE = 02/25/2002
 FBIDESCR : ON FEBRUARY 25, 2002, ALLESSANDRO (SANDY) D. ROGERS
 INPUTBATCH : NCTA_004 (1st Batch of unredacted 302's delivered in August)
 FULLTEXT : FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 02/28/2002

On February 25, 2002, ALESSANDRO SANDY D. ROGERS was interviewed at his place of employment, UNITED AIRLINES UA, Elk Grove Village, Illinois. The interviewing Agent identified himself to Mr. ROGERS and told him that the interview concerned his employment activities with UA on September 11, 2001. Mr. ROGERS voluntarily provided the following information:

On September 11, 2001, he began work at approximately 7:00 a.m., as an Air Traffic Coordinator for the west section of the country. In his job responsibilities for that day he was assigned any air traffic issues at the UA Hubs west of Chicago in the United States. There is a separate position for all air traffic issues to the east of Chicago.

He was aware of the crashes on September 11, from watching a television in the UA Operations Center.

One of the problems on September 11, was some of the UA flights had lost radio contact, referred to as NORDEN, with FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION FAA AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL CENTERS ATC. When an aircraft loses radio contact with the FAA ATC, the ATC will often contact UA and request a message be sent up via the Aircraft Condition and Reporting System ACARS to have that particular flight contact the ATC on a specific radio frequency.

In regard to the ACARS message he sent to UA Flight 93, he recalled receiving a call from the ATC that was handling UA Flight 93 requesting the ACARS message be sent requesting UA Flight 93 contact the ATC. The procedure at the time was the message would be sent to the aircraft on ACARS screen and that an audible alarm would not be activated. The reason that he put the words "ASAP" in the ACARS message was that he was aware of the crashes into the World Trade Center.

He also sent an additional message to all dispatchers at the UAL Operations Center which stated "There may be additional hijackings in progress you may want to advise your flights to stay on alert and shut down all cockpit access inflight, SANDY per MGMT." This was sent at the request of UA management after the two

Investigation on 2/25/02 at Elk Grove Village, Illinois

File # 265A-NY-280350 Date dictated 2/26/02
 by 9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy

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265A-NY-280350

Continuation of FD-302 of ALESSANDRO D. ROGERS , On 2/25/02 , Page 2

aircraft crashed into the World Trade Center. He provided a copy of this message.

The following information was obtained from interview and observation:

Name: ALESSANDRO "SANDY" D. ROGERS
Sex: Male
Race: White
DOB: [REDACTED]
Employment: UNITED AIRLINES WORLD
HEADQUARTERS
1200 EAST ALGONQUIN ROAD
ELK GROVE VILLAGE, IL
Work Telephone: [REDACTED]
UA Employee Number: [REDACTED]
Job Title: Flight Dispatcher Since 1989
Residence: [REDACTED]

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[PDF page 2]

BEGPRODNO : M-INT-00152817
BEGBATES : 265A-NY-280350-30011
DATE = 01/22/2002
FBIDESC : TARA M CAMPBELL
INPUTBATCH : NCTA_004 (1st Batch of unredacted 302's delivered in August)
FULLTEXT : 1/22/2002

9/11 Personal Privacy

TARA M. CAMPBELL, born [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was interviewed at United Airlines UAL Flight Operations in building 22A at John F. Kennedy International Airport JFKIA. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agent and detective and the nature of the interview she provided the following information:

CAMPBELL has been employed by United Airlines as a Flight Operations Service Representative FOSR since June of 1999.

CAMPBELL recalled sending a ACARS message on 9/11/2001 to First Officer Leroy Homer on UAL 93.

CAMPBELL advised that the message she sent on 9/11/2001 was sent to the printer on UAL 93 and she further stated that is the only way she can send a message. She advised that she does not have the capability of sending a message to a display screen on the aircraft.

CAMPBELL advised that she received a phone call from Melody Homer on 9/11/2001 several minutes after the first plane hit the World Trade Center WTC. Melody Homer wanted to know if her husband Leroy was alright. CAMPBELL told Melody Homer that she would send Leroy Homer an ACARS message to make sure he was alright.

Campbell advised that she sent the ACARS message and received no response from the cockpit. CAMPBELL advised that she attempted to send the message two more times and on the third attempt the word "SECURE" started flashing on her computer screen. CAMPBELL advised that this was right after the second plane hit the WTC.

CAMPBELL advised that she did not use any security or safety codes in the ACARS message she sent to UAL 93. CAMPBELL said that she did not send any other ACARS messages to UAL 93 on 9/11/2001.

1/22/2002 Jamaica, New York

265A-NY-280350

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93 Belme; Polcastro;
Lubkemann
302

BEGPRODNO : M-INT-00001982
BEGBATES : 265A-NY-280350-302~1888
DATE = 09/11/2001
FBIDESC : RICHARD BELME
INPUTBATCH : NCTA_004 (1st Batch of unredacted 302's delivered in August)
FULLTEXT :

9/11/01
Reference Lead Control Number SF162

Richard Belme, born [redacted] social security account [redacted]

[redacted] was interviewed at his place of employment, United Airlines UAL, San Francisco International Airport, telephone number [redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, he provided the following information:

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On 9/11/01 at approximately 6:40 am, Belme, an UAL System Aircraft Maintenance Controller, took control of a phone call by an unidentified female flight attendant of UAL flight 93 initially received by Andrew Lubkemann. Belme was on the phone with the attendant for only a couple of minutes. The female flight attendant said that two male hijackers who had knives were onboard, one of which was in the first class section of the plane and the other was possibly in the cockpit. The first class section was secured, no passengers were able to leave or gain entrance to the first class seating area.

Belme provided a hand written statement to the interviewing agents, the statement reads as follows:

"I was called over to the STARFIX Desk at approximately 0640 PST. STARFIX informed me a flight attendant was on the line from Flight 93 and it was being hi-jacked. I took over the call and the flight attendant reported two men with knives are onboard. One man in the flight station and one man at first class. One man attacked a flight attendant but no passengers or crew were hurt. I asked the condition of the aircraft, she said a few small dives but OK. Then I lost contact."

At approximately 7:23 am, Belme received information from Robert Combs of Airphone, Oakbrook, Illinois, telephone number [redacted] that a passenger from UAL Flight 93 had called Airphone. At 7:30 am, Combs informed Belme that the passenger relayed information that there were three males who have bombs, knives, and at present no injuries. At this time UAL Flight 93 was flying over Pennsylvania and the hijackers had taken over the aircraft. Belme had no further identifiable information to provide on weapons or explosives used.

9/11/01 San Francisco, California

265D-NY-280350-SF

9/11/01

9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy

[PDF page 1]

BEGPRODNO : M-INT-00001979
BEGBATES : 265A-NY-280350-302~1880
DATE = 09/11/2001
FBIDESC : ANDREW LUBKEMANN
INPUTBATCH : NCTA_004 (1st Batch of unredacted 302's delivered in August)
FULLTEXT : 9/11/01

Reference Lead Control Number SF162

Andrew Lubkemann, born [redacted] social security
account number [redacted] was [redacted] 9/11 Personal Privacy
interviewed at his place of employment, United Airlines, San
Francisco International Airport, telephone number [redacted]
After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents
and the nature of the interview, he provided the following
information:

On 9/11/01 shortly after 6:00 am pacific time,
Lubkemann a STARFIX Technician received a call through the
STARFIX phone system from a female flight attendant of United
AirlinesUAL Flight 93, Aircraft 5491. The unidentified female
flight attendant told Lubkemann that the plane had been hijacked.
Lubkemann told the Flight attendant to remain calm and that they
were aware of the situation.

Lubkemann provided a hand written statement to the
interviewing agents, the statement reads as follows:

"While answering calls from the STARFIX station, I was
contacted by a female flight attendant. She spoke to me in a
hurried and scared voice. I was informed that she was on Flight
93, Aircraft 5491. She said that the plane was being hi-jacked.
The hi-jackers were in the cabin and Flight deck. I informed her
that we had run into similar problems and were aware of her
situation. I told her to remain on the line and I was going to
transfer her call directly to my shift manager. His phone line
showed busy on the monitor screen, so I then spoke directly with
the 757 controller across the divider. We called across the room
and were able to contact a manager who then came to the STARFIX
table. He took over the call to Flight 93. All specific
information regarding where the hi-jackers were on the aircraft
and how the aircraft was flying, were then taken. This
information was then taken directly to the crisis center. All
information was passed on to the people monitoring the events."

Richard Belme was the manager who had taken over the
phone call from the female flight attendant of UAL Flight 93.

9/11/01 San Francisco, California

265D-NY-280350-SF 9/11/01

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Andrew Lubkemann 9/11/01 2

Information was received that everyone was removed from first
class seating and that the hijackers had knives and were in the
cockpit. Lubkemann had no further identifiable information of
weapons used.

BEGPRODNO : M-INT-00016606
BEGBATES : 265A-NY-280350-302~630
DATE = 09/11/2001
FBIDESC : LEAD #7 INTERVIEW OF RICHARD BELME
INPUTBAT : NCTA_004 (1st Batch of unredacted 302's delivered in August)
FULLTEXT : 09/11/2001

Reference San Francisco Lead #7.

On Tuesday, September 11, 2001, RICHARD BELME, Manager, United Airlines Maintenance Facility, San Francisco International Airport, [REDACTED] was interviewed regarding events surrounding the hijacking and downing of United Flight 93 en route to San Francisco, California on September 11, 2001. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent, BELME provided the following information:

BELME stated that at approximately 6:40 AM, Pacific Daylight Time PDT, he received a call from a female flight attendant aboard United Flight 93 en route to San Francisco, California. The flight attendant was not identified by BELME, however she advised the aircraft had been hijacked by at least two, possibly three individuals. She advised that one of the hijackers was in the aircraft cockpit and a second individual was at the First Class curtain wielding a knife.

The flight attendant did not provide any information regarding the hijacker's identity, nationality, intentions or other pertinent information. She stated to BELME that all passengers appeared to be OK. At that point, communication was terminated, or cut-off, from the aircraft. No further information was available from BELME.

The call was placed to San Francisco using a Starfix Airphone contained within the aircraft. BELME stated the call from the flight attendant was not recorded, however, Airphone, the company that manages the telephonic system may have a recording of the call. BELME provided the name of ROBERT COMBS at Airphone and contact number [REDACTED]

The original point of contact at the United Airlines San Francisco maintenance facility was DEREK SAN, [REDACTED]

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09/11/2001 San Francisco, CA

265D-NY-280350-SF

09/11/2001

9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy

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Privacy

265D-NY-280350

Continuation of FD-302 of COMBS, ROBERT , On 09/11/2001 , Page 2

SA [REDACTED] was ready. Instead of patching BEAMER's call, a party line call ensued, in which Captain JOHN NOONAN of the NEW YORK STATE POLICE, advised he was currently on the phone with whom he believed was the mother-in-law of UA Flight 93 passenger JEREMY GLICK. Captain NOONAN advised the mother-in-law was relaying information her husband was currently obtaining from GLICK. GLICK, according to Captain NOONAN, described one of three hijackers as having a red box which was described as a bomb, and the others had knives. Captain NOONAN also stated he was told by GLICK's mother-in-law that the passengers had decided to rush the hijackers.

JEFFERSON asked BEAMER the location and number of passengers; BEAMER replied there were 10 passengers in the front of the plane, 27 passengers in the back, and 5 flight attendants. BEAMER had also stated he believed the plane had changed course. BEAMER also advised one or all of the hijackers had entered the cockpit, locked the door, and pulled the curtain. Captain NOONAN advised some screams were heard from GLICK's phone, and then things became quite. BEAMER was no longer heard from, but JEFFERSON report no noise other what appeared to be background noise.


No further contact with GLICK nor BEAMER was reported, and at 9:36 AM, both Captain NOONAN and JEFFERSON both stated they lost the phone calls.

The following individuals can be contacted at the below listed numbers:

ROBERT COMBS, GTE AIRFONE - [REDACTED]
and [REDACTED]
LISA JEFFERSON, GTE AIRFONE - [REDACTED]
Captain JOHN NOONAN, NEW YORK STATE POLICE - [REDACTED]
PHYLLIS JOHNSON, GTE AIRFONE - [REDACTED] (Was on
during party line call)
MARSHALL STARKMAN, VERIZON WIRELESS - [REDACTED] (Was
on during party line call, and had some involvement in
relaying GLICK's conversation)

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PHONE CALL

302's FROM
FBI

BEGPRODNO : M-INT-00000059
BEGBATES : 265A-NY-280350-302-22171
DATE = 09/11/2001
FBIDESC : INTERVIEW W/ MERCY LORENZO
INPUTBAT : NCTA_004 (1st Batch of unredacted 302's delivered in August)
FULLTEXT : FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

AA TF
Olsen to Operator

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 09/11/2001

Mercy Lorenzo, operator for AT&T Services AT&T, telephonically contacted the Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI to report an emergency phone call received by her while on duty at AT&T. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the nature of the interview, she provided the following information:

A female passenger called from the telephone located on the back of the airplane seat. Passenger requested to be connected with her husband, a sergeant who resides in Washington, D.C.

The passenger advised the plane was currently being hi-jacked. The hi-jackers, armed with guns and knives, were ordering the passengers to move to the back of the plane. The passenger wanted to know how to let the pilots know what was happening. It did not appear as if they were aware of the situation.

Investigation on 09/11/2001 at Los Angeles, California telephonically
265D-LA-C228332
File # 265D-NY-280350-LA Date dictated 09/11/2001
t9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy

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BEGPRODNO : M-INT-00015586
BEGBATES : 265A-NY-280350-302-97478
DATE : 09/12/2001
FBIDESC : ON 9/11/01, AT APPROXIMATELY 9:00AM, [REDACTED] WAS WOKEN
INPUTBATCH : NCTA_004 (1st Batch of unredacted 302's delivered in August)
FULLTEXT : FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

UA 93
Flight Attendant to [REDACTED]

9/11 Personal Privacy

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 09/12/2001

[REDACTED]

After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the investigation, [REDACTED] provided the following information:

On 9/11/2001, at approximately 9:00 A.M., [REDACTED] was woken as a result of a telephone call from his life partner, [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] received this call at his residence [REDACTED] telephone number, [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] to turn on his television immediately, explaining that a plane had crashed into the World Trade Center.

After watching the televised new reports for several hours, JOHNSON got depressed and decided to go upstairs to spend time with his neighbor, [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] explained that [REDACTED] lives in the apartment directly above his. [REDACTED] did not know [REDACTED]'s telephone number. [REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] is employed as a doorman at a local condominium building. [REDACTED] does not know the address of the building where [REDACTED] works.

While at [REDACTED] apartment, at approximately 12:00 PM, [REDACTED] called his brother in law, [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] explained that [REDACTED] is employed as a flight attendant by United Airlines. According to [REDACTED] has held this position for over ten years. [REDACTED] is married to [REDACTED] sister, [REDACTED], and they reside in the [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] does not know their exact address. [REDACTED] provided [REDACTED] home telephone number as [REDACTED].

According to [REDACTED], he initiated the call to [REDACTED] to ensure that [REDACTED] was not on any of the flights that had been hijacked that morning. According to [REDACTED] indicated that he was currently on vacation. [REDACTED] described [REDACTED] as being in good spirits. CONNOR did not indicate to [REDACTED] that [REDACTED].

Investigation on 9/12/2001

at Chicago, Illinois

File # 265D-NY-28350
by [REDACTED] 9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy

Date dictated 9/12/2001

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265D-NY-28550

9/11 Personal Privacy

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 9/12/2001, Page 2

personally knew any of the United Airlines employees who were on the hijacked flights. [REDACTED] described his conversation with [REDACTED] as being brief.

[REDACTED] estimated that sometime after 3:00 PM Central Standard Time, on September 11, 2001, he initiated a telephone call to Continental Airlines Customer Service Department from his home telephone. The purpose of this call was to inquire about a Continental flight ticket that [REDACTED] had previously purchased for a flight to Providence, Rhode Island on Friday, September 21, 2001. The flight was scheduled to depart O'Hare airport in Chicago at 6:30 PM. [REDACTED] could not recall the name of the female customer service representative he spoke to during this call. [REDACTED] was concerned because the ticket he purchased was non-refundable, and as such he might lose \$200.00 if air transportation had not resumed normal operation by next Friday. Further, as a result of the terrorist attacks which had just occurred that morning, [REDACTED] was afraid to fly. [REDACTED] acknowledged that he had attempted to get a full refund for his ticket by informing the Customer Service Representative that he was petrified to fly because his close friend was a flight attendant on United Flight 93, which crashed outside of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania that morning as a result of terrorist acts. [REDACTED] admitted that he did not have a close friend who was a flight attendant on this flight and that this statement was part of a fabricated story he made up to try and obtain a refund on his previously purchased ticket.

To the best of his recollection, [REDACTED] told the Customer Service Representative a fabricated story, which included the following details: [REDACTED] had received a telephone call from his friend who was working as a flight attendant on United Flight 93 at the time the call was placed. [REDACTED] friend informed [REDACTED] that their flight had been hijacked by three Arab terrorists. [REDACTED] friend advised [REDACTED] that he expected to die. [REDACTED] friend then asked [REDACTED] to take care of his wife and children.

[REDACTED] advised that he probably provided the Continental Customer Service Representative with additional fabricated information, but he was unable to recall this information. [REDACTED] reiterated that he made up this entire story in an effort to receive a refund for his travel ticket. [REDACTED] advised that he did not receive any calls from anyone on any of the hijacked flights. [REDACTED] advised that he had never worked for Northwest or

[PDF page 2]

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Continuation of FD-302 of , On 9/12/2001 , Page 3

any other airline as a flight attendant and did not know anyone who works for an airline other than his brother-in-law.

[PDF page 3]

BEGPRODNO : M-INT-00002972
BEGBATES : 265A-NY-280350-302~3124
DATE = 09/13/2001
FBIDESC : INTERVIEW - MICHAEL A. MCNEIL
INPUTBATCH : NCTA_004 (1st Batch of unredacted 302's delivered in August)
FULLTEXT :

9/13/2001

Michael A. McNeil, date of birth DOB [REDACTED]
Social Security Account Number SSAN [REDACTED]

9/11 Personal Privacy

contacted the Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI Grand Junction Resident Agency GJRA from the Walker Field Airport, 2828 Walker Field Drive, Grand Junction, Colorado 81506, 970 244-9100. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent, McNeil provided the following information:

On September 11, 2001, McNeil, a free lance television engineer sports, was a passenger on United Airline UAL Flight 1523, from LaGuardia, New York Airport to Denver in seat 6A, when he overheard the flight communications from his plane, Cleveland Center and UAL Flight 93, sometime after 9:00 a.m.. He had been listening with earphones since he departed. He had been in New York working the U.S. Tennis Open in Flushing Meadows, New York.

While listening, he heard that New York area airspace was closed. He heard two ten second bursts of unintelligible yelling and altercation. Cleveland Center asked for a repeat and identification. Cleveland Center began a roll call of aircraft in the air space. He next heard what sounded like, "I" or "We have a bomb." The pilot or co-pilot on UAL 93 must have had keyed open the microphone. Cleveland Center said, "Come back." A Continental flight crew member responded with an interpretation, "He said he had a bomb." Cleveland Center began to instruct planes away from the area. The crew of his flight turned off the passenger monitoring system.

After 15 to 20 minutes, the monitoring system was activated. There was a different Cleveland Center air traffic control, because they were in a different sector. One of the UAL 1523 flight crew asked Cleveland Center if there was any news regarding UAL 93. Cleveland Center responded with a negative.

His plane was diverted to Chicago, and made an unusual approach. The flight arrived at approximately 10:00 a.m. Central Time. The plane taxied to an empty space and sat for an hour before the passengers could deplane. He rented a car from Hertz and drove to Grand Junction, Colorado, to return the car.

9/13/2001 Grand Junction, CO telephonically

265D-NY-280350-DN

9/13/2001

9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy

[PDF page 1]

JAULS JOHNSON
BOGUS CALL

BEGPRODNO : M-INT-00000061
BEGBATES : 265A-NY-280350-302~20230
DATE : 09/11/2001
FBIDESC : DEE ANN FREEMAN INTERVIEW
INPUTBATCH : NCTA_004 (1st Batch of unredacted 302's delivered in August)
FULLTEXT : FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 09/12/2001

Dee Ann Freeman, date of birth [redacted] Social
Security Account Number [redacted] employed
since 03/11/2000 by Continental Airlines Reservations, 2715 West
Jetway Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah, telephone number [redacted]
was interviewed at the West Valley Police Department. After being
advised of the identity of the interviewers and the purpose of the
interview, Freeman provided the following information:

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Freeman was at work at approximately 3:15 p.m. on
September 11, 2001, when she received a telephone call from an
African-American customer named [redacted]
[redacted] who was scheduled to take a
Continental flight from Chicago O'Hare to Cleveland and then on by
Continental Express to Albany on 09/21/2001. [redacted] calling from
Chicago, was upset, alternately crying and screaming, and had
called to discuss cancelling his flight plans as a consequence of
his fears about flying in the wake of what had happened to his best
friend that day aboard United Flight #93 which had crashed.
Freeman spoke with Johnson for approximately 34 minutes and the
conversation ended at approximately 3:44 p.m.

[redacted] said he was a NorthWest flight attendant and told
Freeman that he had received a cell phone call from his best
friend, a male flight attendant on United Flight #93, who told
[redacted] to "[t]ake care of my wife and kids. I'm a dead man.
We're being hijacked." The conversation was then cut off. [redacted]
tried to call his friend back but the line was busy. He called the
friend's wife after the flight crashed and was told by her that she
had previously spoken with her attendant husband. He told her that
the Captain and in-flight crew had been gathered in the back of the
plane, where the Captain was held by a hijacker with a blade to his
neck. She told [redacted] that they said they were going to Camp
David. They threatened to cut the Captain's throat with a box
cutter if the crew attempted to intervene.

[redacted] added that United Flight #93 had changed the flight
plan from Las Angeles to Washington D.C. just before the crash. He
said that another of the in-flight attendants was a woman who was

Investigation on 09/11/2001 at West Valley, Utah

File # 265D-NY-280350
9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy
by [redacted]

Date dictated 09/12/2001

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Continuation of FD-302 of Dee Ann Freeman

, On 09/11/2001 , Page 2

married to a police officer. She called her husband during the hijacking and was told by him of the Trade Center plane crashes, so the captain and flight crew had knowledge that they might face a similar end. At some point the Captain made a statement using words to the effect that "I'd rather have my throat cut," or "Maybe I should get my throat cut."

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Freeman advised that identifying information concerning [redacted] might be available on the computer system at Continental Airlines Reservations in Salt Lake City, Utah. Accordingly, Freeman and the interviewers drove together to her place of employment in the vicinity of the Salt Lake City airport, where they arrived at approximately 11:58 p.m. With the assistance of Gene Savard, Operation Analyst, who was the supervisor on duty, Freeman looked up and found the manifest information contained in the Continental Airlines Reservation system concerning [redacted]. Savard printed out a copy of the computer data concerning [redacted] and provided it to the interviewers. The printout identifies [redacted] e-mail address as [redacted] and indicates that he made the reservation over the internet using a Discover Card, card number [redacted] expiration date of January 2003. There is a September 11 notation entered by Freeman as a consequence of her conversation with [redacted] which states:

PAX CLOSE PERSONEL FRND OF DECEASED FLT ATTDNT ON DWN
UA93 ATTACK ON AMERICA PAX IS VERY UPSET PLZ CHG NO FEE
OR REFUND IF PAX IS STILL TOO SCARED TOO UPSET THANK YOU

[PDF page 2]

BEGPRODNO : M-INT-00162543
 BEGBATES : 265A-NY-280350-302~116622
 DATE = 07/01/2002
 FBIDESCR : 6/28 INFORMATION&SPREADSHEET 11/6/01 PROVIDED BY MAR
 INPUTBATCH : NCTA_007 (2nd Batch of unredacted 302's delivered in October)
 FULLTEXT :
 07/01/2002

On 06/28/2002, MARK RUGG, Manager of Network Operations, GTE Airfone Incorporated, 2809 Butterfield Road, Oak Brook, Illinois, 60522-9000, [REDACTED] was interviewed via telephone by Detective [REDACTED] of the New Jersey State Police. Having been advised of the identity of the interviewer, RUGG provided the following information:

On 11/6/2001, RUGG provided SA [REDACTED] a spreadsheet detailing the GTE Airfone records from UNITED AIRLINES FLIGHT 93 (UAL 93). Those records were subsequently made part of the Events of 09/11/2001 Investigative Summary (Appendix A-3) produced by the Newark Division. On this date, RUGG was asked to revisit those records and provide an understanding of the various fields that were depicted in the spreadsheet. Attached to this report is an updated spreadsheet containing the GTE Airfone records provided by RUGG. It will be maintained as a 1A with the case file and this report will serve as a reference for it.

Each field contained in the spreadsheet was reviewed and RUGG provided the following:

Call Date Time - Although the field is self explanatory it should be noted that two calls, 8:30:32 and 8:32:39 respectively, are listed in Central Time. At the time these calls were made from UAL 93 they were processed through the Fort Wayne, Indiana, Radio Base Station (Rbs.) This station is positioned in the Central Time Zone. The remainder of the calls were processed through stations in the Eastern Time Zone.

Acis Call Id - Acis is the computer used by GTE that controls billing. Each record receives a unique index number. The Acis Call Id is the unique number.

Aircraft Id - Field is self explanatory.

Billed Card Type - This field identifies the initials of type of company credit card used to bill call. For example, DC stands for Diner's Club.

Billed Card - Credit card number that call is billed to.

Swiped Card Type Non Indexed - GTE assigns a two digit code to credit card companies. This field is used to index that credit card company used.

Swiped Card - This number reflects the credit card that was originally swiped to begin call process. It does not have to be the same as the billed card if a card is billed to a third party. This would be the case if a caller swiped his/her credit card but then called a car rental company that pays for Airfone calls.

First Name - Once a patron is registered to a corporate calling plan through GTE or had applied for credit in the past with GTE their name is associated with the swiped credit card that is on file with GTE. Todd Beamer was an Oracle employee. The Oracle company has a corporate call program. When he used his Diner's Club card that was registered with a GTE Airfone corporate call program his name was associated with the credit card.

MI - Field is self explanatory

Last Name - Field is self explanatory

Destination Number - This is the telephone number out pulsed from the switch at GTE Airfone corporate headquarters in Oak Brook, Illinois.

Last Dialed Number - This is the telephone number dialed by the patron.

Manual Entry Ind - This is True or false field identifying whether a patron manually entered a credit card number.

Validation Approval Code Decoded - This code reflects if the credit card was validated. It is specific to the credit card company.

Validation Reply Code - It is a unique code specific to credit card companies. The number entered reflects validation approval or disapproval.

Gsn Id - Stands for Ground Switch Node. GTE currently has only one in the US and one in Mexico. The number 001 stands for the ground switch in Oak Brook, Illinois.

Gsn Id Lcp - Stands for Last Call Path. If a call is handed off to a different cell sites this field would reference the last cell site utilized.

Rbs Id - Stands for Radio Base Station. It references what ground cell site was used upon origination of phone call. The following are ID#'s that were noted on UAL 93 Airfone records. 026 Fort Wayne, Indiana; 059 Columbus, Ohio; 091 Belleville, Michigan; 065 Coraopolis, Pennsylvania "

Rbs Id Lcp - Last ground cell site utilized when phone call was terminated.

Station Group - This field references the piece of equipment to track the routing of the call.

Terminal Unit - This field references the handset that was used to place phone call.

Distribution Unit - An aircraft is split into two segments with two distribution handling the handsets.

Number Of Handoffs - References the number of cell site handoffs made during a call.
Operator Id - If an operator is contacted during the call the operator's ID# is referenced. During one of Todd Beamer's calls to his home his Diner's Club credit card was denied. This routed his call to a GTE operator. Phyllis Johnson (PJ) was the first operator to speak to him before she transferred the call to Lisa Jefferson.
Weight On Wheels - This field references if aircraft is in flight during the call. The designation 2 reflects the aircraft is in flight.
Duration Connect - This field references how long, in seconds, it takes for the network to connect a call to its dialed number.
Duration Operator - This field references how long a patron speaks to an operator. During the Todd Beamer call, 3925 seconds were tallied for how long the call to the operator lasted. According to RUGG, even though UAL 93 had crashed GTE kept the call open.
Scp Duration - This stands for the Switch Control Processor. It reflects the duration of the telephone call.

06/28/2002Newark, NJ(telephonically)

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265A-NY-280350-302
Mark Rugg06/28/2002 2

265A-NY-280350-302
Mark Rugg06/28/2002

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BEGPRODNO : M-INT-00036632
BEGBATES : 265A-NY-280350-302~6399
DATE = 09/11/2001
FBIDESC : RAY KIME WAS INTERVIEWED
INPUTBATCH : NCTA_004 (1st Batch of unredacted 302's delivered in August)
FULLTEXT : 09/11/01

Reference San Francisco lead #SF97

On September 11, 2001, Federal Bureau of Investigation
FBI Special Agents [redacted] 9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy
interviewed Ray Kime, Date of Birth [redacted], Manager, System
Aircraft Maintenance Control SAMC, United Airlines, located at
the San Francisco International Airport SFO. Kime was
interviewed at his residence: [redacted]
California. After being informed of the nature of the interview
and the identity of the interviewing Agents, Kime provided the
following information:

9/11 Personal Privacy

Kime was working the night shift at the SAMC at SFO on
the morning of September 11, 2001. His job entails coordination
of communications with all flights on the ground and in the air
for mechanical related problems. His office has the ability to
make contact utilizing a system that United Airlines calls
"Starfix". The "Starfix" system gives the SAMC the ability to
converse directly with flight attendants about issues arising on
board the aircraft. The SAMC also has the ability to contact the
flight crew utilizing a system called "Air Rinc". Kime said that
this system is similar to an airborne E-mail system, where the
SAMC can type messages to the flight crew and converse as if they
were using an E-mail system.

At approximately 5:30 A.M. on September 11, 2001, Kime
was in the SAMC, when Rich Belme, a day shift coordinator in the
SAMC, entered the room. The two men discussed issues related to
the aircraft that were currently not in service. At this time,
Marc Policastro, an employee who was manning the "Starfix"
system, approached Kime and Belme and informed them that he had
just taken a call over the "Starfix" system and that the flight
attendant that was calling said that her plane, Flight #175, had
been hijacked. The flight attendant also said that the another
flight attendant on-board had been stabbed and that the flight
crew was dead. Kime advised that the "Starfix" calls were not
recorded.

At this time Kime contacted System Operations Control
in Chicago, Illinois. This center, which also goes by the name

09/11/2001 Martinez, California

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[redacted] 9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy

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Ray Kime 09/11/2001 2

OPB, has many functions, one of which is similar to that of a
dispatch center for all of the planes in service. Kime contacted
Rich Miles at OPB and informed him of what he had been told by
Policastro. Miles said that they knew of the hijacking, and that
it was American Airlines Flight #11. Kime told Miles that it was

in fact a United Airlines plane that was hijacked. Miles and Kime discussed the situation. Kime said that United Airlines has a policy where Crisis Centers are set-up in this type of situation, and Kime and Miles began to follow the checklists for this type of scenario. At this time Belme told Policastro to write a statement as to exactly what happened.

At approximately 6:00 A.M., another employee, Kime believed that the name of the employee was Paul Hamilton, but was unclear, approached Kime and Belme regarding a new call received over the "Starfix" system. The new call was from a flight attendant on Flight #93. The flight attendant of Flight #93 said that three people with knives and bombs were on board and that they were taking over the plane.

Kime said that one of the procedures after this type of event occurs is to attempt to use the "Air Rinc" system to contact the flight crew. Kime said that both flights were sent messages via "Air Rinc". The message sent to the planes requested that the flight crews respond if they were able. The SAMC did not receive a response from either plane.

At this time Kime contacted OPB in Chicago again. This time he spoke to Bill Ray, the director of OPB. They continued to talk and followed the checklist for the crisis center.

Belme said that he did not know what to tell the flight attendants on the "Starfix" system. At this time Belme and Kime decided to contact United Airlines Security Personnel and a day shift employee in the SAMC contacted the FBI.

Kime also said that they received other calls from flights with airborne related concerns. A flight from Narita, Japan requested assistance in disabling the in-flight phone service. Kime was unclear as to why the crew wanted this done, but he believed that it was to limit the panic on the flight. The flight was diverted to Anchorage, Alaska, and it seemed as if the in-flight problems stopped after the phones were disabled.

[PDF page 2]

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Ray Kime

09/11/2001 3

A United Airlines employee working in London in a facility similar to that of SAMC, contacted the SAMC to tell them that they had received a call from a Satellite Phone SATCOM, from an unknown aircraft. The person on the phone sounded as if they were being choked. Kime told the United Airlines employee to write a statement as to these events.

Kime did not have any further information in regards to the type of weapons used or the people who were on-board the aircraft. Kime was instructed to contact the SA [redacted] or [redacted] if he had any further information.

The notes from this interview have been placed in a 1A envelope and have been sent to the file.

[PDF page 3]

9/11 Law Enforcement
Privacy

BEGPRODNO : M-INT-00113892
BEGBATES : 265A-NY-280350-302-97362
DATE = 01/24/2002
FBIDESC : INTERVIEW OF DEREK PRICE
INPUTBATCH : NCTA_004 (1st Batch of unredacted 302's delivered in August)
FULLTEXT : 01/25/02

DAVID PRICE, DOB [REDACTED] United Airlines UAL employee number [REDACTED] was contacted at his place of work, the UAL maintenance center, San Francisco International Airport, San Francisco, California. Also present during this interview was DOUG NIXON, of the UAL Quality Assurance section, telephone number [REDACTED]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the nature of the interview, PRICE provided the following information:

PRICE has worked for UAL for approximately 13 years. He was initially employed as a mechanic, but has worked for the last four years as a systems maintenance controller. Before coming to work for UAL, he served in the Air Force as a mechanic.

When sending a message to an aircraft flight crew via the Aircraft Communications and Reporting System ACARS, a controller can direct the message to either a computer screen or to a small printer, both in the cockpit. If a message is routed to the computer screen, a flashing message indicator appears, and a member of the flight crew must use a computer keystroke to retrieve the message. Messages on the computer screen can then be printed out by the flight crew using additional commands. PRICE usually routes weather and equipment repair information directly to the cockpit printer, so the flight crew will have a paper copy to refer to throughout the flight. He usually routes all other traffic to the computer screen. It is possible to shut off the ACARS system in the cockpit by pulling a circuit breaker, but a controller on the ground would not receive any indication that this had happened.

PRICE came in to work at approximately 5:30 a.m. on 09/11/2001. At approximately 5:45 a.m., he heard from a Starfix technician that UAL flight 75 had been hijacked. This technician had received a telephone call from a flight attendant on board flight 75 via a GTE air phone. Flight crew personnel onboard aircraft can contact Starfix technicians on the ground directly by dialing "fix" *349 on these phones. Starfix technicians are mechanics who usually deal with items inside the aircraft cabins. PRICE did not recall the name of the Starfix technician who received the call from flight 75, but believes he has been interviewed by FBI agents.

01/24/02 San Francisco, CA

265A-NY-280350-302

9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy

[PDF page 1]

265A-NY-280350-302

David Price

01/24/02 2

Immediately upon hearing of the hijacking, PRICE advised his manager, and sent a message to flight 75 via ACARS. PRICE directed this message to the computer screen. He could not recall the exact text of his message, but remembered asking the

flight crew to confirm reports of an incident onboard. He did not use any code words in this message, and he did not receive any confirmation of receipt from the flight crew. PRICE also contacted the UAL facility in London, England, and advised them to try and contact flight 75. PRICE subsequently heard reports that flight 75 had crashed, and did not send any more messages to that flight.

At approximately 6:30 or 6:45 a.m., RICH BELME, another systems maintenance controller, received a call from a flight attendant on board UAL flight 93 via a GTE air phone. This flight attendant advised BELME that flight 93 had been hijacked. Upon hearing this, PRICE again advised his manager, then sent an ACARS message to the computer screen in the cockpit of flight 93. When PRICE was shown the text of this message, contained in the log of ACARS messages to flight 93, PRICE recognized it as the message he sent. He specifically remembered that he asked the aircrew to confirm reports of an "incident," and did not use the word "hijacking." PRICE did not use any code words in this message, and did not receive any confirmation of receipt from the flight crew. He subsequently heard reports that flight 93 had crashed, and did not send any more messages to that flight.

PRICE believes that BELME was interviewed by FBI agents immediately after the hijackings in September.

[PDF page 2]

BEGPRODNO : M-INT-00104326
BEGBATES : 265A-NY-280350-302-87231
DATE = 12/10/2001
FBIDESC : INFORMATION PROVIDED BY LOIS DANVIR ON 11/5&12/10/01
INPUTBATCH : NCTA_004 (1st Batch of unredacted 302's delivered in August)
FULLTEXT : FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

9/11 Personal Privacy

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 12/10/2001

LOIS DANVIR, Manager of Emergency Response Planning,
United Airlines UA, 1200 East Algonquin Road, Elk Grove Village,
Illinois, 60007, [REDACTED] having been advised of the
identity of the interviewing agent and the purpose of the interview
provided the following information during telephonic interviews on
11/5/2001 and 12/10/2001:

As Manager of Emergency Response Planning for UA, DANVIR
was responsible for, among other things, insuring that contact was
made with the next of kin of the passengers on UA Flight 93, in the
aftermath of the hijackings and terrorist attacks on 9/11/2001. As
the news of the hijackings was released, UA began receiving
telephone inquiries from individuals regarding possible passengers
on these flights. UA posted a toll free number which was accessible
within the United States US. The phone number was 800 932-8555.
Individuals in foreign countries would have to call the regular
reservation phone numbers in that particular country.

On 9/11/2001 the phone inquiries were handled by UA
Reservation Agents RA. The RA's had a "fill-in" format on their
computer screens. The RA's entered caller information into their
computers. The information would then be printed out. All printed
reports were retained. UA does not save any of these records on the
computer. All reports were generated on paper at the time of the
call. There are no computer records of any of the calls received
pertaining to UA Flight 93.

Prior to 2PM on 9/11/2001, the RA's did not have the
passenger manifest for Flight 93. Prior to obtaining the manifest,
the RA's inputted information into their computers from all callers
making passenger inquiries. This information included the name of
the passenger being inquired about. After obtaining the manifest,
the RA's would check the name being inquired about against the
manifest. If the check was negative the call would be let go, and
the name of the caller would not be recorded. If the check was
positive, information on the caller would be loaded into the
computer and printed.

Investigation on _____ at _____
11/5-12/10/01 Newark, N. J.

telephonically

File # _____
265A-NY-280350-NK
by 9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy

Date dictated

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9/11 Law Enforcement
Privacy

265A-NY-280350-NK

Continuation of FD-302 of LOIS DANVIR

On 11/5-12/10/01, Page 2 P

The headquarters for the Special Assistance Center was set up at the UA Reservation Center in Chicago, located on the outskirts of O'Hare Airport. UA made contact with the next of kin, of any passengers whom they had not received inquiries about. DANVIR believes that contact had been made with every family by the evening of 9/11/2001. At that time UA had received approximately 46,000 calls. UA received approximately 100,000 inquiries by the Monday after 9/11/2001.

DANVIR had contact with FBI Special Agent [redacted] who is stationed at O'Hare Airport. SA [redacted] phone numbers are [redacted] 24 hour number.

The printed records of the phone calls are being maintained by UA. DANVIR is the point of contact should these reports be needed for a future court proceeding.

Family Assistance Representatives FAR's have been assigned for each of the Flight 93 victim's families. The Dublin reservations office worked with the family of passenger CHRISTIAN ADAMS, who was from Germany. The Tokyo reservation office worked with the family of passenger TOSHIYA KUGE, who is from Japan.

File folders have been prepared for each of the passengers, including the hijackers. The files for each passenger include all of the reports generated from inquiries made regarding that passenger. DANVIR requests that a subpoena be provided if the FBI needs records of the inquiries/notifications pertaining to the victims.

A review of the records indicates that no inquiries were made of UA pertaining to the hijackers by either their family members or friends. DANVIR would be able to testify regarding that information if so needed at a later date.

On 11/13/2001 DANVIR e-mailed SA [redacted] a list of UA Flight 93 passengers. The list included the names of the next of kin, as well as the names or relationship of the person making the inquiry regarding the passenger. The list also specified whether UA was contacted, or whether UA made contact with the family. This list is being retained in the 1A section of the case file. DANVIR would be able to provide more specific information regarding the next of kin, Reservation Agents and Family Assistance Representatives if necessary.

[PDF page 2]

FD-302a (Rev. 10-6-95)

265A-NY-280350-NK

Continuation of FD-302 of LOIS DANVIR , On , P
11/5-12/10/01age 3

[PDF page 3]

BEGPRODNO : M-INT-00112509
BEGBATES : 265A-NY-280350-302-96202
DATE = 01/16/2002
FBIDESC : MARK RUGG
INPUTBATCH : NCTA_004 (1st Batch of unredacted 302's delivered in August)
FULLTEXT : FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

9/11 Personal Privacy

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 01/16/2002

On 10/31/2001 MARK RUGG, Manager of Network Operations, GTE Airfone Incorporated, 2809 Butterfield Road, Oak Brook, Illinois, [REDACTED], cell phone [REDACTED] was interviewed via telephone by Special Agent SA [REDACTED] of the Newark Division. Having been advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the purpose of the interview, RUGG provided the following information:

RUGG advised that he would forward SA [REDACTED] documentation of all GTE Airfone phone calls made from United Airlines UA Flight 93 on 9/11/2001.

On 11/6/2001 SA [REDACTED] received a Federal Express package from RUGG. The package contained the following documents:

1. A seating diagram consistent with UA Flight 93.
2. A three 3 page spreadsheet depicting GTE Airfone call activity on UA Flight 93 on 9/11/2001 which included the date of call, the time of call, call billing information, number dialed, distribution unit and terminal unit.
3. A spread sheet which lists approximate seat locations of GTE Airfone phones as determined by the distribution unit and terminal unit.

The above listed items have been placed in a 1A envelope and retained in the 1A section of this file.

9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy

Investigation on 10/31/01 at Oak Brook, IL telephonically
File # 265A-NY-280350-302 Date dictated
by [REDACTED]

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[PDF page 1]

Phone call AND Flight AND 77 (2)

Cell Call AND Flight AND 77 (0)

phone AND CALL AND Flight AND 77 (32)

Cell ~~AND~~ CALL AND ~~Flight~~ AND 77 (15)

BEGPRODNO : M-INT-00008857
BEGBATES : 265A-NY-280350-302-39685
DATE = 09/11/2001
FBIDESC : MAY, RON
INPUTBAT : NCTA_004 (1st Batch of unredacted 302's delivered in August)
FULLTEXT : 09/11/2001

9/11 Personal Privacy

On September 11, 2001, at approximately 1930 hours
Special Agent's SA's [REDACTED]
were assigned a lead to contact and interview RON MAY, AT [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] The purpose of this interview was to speak with MAY
reference a telephone call with his daughter RENEE MAY while she
was on board American Airlines Flight 77.

Mr. May informed SA [REDACTED] that he was not interested
in speaking at this time, however would speak with SA's [REDACTED]
and [REDACTED] on September 12, 2001. SA [REDACTED] will contact May
and meet reference information related to the phone call between
May and his daughter.

9/11 Law Enforcement
Privacy

09/11/2001 Las Vegas, Nevada (telephonically)

265D-NY-280350

09/11/2001

[REDACTED]
[PDF page 1]

BEGPRODNO : M-INT-00000058
BEGBATES : 265A-NY-280350-302~22170
DATE = 09/11/2001
FBIDESC : INTERVIEW W/ TERESA GONZALEZ
INPUTBATCH : NCTA_004 (1st Batch of unredacted 302's delivered in August)
FULLTEXT : FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

9/11 Personal Privacy

Date of transcription 09/11/2001

Teresa Gonzalez, operator for AT&T Services AT&T, telephonically contacted the Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI to report an emergency phone call received by AT&T. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the nature of the interview, she provided the following information:

Mercy Lorenzo, also an operator with AT&T, received a call from a female passenger on flight 77 requesting to be transferred to telephone number [REDACTED]. The female passenger advised the plane was being hi-jacked. Hi-jackers were ordering passengers to move to the back of the plane and were armed with guns and knives. Lorenzo indicated the pilot might not yet be aware of the take over of the plane.

Additionally, the number provided was the number of the passenger's husband. He is a Sergeant and resides in Washington, D.C.

Investigation on 09/11/2001 at Los Angeles, California telephonically
265D-LA-C228332
File # 265D-NY-280350-LA Date dictated 09/11/2001
9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy

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[PDF page 1]

BEGPRODNO : M-INT-00008874
BEGBATES : 265A-NY-280350-302-39718
DATE = 09/12/2001
FBIDESC : RONALD AND NANCY MAY
INPUTBATCH : NCTA_004 (1st Batch of unredacted 302's delivered in August)
FULLTEXT : 09/12/2001

9/11 Personal Privacy

Ronald and Nancy May, home address [REDACTED] were contacted at their home on September 12, 2001, at approximately 11:15 am, by Special Agent SA [REDACTED] and FBI Chaplain [REDACTED]. After being provided with the identities of the interviewing agents and Chaplain [REDACTED], Mr. and Mrs. May provided the following information:

On September 11, 2001, at approximately 6:13 am, Nancy May received a telephone call from her daughter, Renee May, a flight attendant with American Airlines. Renee May advised her mother that she was on American Airlines Flight #77 and that they were being hijacked. She indicated there were six 6 hijackers and that the hijackers had moved them (unknown if she meant all the passengers or only the flight crew) to the back of the plane. Renee May asked her mother to call American Airlines to make sure they knew of the hijacking and provided the following three phone numbers for her mother to call:

9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy

[REDACTED]

During the phone conversation, Nancy May heard a male voice in the background who seemed to be assisting Renee with providing the correct telephone numbers for American Airlines. Nancy May did not know whether her daughter was utilizing an in-flight telephone or her own personal cellular telephone 410/935-4315. The connection with her daughter was then lost.

Following this conversation, Nancy and Ron May immediately contacted Patty Carson at American Airlines to relay the information provided by their daughter. After confirming the flight number and providing Renee May's employee number to Patty Carson, Ron May was advised that American Airlines would check into the information they had provided and would call them back.

Later, in the early afternoon, American Airlines contacted Ron and Nancy May and informed them that their daughter's flight had been the plane that was crashed into the Pentagon and provided them with American Airlines telephone numbers that they could call periodically to get updated information. At that time, the Mays were also asked for

09/12/2001 [REDACTED]

265D-NY-280350-LV

[REDACTED]
52764.01

[PDF page 1]

265D-NY-280350

Ronald & Nancy May

09/12/2001

2

permission to release their telephone number to the FBI so that an Agent would speak with them. Ron May gave permission and was subsequently called and telephonically interviewed by Special

Agent [REDACTED] of the FBI Washington Field Office, telephone number [REDACTED]. Ronald May was advised by SA [REDACTED] that FBI Agents from the Las Vegas Division would be contacting he and his wife in person. Ronald May was also later contacted by Susie Freeman from the American Airlines Office in Chicago and advised that she had been assigned to assist the Mays through this incident and would be flying out to see them as soon as national flights resume.

It should be noted that Jeff May and Ken May, Ronald and Nancy's sons brothers of Renee May were also present during the interview.

[PDF page 2]

BEGPRODNO : M-INT-00003811
BEGBATES : 265A-NY-280350-302~30777
DATE = 09/11/2001
FBIDESC : THEODORE OLSON, SOLICITOR GENERAL, UNITED STATES OF
INPUTBATCH : NCTA_004 (1st Batch of unredacted 302's delivered in August)
FULLTEXT : FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 09/11/2001

Theodore Olson, Solicitor General, United States of America, was interviewed at his residence, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, Olson furnished the following information.

9/11 Personal Privacy

Barbara Olson, Theodore's wife, was a passenger on American Flight # 77, departing Dulles Airport at approximately 8:10am or 8:30am this morning, bound for LAX Airport in Los Angeles, California.

At approximately 9:00am this morning, he did not look at his watch, one of the women in his office advised him of the terrorist attack at the World Trade Center WTC in New York. He went to his back office and turned on the television. At that time they were rerunning film of the second plane hitting the WTC.

At this time one of the women in his office told him that Barbara was on the phone. Helen Voss is his regular secretary. She did not relay the call from his wife. It was someone else in the office. At the time he was thanking God that her flight could not have had enough time to get to New York. He picked up the call from his wife and spoke for about one 1 minute. Barbara told him that her plane had been hijacked. She said they had knives and box cutters. He asked if they knew she was on the phone and she replied that they didn't. Barbara told him that they put the passengers in the back of the plane. She had been sitting in first class. Olson's call was then cut off.

After the first call, Olson used his direct line to the Attorney General, but was unable to reach him, so he called the DOJ Command Center and requested someone come to his office. He told them that his wife's plane had been hijacked and gave them the flight number. He wanted to pass this information to someone who could possibly do something.

Shortly after, the same person buzzed him again and said Barbara was on the phone again. Barbara was put through to him. Barbara said the pilot had announced that the plane had been

Investigation on 9/11/01

at [REDACTED]

File # 265D-NY-280350-302

Date dictated

by [REDACTED] 9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy

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[PDF page 1]

FD-302a (Rev. 10-6-95)

265D-NY-280350-302

Continuation of FD-302 of Theodore Olson , On 9/11/01 , Page 2

hijacked. She asked Olson what she should tell the captain to do. Olson asked her for her location. She said they were over homes and asked someone else in the plane who said they were traveling North East. Olsen told his wife that two planes had been hijacked and hit the WTC. Barbara did not seemed panicked. This call was then cut off. She didn't manifest anything about a crash. Olson then went back to the television and learned of the crash at the Pentagon.

Barbara did not say anything to describe the hijackers, but did refer to them as "they". She told him "they" had knives and box cutters. She did not make any statements about the hijackers stabbing or slashing the passengers.

Barbara Olson's cell phone number is 202 365-5889. Olson doesn't know if the calls were made from her cell phone or the telephone on the plane. She always has her cell phone with her.

[PDF page 2]

BEGPRODNO
BEGBATES
DATE
FBIDESCR
INPUTBATCH
FULLTEXT

: M-INT-00103318
: 265A-NY-280350-302~86447
= 09/11/2001
: SA [REDACTED] WAS ASSIGNED A LEAD FROM THE WFO COMMAND POST
: NCTA_004 (1st Batch of unredacted 302's delivered in August)
: FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

9/11 First Responder/Family
Privacy

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 09/12/2001

On this date, SA [REDACTED] was assigned a lead from the WFO Command Center reference the Pentagon incident that took place on 9/11/2001. The lead listed a contact person, RON MAY, telephone number [REDACTED] relative to a Flight Attendant on American Airlines, Flight #77, that crashed into the Pentagon Building.

At approximately 5:30 pm, SA [REDACTED] contacted RONALD MAY,

[REDACTED] at telephone number [REDACTED].
[REDACTED] MAY provided the following information:

MAY stated that his daughter is RENEE MAY 39 Y.O.A.. She is a flight attendant with American Airlines. At exactly 6:13 a.m. Pacific Time, his wife NANCY MAY was called at their residence by RENEE MAY. RENEE was calling the family on what they believed was her cellular phone. RENEE stated that she was on American Airlines Flight #77 bound for Los Angeles from Dulles International Airport. RENEE told her mother that the flight she was on had been hijacked by six 6 hijackers. RENEE further explained that the hijackers put "us" in the back of the airplane.

SA [REDACTED] then spoke directly with NANCY MAY, the mother of RENEE MAY, about the conversation she had with her daughter. NANCY MAY verified the information provided by her husband and further stated that her daughter sounded as though she was very calm during the conversation. NANCY MAY further stated that her daughter gave her contact phone numbers for American Airlines and asked her mother to call the numbers in case the airlines were not informed about the hijacking. NANCY MAY also indicated that she could hear several other people in the background of the conversation attempting to give contact numbers to her daughter.

After getting off the telephone with their daughter, the MAY family immediately called the contact numbers, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] provided to them by RENEE, and spoke with PATTI CARSON at American Airlines, informing her about the situation on the flight. After providing the information to the airlines, the MAY family was unable to contact their daughter again on her cellular phone.

9/11 Law Enforcement
Privacy

9/11 Personal Privacy

Investigation on
9/11/2001

at
Washington, D.C.

File #
265D-NY-280350-302
by [REDACTED]

Date dictated

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[PDF page 1]

FD-302a (Rev. 10-6-95)

9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy

265D-NY-280350-302

Continuation of FD-302 of Interview of RONALD and NANCY MAY , On 9/11/2001 , Page 2

SA [] RONALD MAY provided the following personal information to
regarding her their daughter, RENEE MAY:

RENEE MAY
Sex: Female
Age: 39 Y.O.A.
Address: not provided
Cellular Phone Number: 410 935-4315

The MAY's stated that their daughter has worked for
American Airlines for approximately 15-16 yrs. and is based out of
the Washington-Baltimore area. The MAY's also stated that RENEE MAY
has a fiancée and an uncle living in the Baltimore area.

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[PDF page 2]

BEGPRODNO : M-INT-00158680
 BEGBATES : 265A-NY-280350-IN-41864
 DATE = 09/20/2001
 FBIDESCR : AMERICAN AIRLINES AIRPHONE USAGE
 INPUTBATCH : NCTA_004 (1st Batch of unredacted 302's delivered in August)
 FULLTEXT : On September 20, 2001, Intelligence Operations Specialist,
 [REDACTED] conducted the following analysis of the airphone
 usage on board the hijacked American Airline flights #11 and #77.

AMERICAN AIRLINES AIRPHONE USAGE

The following charts display the unique telephone calls Eastern time that were made using the airphones on American Airline flights #11 and #77, on Tuesday morning, September 11, 2001. The charts also list the calling card or credit card number that was used to make each call from the airphones on those flights. This report does not contain any personal cell phone calls that may have been made by the passengers, flight crew, or hijackers. Moreover, the cell site hand-off phases of each call are not included in this report. Although the identity and seat number of each caller could not be determined, this information is being furnished for whatever investigative response is deemed appropriate.

KEY

NA = The flight records did not contain the information for that particular call.

0,3 = It is not clear why the callers dialed these individual numbers, but zero 0 may have been dialed in an attempt to contact a live AT&T operator.

AMERICAN AIRLINES FLIGHT #11 BOSTON TO LOS ANGELES N.TOWER

	Number Called	Time	Calling Card	Credit Card	Number
1.	800-433-7300	8:18am	AT&T CIID		8440417162
2.	[REDACTED]	8:22am	NA	NA	NA
3.	[REDACTED]	8:25am	NPT		8707936486
4.	NA	8:28am	NA	NA	NA
5.	NA	8:16am	NA	NA	NA
6.	NA	8:20am	NA	NA	NA
7.	[REDACTED]	8:24am	NA	NA	NA
8.	NA	8:25am	NA	NA	NA
9.	[REDACTED]	8:29am	NPT		8707936486
10.	[REDACTED]	8:32am	NPT		8707936486

[PDF page 1]

AMERICAN AIRLINES FLIGHT #77 D.C. TO LOS ANGELES PENTAGON

	Number Called	Time	Calling Card	Credit Card	Number
1.	[REDACTED]	9:11am	NA	NA	NA
2.	NA	9:14am	NA	NA	NA
3.	[REDACTED]	9:12am		Visa 4744770000706490	
4.	0, 3, 0	9:15am	NA	NA	NA

9/11 Personal Privacy

5. 0 [REDACTED] 9:18am NA NA NA
6. 0, 3, 0 9:20am NA NA NA
7. 0, 3, 0 9:25am NA NA NA
8. 0, 3, 0 9:30am NA NA NA

RESULTS-FLIGHT #11

On flight #11, at least one call was made to 800-433-7300 American Airlines, with AT&T CIRD calling card number 8440417162, even though it is a toll-free number. Approximately five separate calls were made to [REDACTED] (Boston Flight Service MOD Office) in Massachusetts, and three of these calls used NPT calling card number 8707936486. At least four other unique calls, or attempted calls, were made to unknown numbers. All of the airphone calls were made between 8:16am and 8:32am.

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RESULTS-FLIGHT #77

On Flight #77, at least two calls were made to telephone number [REDACTED] subscriber unknown in Nevada, and one of them used Visa card number 4744770000706490 to make the call. Another caller dialed zero 0, and was subsequently connected to telephone number [REDACTED] Solicitor General's Office in the District of Columbia. Approximately four other telephone calls were made directly to the number zero 0, and the callers may have dialed a three 3 and then another zero 0 before the calls were terminated. One other call was made to an unknown telephone number. All of the airphone calls were made between 9:11am and 9:30am.

[PDF page 2]

BEGPRODNO : M-INT-00048160
BEGBATES : 265A-NY-280350-302~63164
DATE = 09/19/2001
FBIDESC : EARL ALEXANDER DORSEY
INPUTBATCH : NCTA_004 (1st Batch of unredacted 302's delivered in August)
FULLTEXT : FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

9/11 First
Responder/Family
Privacy

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 09/19/2001

EARL ALEXANDER DORSEY, black male, date of birth [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] was interviewed at
his residence [REDACTED] After
being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and the
nature of the interview, he provided the following information:

DORA MARIE MENCHACA, the deceased wife of DORSEY, was born
on June 6, 1956 and grew up in San Antonio, Texas. MENCHACA's
parents, JOSE and IGNACIA MENCHACA, still currently live in San
Antonio. MENCHACA had three brothers, JOSE JR., JOHN, MARK, and two
sisters, NANCY and JACQUILIN.

DORSEY and MENCHACA were married on June 25, 1988 and have
two children, IMANI DORSEY, date of birth December 20, 1982, and
JARYD DORSEY, date of birth October 7, 1996.

MENCHACA was employed as a research scientist at Amgen
Inc., One Amgen Center Drive, Thousand Oaks, California 91320,
business phone 805 447-3611.

DORSEY, their son JARYD, and MENCHACA were in Greensboro,
North Carolina during the weekend of September 8-9, 2001. On Sunday
September 9, 2001, MENCHACA boarded a 5:40 PM flight on American
Airlines to Washington, D.C. The purpose of MENCHACA's trip was to
have a business meeting with the Federal Drug Administration FDA
on September 10-11, 2001. DORSEY believes that MENCHACA may have
booked this flight and her return flight to Los Angeles on September
11, 2001, through the Amgen Travel Agency.

DORSEY spoke to MENCHACA at approximately 6:50 PM on
Sunday September 9, 2001, after she arrived in Washington, D.C.
DORSEY does not know where MENCHACA stayed while she was in
Washington, D.C. or how she got back and forth from the airport.

MENCHACA was scheduled to meet with the FDA on September
10 and September 11, 2001 and she was originally scheduled to fly
back to Los Angeles at approximately 2:00 PM or later on Tuesday,
September 11, 2001; however, the meeting with the FDA ended ahead of
schedule on Monday, September 10, 2001. DORSEY spoke telephonically

Investigation on 9/19/01 at Santa Monica, California

File # 265A-NY-280350-302 Date dictated 9/19/01

9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy
by [REDACTED]

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[PDF page 1]

FD-302a (Rev. 10-6-95)

9/11 First Responder/Family Privacy

265A-NY-280350-302

Continuation of FD-302 of EARL ALEXANDER DORSEY , On 9/19/01 , Page 2

to MENCHACA on two or three occasions on September 10, 2001. During these conversations, MENCHACA advised that her meeting had ended early and that she was going to attempt to catch an earlier flight on Tuesday, September 11, 2001. DORSEY's last conversation with MENCHACA was at approximately 11:00 PM EST on September 10, 2001. During this conversation, DORSEY and MENCHACA agreed that MENCHACA would call DORSEY's cell phone on September 11, 2001, to leave a message pertaining to which flight she would be returning on. DORSEY stated that it was agreed that MENCHACA would call DORSEY's cell phone rather than the phone at their residence so as to not wake up their son who would still be asleep.

At approximately 8:00 AM EST 5:00 PST on September 11, 2001, MENCHACA called DORSEY's cell phone [REDACTED] and left a voice mail advising that she had caught an earlier flight back to Los Angeles. DORSEY advised that, based upon the context of the voice mail, it appeared that MENCHACA was calling from the boarding area just prior to getting on the flight.

On Tuesday, September 11, 2001, at approximately 8:40 AM PST, DORSEY received a telephone call from MENCHACA's mother advising that there had been a plane crash and wanting to know if MENCHACA was alright. DORSEY told MENCHACA's mother that MENCHACA's flight departed from Washington D.C. and that she was probably alright. Approximately 15 minutes later, MENCHACA's secretary called to inquire if MENCHACA had changed her travel plans. DORSEY advised MENCHACA's secretary of the change in travel plans. At approximately 7:00 AM PST, MENCHACA began watching television coverage of the airplane crashes. At approximately 7:30-7:45 AM, DORSEY called American Airlines automated information system to try to get information concerning MENCHACA's flight, American Airlines flight #77, but he was not able to learn any information. DORSEY subsequently spoke to an American Airlines representative but again was not able to get any information pertaining to the flight. DORSEY then tried to learn information from American Airline's internet sight, but again was not successful. Later, DORSEY saw coverage of the airplane crashes and learned that a flight in Washington, D.C. had crashed. At approximately 8:10-8:20 AM, DORSEY learned from television coverage that Flight #77 had crashed in Washington. At approximately 8:40 AM, DORSEY learned from an Associated Press AP news report that Flight #77 had been hijacked. DORSEY then called MENCHACA's parents in Texas, their daughter in Portland, and friends in Los Angeles to advise them of the crash. During this time, American Airlines did not initiate contact with DORSEY to advise that MENCHACA's plane had crashed. DORSEY's

[PDF page 2]

FD-302a (Rev. 10-6-95)

Continuation of FD-302 of EARL ALEXANDER DORSEY , On 9/19/01 , Page 3

brother and a friend went to Los Angeles International Airport LAX to talk to American Airlines about the crash. DORSEY was in contact with American Airlines later in the day regarding the unconfirmed list of passengers on Flight #77. DORSEY later learned that American Airlines had contacted MENCHACA's employer to advise that MENCHACA had been on Flight #77.

DORSEY advised that MENCHACA's luggage consisted of two black bags, one was a rolling piece with a carry on that can be strapped to the top of it. MENCHACA did carry a purse but DORSEY did not know the exact contents of it other than it most likely contained a wallet with credit cards and some photographs inside, a cell phone, and eyeglasses.

DORSEY was not aware of any threats that had been made towards MENCHACA. He advised that she would have told him of any threats made towards her.

MENCHACA had life insurance through AMGEN. MENCHACA's health insurance was through U.S. Healthcare. DORSEY advised that she had recently been using a new personal physician but he did not know the identity of the doctor. MENCHACA had not undergone any type surgical of procedures since being married to DORSEY. DORSEY had information regarding MENCHACA's dentist on his personal computer; however, DORSEY advised that the computer had recently crashed and he was not able to access that information.

DORSEY provided the following physical description of MENCHACA:

- Ethnic background - Mexican-American
- Height - 5'6 1/2" tall
- Weight - 170 pounds
- Hair - Salt and pepper colored; cheek length
- Eyes - Hazel; wears glasses/contact lens
- Other - one circular scar on the right or left wrist
wore wedding band with 4-5 diamonds in a row
on ring finger of left hand.
pierced ears - usually wore stud type earrings

[PDF page 3]

GENERAL

BEGPRODNO
BEGBATES
DATE
FBIDESC
INPUTBATCH
FULLTEXT

: M-INT-00125731
: 265A-NY-280350-302~107780
= 12/19/2001
: INTERVIEW
: NCTA_004 (1st Batch of unredacted 302's delivered in August)
: FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 12/19/2001

[redacted] Special Investigator and Firearms Instructor, Firearms Training Unit, FBI Academy, was interviewed at the Dulles International Airport. Also present for initial part of the interview were Assistant United States Attorneys ROBERT SPENCER, Eastern District of Virginia, KENNETH KARAS, Southern District of New York, and DAVID J. NOVAK, EDVA, Richmond Division. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing and observation Agents, [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted] escorted the interviewing Agents aboard a United Airlines UA Boeing 757 for the purpose of a familiarization exercise. [redacted] pointed out and described the functionality of the Aircraft Communication and Reporting System ACARS, the Flight Management Computers FMCs, the Inertial Reference Units IRUs, the VOR, autopilot and communications systems of the plane.

Regarding the FMC, the flight path is programmed in the FMC by either entering latitude and longitude coordinates or the three letter identifier for a specific navigation aid navaid or airport. After the initial flight path has been entered in the GPS, anyone with some familiarity with the FMC system can easily modify the initial flight plan with only a few keystrokes. The commercial Boeing 737-300 series possesses an FMC which is similar to the 757 but commercial Boeing 727s do not have an FMC.

Regarding GPS systems, [redacted] advised that with a handheld GPS, one could travel to an area and obtain a way point to determine the coordinates for that particular place. The way points can then be used to manually fly the aircraft to the desired location. In addition by entering the latitude and longitude of the wave point into the FMC, the pilot can program the aircraft to fly to the wavepoint automatically by using the Autoflight System AFS. For use in an aircraft, the FMC would require an antennae and KRAUSS speculated that it probably would have been placed around the window near the Pilot.

Regarding the VOR, a plane must be within approximately 200 miles of the tower site to receive the radial beacon signal. The VOR is an older navigational aid and is typically used as a

Investigation on 12/18/2001 at Dulles International Airport

File # 265A-NY-280350-302

Date dictated 12/19/2001

by [redacted]

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9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy

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back up to land the plane in the event the electronic GPS aids are not functioning.

[REDACTED] pointed out the microphones from which records sounds on the Cockpit Voice Recorder CVR. These microphones are located above the Captain's head, in the Pilot's and First Officer's radio headset, the Captain and First Officer's handheld radio and in the Captain's and First Officer's oxygen masks. Federal Aviation Administration FAA regulations dictate oxygen mask usage by the Pilot or the First Officer in the event the Pilot or First Officer is alone in the cockpit at altitudes greater than 25,000 feet. FAA regulations further dictate that when a commercial airliner is flying at altitudes greater than 41,000 feet, both the Captain and the First Officer are required to wear an oxygen mask when in the cockpit. [REDACTED] noted that oxygen mask usage results in muffled voices and speculated that the occurrence of muffled voices on the CVR could be indicative of oxygen mask usage. [REDACTED] demonstrated the functionality of the aircraft's radio and public address PA buttons. These buttons control with whom the Captain or the First Officer speaks. Only one of the buttons can be selected at a time. There are two sets of the buttons. One set is for the Captain and the other is for the First Officer. [REDACTED] did not believe that the hijacker pilot used the Captain's headset because the headset probably would not have fit him properly and would have been tossed aside. If the headset were tossed aside, the CVR may reflect banging noises if the headset impacted the walls of the cockpit.

A fire axe is located behind the seat of the First Officer near the floor. The First Officer sits on the right of the cockpit while the Captain sits on the left. The fire axe is used to break through panels to aid in the extinguishing of on-board fires and is also used as an extrication tool for escape. Some Boeing 757s have two jumpseats in the cockpit while others only have one.

Since September 11, 2001, [REDACTED]

9/11 Closed by Statute

Cockpit keys are maintained by the Captain, the First Officer and some Flight Attendants. Some Flight Attendants used to carry the cockpit key on their security badge neck chains. Prior to September 11, 2001, a cockpit key was also maintained outside the cockpit in the forward galley area.

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[REDACTED] demonstrated the use of the ACARS system by retrieving and displaying several weather reports which had been sent earlier in the day. The ACARS system is a VHF-based radio system which is synchronized with Coordinated Universal Time UTC. ACARS messages are received on either the ACARS display screen or a small printer. [REDACTED] printed out an example of a printed ACARS message. This message was placed in a 1A envelope. A visual indicator on the ACARS screen labeled "MSG" flashes when a message is received. This indicator is difficult to see. Because the indicator is difficult to see, critical messages are typically forwarded to the printer which is more obvious to the Captain or First Officer rather than to the display screen.

[REDACTED] was provided access to the preliminary National Traffic Safety Board NTSB UA 93 Flight Profile, Flight Data Recorder FDR narrative, Altitude Profile graph and FDR graphs. The full flight FDR graph reflected that at about 09:40, the altitude of the aircraft increased to over 40,000 feet while the speed decreased to less than 200 knots. [REDACTED] noted that a potential stall of the aircraft might have occurred if the aircraft speed had decreased to less than 190 knots at this altitude. [REDACTED] clarified that a stall in the engines would not have occurred, however, "the wings would have stopped flying."

The NTSB Final 6-minute FDR graph, Flight Profile and FDR narrative reflect that at about 10:00, a "series of control column inputs caused the aircraft to pitch nose-up and nose-down aggressively" which caused the gravitational pull to range from +4 to -1 G. [REDACTED] noted that the FDR graph only reflected the negative G force to -1 G and questioned whether the negative G force was even measurable at a level greater than -1 G. [REDACTED] speculated that UA flight 93 might have experienced negative G force greater than -1 G. The Boeing 757 is rated for negative G force up to -1 G. Any negative G force greater than -1 would have unpredictable and potentially detrimental effects on the integrity of the aircraft's structure. [REDACTED] speculated that the UA flight 93 was probably "coming apart" if the negative G force of the aircraft was greater than -1 G.

The Flight Plan Forecast contains weather briefings and might also contain previous pilot reports.

[REDACTED] reviewed the UA ACARS log for UA flight 93 on 9/11/2001. The abbreviation EWR is the three letter identifier for Newark International Airport. The abbreviation CHIDD represents

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the UA Dispatch in Chicago, IL. The abbreviation DTW is the three letter identifier for Detroit International Airport. The abbreviation JFKFOUA refers to the UA Flight Operations Office at JFK International Airport. [] commented that the message sent from UA flight 93 at 13:21 9:21 Eastern Time indicated that the Captain had encountered occasional light chop and the wind was 290/50. [] surmised that the Captain could have delayed allowing cabin movement due to the occasional light chop.

Regarding the message stating "Leroy, Melody wants to make sure you are o.k. send me back a message" which was sent to UA 93 from JFKFOUA at 13:22 9:22 ET, [] commented that it is unusual for messages of a personal nature to be forwarded on the ACARS system. [] opined that it was suspicious that Leroy did not acknowledge receipt of that message because if he [] were piloting an aircraft and received such a message, he would immediately respond.

Regarding the ACARS message stating "HOW'S THE WX. CAN DISPATCH BE OF ANY ASSISTANCE?" sent by Chicago Dispatch at 13:36 9:36 ET, [] stated that this message which appeared to be inquiring about the weather was not a standard UA code, but that it appeared to be an attempt by the dispatcher to ascertain the status of UA flight 93.

[] reviewed the FAA radio communications transcript for UA flight 93. [] explained Liberty West, Franklin-R, and Lorain-R are names given to aircraft control towers that have responsibility for a specific geographic flight area. The controllers operating under the given names could be at the same physical location sitting side by side.

Of particular interest on the FAA radio communications transcript was a transmission at 9:35:36 in which Cleveland Tower directed UA flight 93 "if able ah squawk trip please." The word trip is an old codeword to identify a hijacking in progress and squawk is a codeword to instruct the Captain to turn the transponder to 7500.

[] reviewed the VCR transcript of ExecuJet 956.

The Aeronautical Radio Incorporated ARINC relays radio transmissions from aircraft to its respective home company counterpart. ARINC allows United pilots and pilots of other airlines to communicate via radio transmissions with their

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respective corporate offices even though the aircraft is physically located on the other side of the world.

The UA e-mail system is called UNIMATIC.

Robert Spielman is the UA Chief Pilot for the New York

Pilot domicile. Spielman could identify the First Officers who have flown with UA 93 Captain Jason Dahl. These First Officers could provide information regarding Dahl's in-flight habits including when he allowed Flight Attendants to begin food service, when he allowed passengers to move around the cabin, his food and beverage habits and if and where he allowed cockpit keys to be located outside the cockpit.

A representative of UA In-Flight Services can provide specifics regarding UA 93's in-flight service routines.

Several photographs were taken of the cockpit and First Class and Coach sections of the plane. These photographs were placed in 1A envelopes.

Copies of the preliminary NTSB UA 93 Flight Profile, NTSB FDR narrative, NTSB Altitude Profile graph, NTSB FDR graphs, the FAA Tower communications transcript and the ExecuJet 956 CVR transcript were placed in a 1A envelope.

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