

NARRATIVE #2: THE TERRORIST HIJACKINGS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001

Preface: The following document provides Team 7's current narrative story of the four flights hijacked on September 11, 2001:

- American Airlines Flight #11 which impacted the North Tower of the World Trade Center in New York City.
- United Airlines Flight #175 which impacted the South Tower of the World Trade Center in New York City.
- American Airlines Flight #77 which impacted the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia.
- United Airlines Flight #93 which impacted the ground in Shanksville (Somerset County), Pennsylvania.

The narratives are based on the facts as best we know them from the documentary record, interviewee information and other evidentiary material.

The narratives begin with the arrival of the hijackers at the respective airports on 9/11, and tell the story of how the hijackers were ticketed, processed in regard to security and seated on the aircraft; what happened on the aircraft from take-off to grounding, including communications to and from the plane; and the situational awareness of the airlines as to the status of their respective hijacked flights.

The narratives do not include issues under the purview of Team 8 regarding the situational awareness of the U.S. Air Traffic Control system; the aircraft's flight path and performance; the response of the North American Air Defense system (NORAD); or the situational awareness and emergency response of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).

Placeholders are indicated where additional investigation is still underway or the Commission is awaiting further supporting information and evidence on an important data point.

All times indicated in the narrative are in Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) unless otherwise noted.

AMERICAN AIRLINES FLIGHT 11

COLGAN AIR FLIGHT 5930

The American Airlines Flight #11 flight story includes a narrative regarding Colgan Air Flight #5930 which departed from the Portland International Jetport (Portland, Maine) to Logan International Airport (Boston, Massachusetts) on the morning of September 11, 2001. Two of the AA #11 hijackers, Mohamed Atta and Abdul Aziz al Omari, were passengers aboard the Colgan Air flight prior to their transfer to AA#11.

Hijacker Ticket Purchases

Ticket records show that Atta and al Omari purchased their tickets for the Colgan Air flight on August 28, 2001 at the same time they purchased their tickets for AA Flight #11.¹ Colgan Air operated under a code share and service agreement as a U.S. Airways Express carrier. The purchase was made through the American Airlines website (AA.com) using a Bank of America Visa credit card issued in the name of Mohamed Atta.² American Airlines and U.S. Airways had a code sharing agreement that allows passengers to book flights aboard either of the airlines on either of the company's websites.

The Day of September 11, 2001

Hijacker Arrival at the Airport

At 5:40 a.m. on September 11, 2001³, a car confirmed to have been rented by Mohamed Atta in Boston on September 9, 2001⁴ entered the Portland International Jetport parking facility.⁵ The entry time was indicated by the parking stub found in the car by law enforcement officials after the 9-11 attacks. (PLACEHOLDER: FOOTNOTE EVIDENCE)

Hijacker Check-in and Baggage Check

Law enforcement interview records with U.S. Airways personnel working at the Portland Jetport indicate that Atta and al Omari checked in at the U.S. Airways counter and checked two bags under Atta's name.⁶ (PLACEHOLDER: Awaiting documentary evidence from U.S. Airways on check-in time, bag check and CAPPS selection information. Chuck Severance, the U.S. Airways station manager, is scheduled for interview to discuss the black security tag on Atta's bag as per John Tamm)

An FBI interview of the ramp worker at Boston who handled Atta's luggage when it arrived at Logan International Airport indicated that the bag was marked by a black security tag indicating that the item should not be loaded onto the aircraft without assuring the passenger was on-board.⁷ This is an indication that Atta may have indeed

been chosen as a selectee by the Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS). The Jetport did not have Explosives Detection Screening equipment (EDS) or K-9 bomb detection capability. The consequences of selection by the CAPPS system would have been either a physical search of the checked luggage or Positive Passenger Bag Match (PPBM).⁸ PPBM requires that the carrier ensure the passenger actually boarded the aircraft before his bags were loaded onto the plane.⁹ Both checked bags were loaded onto the aircraft servicing Colgan Air Flight #5930. (PLACEHOLDER: CONFIRMING CAPPS CONSEQUENCES AT COLGAN)

Hijacker Pre-Screening Selectee Status

(PLACEHOLDER: PENDING DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE ON THEIR CAPPS OR MANUA PROFILING STATUS AT PORTLAND).

Checkpoint Security Screening

At 5:45 a.m. Atta and al Omari were recorded by Closed Circuit Television entering the sole security checkpoint at Portland.¹⁰ This checkpoint was the custodial responsibility of Delta Airlines which contracted for security screening services with Globe Security. The checkpoint featured two lanes, each outfitted with a magnetometer and x-ray equipment. The checkpoint did not have explosive trace detection equipment.¹¹

The checkpoint videotape was seized as evidence by the FBI and reviewed by the Commission.¹² The videotape showed that Atta and al Omari walked through the magnetometer at 5:45:03 a.m. Both Atta and al Omari proceeded through the walk-through metal detector and were neither stopped nor subjected to secondary screening with a hand wand metal detector. A screener was stationed at the magnetometer and monitoring the machine. Though not conclusive the video would suggest that neither of the subjects alarmed the magnetometer. Both Atta and al Omari proceeded from the magnetometer immediately to the x-ray belt. Atta picked-up a black shoulder bag. Al Omari claimed a similar bag, and also a smaller black case that he held in both hands. The item cannot be distinguished but had the appearance of a camera or camcorder case. Both of the subjects then proceeded to the gate passing out of view of the video camera at 5:45:15 a.m.

The checkpoint log indicates that the magnetometer and x-ray equipment were properly tested prior to the opening of the checkpoint. (PLACEHOLDER: CONFIRM) The logs also show that the checkpoint had its full complement of staff. (PLACEHOLDER: CONFIRM AND DESCRIBE WHAT POSITIONS)

Checkpoint Issue: The Air Carrier Standard Security Program in effect on September 11, 2001 required that security screeners conduct random and continuous hand searches of

carry-on items. The checkpoint video reviewed by the commission indicated that no such random or continuous hand searches were taking place at the checkpoint that morning. (PLACEHOLDER: REVIEW OF TAPE BY FAA ENFORCEMENT SPECIALIST IS SCHEDULED TO CONFIRM THE VIOLATION).

Hijacker Boarding

Seating aboard the Colgan flight was open rather than assigned seating.¹³ Records indicate that eight passengers boarded the flight, including Atta and al Omari.¹⁴ (PLACEHOLDER: CONFUSION ABOUT THE CORRECT NUMBER WILL BE RESOLVED WITH FORTHCOMING DOCUMENTATION). The flight crew included a pilot and a first officer who also served as the flight attendant. The first officer testified to the Federal Bureau of Investigation that Atta and al Omari were the last to board the aircraft and sat in the last row of the plane – Row 9, which was three seats abreast at the back of the aircraft.¹⁵

The Flight

Colgan Air Flight #5930 was serviced by a Beechcraft 1900 (Tail #N15301)—a 19 seat regional airliner. (PLACEHOLDER: ADD FOOTNOTE) It departed from Gate 11 at Portland International Jetway on time at 6:00 a.m., arriving at Gate B9(A) at Boston Logan International Airport at approximately 6:45 a.m., one hour before the scheduled departure of AA Flight #11.¹⁶

Post-Flight Evidence from Aircraft and Passenger Interviews

On the evening of September 11, 2001 the aircraft that serviced Colgan Air flight #5930 was searched by the FBI and the Massachusetts State Police, including K-9 teams, at Logan Airport. The explosives search was negative and eight items were taken into evidence by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (PLACEHOLDER: PENDING EVIDENCE LIST FROM FBI EVIDENCE FILE)

Purpose of the Flight

No physical, documentary or analytical evidence derived either by the Commission or law enforcement provides a clear or convincing reason why Atta and al Omari drove to Portland, Maine from Boston on the morning of September 10th, only to return to Logan International Airport on Flight #5930 on the morning of September 11.

The Commission was briefed by Portland Police Chief Michael Chitwood who indicated that the Portland police pursued over 60 leads regarding the presence of Atta and al Omari in Portland but that none of the leads shed any light on the question of their travel to and from Portland, Maine.¹⁷ The Commission also was briefed by the South Portland Police Chief (PLACEHOLDER: TEAM 7 and JOHN TAMM TO IV SOUTH PORTLAND POLICE).

The most logical theory about Atta and al Omari's travel to Portland is that the hijackers chose to fly into Boston to avoid suspicion that may have been aroused if they had arrived at Logan at approximately the same time as eight other young Middle Eastern males to check-in for American Airlines Flight #11 and United Airlines Flight #175.

A related possibility is that Atta and al Omari may have determined that in the event the hijackers' operational security had been compromised by U.S. intelligence or law enforcement, or by the U.S. aviation security system, then the two terrorists would be apprehended during their check-in at the Portland airport, which would have been preferable to being stopped at Logan Airport where the terrorist team intending to hijack United Flight 175 would be assembling at the same time. Again, as the operational leader it is likely that Mohamed Atta would have been particularly subject to such concerns.

Telephone records show that a phone call was placed from a pay phone in the gate area from which UA Flight #175 departed to Mohamed Atta's cell phone at **6:54 a.m.** (PLACEHOLDER: NEED TO RECONCILE THIS TIME WITH 6:52 AM TIME SUPPLIED BY FBI IN SPECIFIC ANSWER TO QUESTION ABOUT THIS CALL).¹⁸ This phone call indicates that the two hijacking teams engaged in tactical communications, such as situational reporting and possible "go" or "no go" determinations.

The Massport Aviation Director reported to the Commission that Portland, Maine was the nearest airport to Boston with a flight that would have arrived at Logan in time for the passengers to transfer to American Airlines Flight #11.¹⁹ (CONFIRMATION PENDING)

Another theory, not exclusive of the first, is that Atta, the leader of the 9-11 hijackers, may have believed that he and al Omari were more likely to successfully pass through checkpoint screening at a smaller airport, carrying items such as mace and/or pepper spray, than they were at Logan Airport.

The Commission would note two considerations in regard to this theory. First, the evidence, including public sources to which the hijackers had access, would not have supported the theory that smaller airports possessed more porous checkpoints. For instance, in the Spring of 2001, a Fox news special investigation publicly described serious shortcomings in the detection capabilities at Logan Airports security screening checkpoints. Second, Atta and al Omari were required to go through another security checkpoint when they arrived at Logan in order to access the terminal from where American Airlines Flight #11 departed. Given the hijackers detailed planning for the operation, it is likely they had discerned that fact prior to 9-11.

One other fact bears mentioning. The Commission notes that the mileage reading of the car rented by Mohamed Atta, which was recovered at the Portland International Jetport, indicated that the car had been driven (PLACEHOLDER: HOW MANY MILES-FROM EVIDENCE—AND FOOTNOTE) from the time Atta rented the car in Boston. The mileage between Boston and Portland is approximately 118 miles using the most

expeditious route. This means that Atta drove a substantial number of miles to locations unknown either in or around Boston, to locations on the way to Portland, or to locations in and around Portland, Maine. The travel associated with this additional mileage could hold the reasons for Atta's and al Omari's presence in Portland.

AMERICAN AIRLINES FLIGHT #11

Hijackers: Pilot: Mohamed Atta; Abdul Aziz al Omari; Waleed al Shehri; Wail al Shehr; Satam al Suqami.

Hijacker Weapon and Ticket Purchases

Financial records indicate that Mohamed Atta purchased two Victorinox Swiss Army Knives at the Zurich Airport on July 8, 2001.²⁰

Waleed al Shehri: Cliphanger Viper and Imperial Tradesman Dual Edge.
(PLACEHOLDER: CHECK UPDATED FBI LIST FROM SAM. ALSO RECONCILE WITH 1/31/03 PENTTBOM REPORT WHICH ASSIGNS THESE PURCHASES TO AL-SHEHHI ON 8/13/01; P. 48.)

On August 28, 2001 Atta booked and purchased paper, one-way business class tickets for AA Flight #11 for himself and Abdul Aziz al Omari on the AA.com website. The tickets were paid for using Atta's Visa card.²¹ (Atta ticket # 0012135020181; al Omari ticket #0012135020182)²² al Omari subsequently claimed to have lost his ticket and a renewal was issued on September 9, 2001 in Boston (ticket number 2179084144).²³

Atta was registered as a member of the American Airlines AAdvantage (frequent flyer) program (account number AA6H26L04). He had enrolled in the program on August 25, 2001 and had 3,754 miles credited to his account for a flight from (PLACEHOLDER: GET DETAILS AND CONFIRM). Why Atta enrolled in the frequent flyer program is not known definitively. However it is quite possible that he believed this might help place him above suspicion by the aviation security system, including selection by the Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System.

On August 26, 2001 Waleed al Shehri purchased his one-way, electronic ticket (PLACEHOLDER: PENTTBOM says TICKETS—CONFIRMATION PENDING) by phone through AA's Cincinnati Reservations Office and paid for the ticket using his Visa card (ticket #0012109108613).

On August 26, 2001, Wail al Shehri purchased his one-way electronic ticket by phone through AA's Cincinnati Reservations Office using his visa card (ticket #0012109108519).^{24 25}

On August 28, 2001 the ticket for Satam al Suqami, was purchased in cash by Waleed al Shehri in person at the Deerfield Beach, Florida Travel Center²⁶ (ticket # 0012178864231).²⁷

The Commission has found no ticketing, passenger occupancy or financial evidence to indicate that the AA Flight #11 hijackers purchased additional seats (beyond the ones they actually used) in order to limit the number of passengers they would need to control during the operation.^{28 29} (PLACEHOLDER: ADD SPECIFIC CITES FROM AIRLINES.)

Suspicious Booking

Among the individuals booked for passage aboard AA Flight #11 on September 11, 2001 (but not ticketed) were seven individuals who did not show for the flight and whose reservations had been made at 4:00 am EDT on September 11, 2001 by Intervia Travel Agency located in Karachi, Pakistan.

Three of the passengers were listed by the name "Noris" and four listed as "Cooper." The travel was booked as one-way tickets (CONFIRMING WHETHER THEY WERE FIRST CLASS). A search conducted by a World Span Computer Reservation System employee, the results of which were provided to the FBI, indicated that the same travel agency booked the same seven people for travel on a September 11, 2001 morning flight from Los Angeles to St. Louis aboard TWA Flight #342. (INVESTIGATION CONTINUING).³⁰

Hijacker Arrival at Airport and Check-in

At 6:45 a.m. Atta and al Omari arrived at Boston Logan airport at Terminal B, Gate B9A aboard Colgan Air Flight #5930 from Portland, Maine. Atta was carrying a black shoulder bag. Al Omari was also carrying a black shoulder bag as well as a small black case similar to a camera or camcorder carrying case. Two bags checked by the hijackers at Portland International Jetport were unloaded from Colgan Air Flight #5930. The bag tags indicated that the luggage should be transported by U.S. Airways to American Airlines for loading aboard AA #11 from Boston to Los Angeles International Airport (LAX). FAA security rules did not require additional screening or special security handling of Atta or al Omari's luggage in Boston because AA Flight #11 was the second leg of Atta and al Omari's itinerary.

After exiting the aircraft, the two terrorists walked up an escalator and across a parking lot that separates the terminal area from where Atta and al Omari arrived to the Terminal B location from where American Airlines Flight #11 was scheduled to depart. The two were observed by a witness asking directions to the terminal area. Prior to accessing the gate area for Flight #11, Atta and al Omari had to pass through the Pier A checkpoint (PLACEHOLDER: DESCRIPTION OF CHECKPOINT) managed by Huntleigh USA Corporation.

Also at 6:45 a.m. Wail al Shehri, Waleed al Shehri and Satam al Suqami arrived at Logan airport and parked their rental car (PLACEHOLDER: WHERE LOCATED). The car was found later in the day by a tip provided to authorities from an individual who

reported a suspicious incident that occurred in the parking lot that morning. The individual had parked his car in the lot in order to catch an early morning flight from Boston to Atlanta, Georgia. He reported that three Middle Eastern men were parked in a car next to him. One of the passengers opened their car door striking the citizen's automobile. Angered, the citizen opened his door striking the other car. The citizen reported that the three subjects remained in their car and did not respond in any way to the provocation. When the citizen heard about the attacks he contacted the authorities to report the incident. The hijackers' rental car was found in the location described by the citizen and contained (PLACEHOLDER: DESCRIBE THE EVIDENCE, SOURCE).

(PLACEHOLDER: TIME) Wail al Shehri, Waleed al Shehri and Satam al Suqami checked in at the American Airlines ticket counter. Each of them checked a single bag.³¹

Hijacker Pre-Screening Selectee Status

According to ticket records, Wail al Shehri, Waleed al Shehri and Satam al Suqami were selected by the Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS).³²

Accordingly their luggage was screened by a CTX explosives detection system (PLACEHOLDER: PENDING CONFIRMATION) and then loaded onto the aircraft servicing AA Flight #11. Under FAA security rules in effect at the time, the hijackers' designation as "selectees" did not require that they undergo any screening of their person or carry-on bags beyond that of a non-selectee.³³

Checkpoint Security Screening

Because the main entry way to the airport, the ticket area, the security checkpoints and the gate area were not monitored by surveillance equipment no conclusive evidence exists regarding the time at which the AA Flight #11 hijackers passed through checkpoint screening. However, to access the gate area all five would have been required to pass through the Pier A checkpoint in order to access Terminal B Gate 32 from where the flight was departing. Only two checkpoints serviced this area: checkpoint B4 (also known as the Mid-checkpoint) and checkpoint B5 (also known as the North or Main Checkpoint). Both checkpoints were operated by Globe Security, under a contract with American Airlines. (PLACEHOLDER: DESCRIBE CHECKPOINT. WHAT'S THE PAPERWORK SAY ABOUT STAFFING TESTING)

The logs and records from the checkpoint indicate that the magnetometers and x-ray equipment were properly tested and operational on the morning of September 11, 2001. (PLACEHOLDER: DISCUSS STAFFING). Records indicate that the checkpoint (PLACEHOLDER: GIVE ASSESSMENTS FOR THE YEAR)

In passing through this checkpoint each of the individuals would have been screened by a walk-through metal detector calibrated to detect items with a metal content of a 22 caliber handgun or more. Any of the hijackers who may have alarmed the walk-through

magnetometer would have been screened with a hand wand metal detector—a procedure requiring the screener to identify the item or items that caused the alarm. In addition, the hijackers' carry-on belongings would have been screened by an x-ray machine in order to identify prohibited or restricted items. Restricted or prohibited items discovered during the walk through metal detector, hand wand, or x-ray screening would have been confiscated.

Neither the supervisor on duty at the checkpoint nor any of the screeners reported observing anything suspicious that morning. No records were kept to log individuals who may have alarmed the magnetometer, or from whom restricted or prohibited items were confiscated at the checkpoint, unless the individual possessed an "illegal" item such as an unlicensed firearm. No such police reports were filed at the checkpoint that morning. (PENDING CONFIRMATION)

At 6:52 a.m. Atta received a phone call from a pay phone in Terminal C at Logan International Airport—the terminal from which United Airlines Flight #175 (hijacked later in the day) was due to depart.

Pre-Flight Preparation

At 7:00 a.m. Captain John Ogonowski and First Officer Thomas McGuinness prepared American Airlines Flight #11 for departure including a release affirming the fuel load and gross weight of the aircraft. AA Flight #11 was fueled with 76,400 pounds of JET A fuel.³⁴ The average fuel load for AA Flight #11 for the flight in 2001 was 70,000 pounds of JET A fuel. (PLACEHOLDER: CONFIRMING WHY THE ADDITIONAL FUEL).

As part of the pre-flight procedure the pilots were required to review bulletins posted by the FAA and the air carrier, including any security messages. Records show that the pre-flight bulletins for flight #11 did not contain any security warnings or issues. (PLACEHOLDER: CONFIRM)

Each American Airlines flight was assigned a "dispatcher" by the air carrier. The dispatcher was responsible for authorizing and monitoring the operation of the flight.

It is the dispatcher's and pilot's joint responsibility to ensure the safety of every flight. The dispatcher authorizes the flight by creating and issuing a flight release and flight plan. The flight release/plan specifically spells out safety parameters under which the flight is to be conducted. These parameters include fuel quantity, route of flight, altitude, severe weather avoidance, type of aircraft, and an alternate airport selection if the destination has marginal weather conditions. The pilot signifies his or her acceptance of the release by jointly signing the release with the dispatcher.³⁵

Peggy Houck, American Airlines dispatcher in charge of AA Flight #11, stated that all aspects of pre-flight preparation of the flight were routine. She reported having no pre-

flight communications with the pilot or aircraft because no problems or issues in need of resolution were indicated.³⁶

Hijacker Boarding

At 7:31 a.m. Wail Al-Shehri and Waleed Al-Shehri boarded American Flight #11. At 7:39 a.m. Atta and al Omari embarked on the aircraft and al Suqami boarded at 7:40 a.m.³⁷ (PLACEHOLDER: THESE TIMES, WHICH ARE PULLED FROM AA'S SABRE RESPONSE SYSTEM, NEED FURTHER VERIFICATION BECAUSE THAT REPORT HAS SOME OTHER PASSENGERS "BOARDING" AFTER THE FLIGHT HAD PUSHED BACK.)

(PLACEHOLDER FOR INFORMATION ON ATTA'S REQUEST FOR CONFIRMATION THAT HIS BAGGAGE HAD BEEN LOADED)

Flight Profile

American Airlines Flight #11 provided daily, non-stop service from Boston's Logan International Airport (BOS) to Los Angeles International Airport (LAX), scheduled for a 7:45 a.m. departure, operating seven days a week.³⁸ The aircraft used for the flight on September 11, 2001 was a Boeing 767-200 ER, tail number N334AA.³⁹

On this day, the plane was piloted by Captain John Ogonowski and First Officer Thomas McGuinness. It carried its full capacity of nine Flight Attendants:

- Karen Martin (Position 1), who would have been seated at takeoff in the forward left jumpseat (1L) located between the First Class cabin and the cockpit entrance;
- Kathleen Nicosia (Position 2), would have been seated in the left aft jumpseat (3L) at the rear of the main cabin in the back of the aircraft;
- Betty Ong (Position 3), at take-off would have been in the right aft jumpseat (3R) at the back of the aircraft behind Coach section;
- Dianne Snyder (Position 4), would have been seated in the mid-galley jumpseat (2R), behind the mid-galley within the main cabin;
- Barbara "Bobbi" Arestegui (Position 5), would have been in the forward right jumpseat (1R Center), which was in the forward galley between the cockpit and the First Class cabin;
- Jeffrey Collman (Position 6), was in the middle left jumpseat (2L) located in the middle galley within the main cabin;
- Sara Low (Position 7), was in the middle right jumpseat (2R) in the middle galley within the main cabin;
- Jean Roger (Position 8), would have been in the forward left jumpseat (1L Center) in the forward galley; and
- Madeline "Amy" Sweeney (Position 9), would have been seated in the left aft jumpseat (3L) at the back of the aircraft behind the Coach section.⁴⁰

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On the morning of September 11, 2001, Flight Attendant [REDACTED] scheduled for flight attendant position #8, called in sick. The FBI interviewed [REDACTED] about her absence and nothing suspicious was indicated.⁴¹

The aircraft had a capacity of 158 passengers, with 9 seats in First Class, 30 in Business Class and 119 in Coach.⁴² On September 11, 2001 81 passengers boarded AA Flight #11 (including the 5 terrorists). All nine of the first class seats were occupied (100%), two of them by hijackers Waleed al Shehri (2B) and Wail al Shehri (2A). Nineteen of the 30 seats in business class were occupied (48.7%), three of which were occupied by hijackers Mohamed Atta (8D), Abdul Aziz al Omari (8G) and Satam al Suqami (10B).⁴³ Fifty-three of the 119 coach seats were occupied (44%), none of them by hijackers.

The percentage of seats occupied on the aircraft (also known as "load factor") on September 11, 2001 was 51.26%, compared to an average load factor of 38.6% (for AA #11 flights that operated on Tuesday's over the three months preceding 9/11/2001).⁴⁴

These facts show that load factors on this flight were somewhat above the norm. The evidence does not suggest that passenger levels were manipulated by the hijackers in order to reduce the number of passengers they would be required to control.⁴⁵

Fifty-nine people had booked travel aboard AA #11 on 9/11 and either cancelled or changed their booking prior to flight time. An additional fifteen passengers were listed as no shows for the flight.⁴⁶

~~(PLACEHOLDER FOR WRAP-UP OF INVESTIGATION OF NO SHOWS/CANCELLATIONS/ AND PASSENGERS)~~

The Flight

At 7:40 a.m. AA Flight #11 pushed back from Gate 32 in Terminal B of Logan International Airport and taxied to its departure runway.⁴⁷ At 7:59 a.m. it took off on runway 4R.⁴⁸

By 8:13 a.m. AA Flight #11 was at an altitude of 26,000 feet, and had not quite reached its assigned cruising altitude of 28,900 feet.⁴⁹ Up to this time all communications and flight profile data were normal. While cabin service generally would not start until after the cruising altitude was reached, some pilots under the proper circumstances would turn off the "Fasten Seatbelt" signs at some point prior to reaching that altitude, which would have permitted Flight Attendants to begin service then. It is not certain that cabin service had begun by this time, but it is very likely that Flight Attendants would at least have begun preparations.

The initial service assignments for Flight Attendants on AA Flight #11 would have had Karen Martin working in the First Class cabin, with Bobbi Arestegui in the First Class Galley. Sara Low and Jean Roger would have been serving Business Class passengers, with Dianne Snyder in the Mid-Galley. Betty Ong and Amy Sweeney would have been

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working in the Coach section, with Karen Nicosia in the aft galley. Jeffrey Collman would have been assigned to work in Coach, but to assist in First Class if needed.⁵⁰ Given the higher "load factor" in First Class compared to Coach on 9/11, it is possible he would have started in First Class.

At 8:15 a.m. the aircraft reached its cruising altitude of 28,900 feet. The seatbelt sign would almost certainly have been turned off by the Captain by this point. Air Traffic Control radioed AA Flight #11 requesting that the aircraft climb to 35,000 feet. No acknowledgement from the aircraft was received. Air Traffic Control continued various attempts and methods of reaching the aircraft intermittently over the next 10 minutes.

The Hijacking

Between 8:14 a.m. and 8:18 a.m. the hijackers began their takeover of the aircraft, using knives, mace or a mace-like chemical, violence and the threat of violence, and a bomb. Based on information supplied by eyewitness accounts the hijackers initiated and sustained their command of the aircraft using knives (as reported by two flight attendants), violence including stabbing and slashing (as reported by two flight attendants), the threat of violence (as indicated by a hijacker in radio transmissions received by Air Traffic Control), mace (reported by one flight attendant), the threat of a bomb, either fake or real (reported by one flight attendant) and deception about their intentions (as indicated by a hijacker in a radio transmission received by air traffic control).

At 8:19 a.m. AA #11 Flight Attendant Betty Ong contacted the American Airlines Southeastern Reservations Office in Cary, North Carolina via GTE air phone to report an emergency aboard the flight. (Commission interviewees stated that flight attendants know the reservations 800 phone number by heart because they call it frequently to help passengers with reservations questions. Calls to the number are routed to the first open line at one of several reservations facilities, including the reservations center in Cary.)⁵¹

The emergency call from Betty Ong was to last approximately 25 minutes (8:19 a.m. - 8:44 a.m.) over which time Ms. Ong relayed vital information about events taking place aboard the airplane to authorities on the ground. The call from Ms. Ong was received initially at the Reservations Office by American Airlines employee Vanessa Minter, and then taken over by her colleague Winston Sadler. Realizing the urgency of the situation Mr. Sadler pushed an emergency button that simultaneously initiated a tape recording of the call and sent an alarm notifying Nydia Gonzalez, the reservations office supervisor, to pick up on the line. Gonzalez was paged to respond to the alarm and joined the call a short time later. Only the first four minutes of the phone call between Ong and the reservations center (Minter, Sadler and Gonzalez) was tape recorded because the recently installed recording system in that office was designed with such a recording time limit on its tapes.⁵² (PLACEHOLDER FOR WHY THE LIMIT).

At 8:19 a.m. Ms. Ong immediately told Sadler that “The cockpit is not answering, somebody’s stabbed in business class...and I think there’s mace...that we can’t breathe...I don’t know, I think we’re getting hijacked.”

Note: While the “stabbing” in business class may have been the attack on the flight attendants, or an unnamed victim, it is also quite possible that this is the initial report of the attack (reported with more specificity later) on Daniel Lewin, a passenger seated in 9(B). Lewin was seated in Business Class directly behind Atta and al Omari, and in front of al Suqami. As reported in press accounts, Lewin was a 31-year old who had served 4 years as an officer in the Israeli military.

At 8:20 a.m. Ms. Ong reported that flight attendants Karen Martin and Bobbi Arestegui had been stabbed. (Both Martin and Arestegui were assigned to the First Class cabin.)

Note: American Airlines flight attendants all carried cockpit keys on their person. Although no information was provided from the flight about exactly how the hijackers gained access to the cockpit, it is possible the stabbings of the flight attendants could have been for the purpose of acquiring a key, forcing one of them to open the cockpit door, or to lure the Captain or First Officer out of the cockpit.

Also at *8:20 a.m.* American Airlines Dispatcher Peggy Houck received a communication from an American Airlines flight traveling from Seattle to Boston reporting to her that Air Traffic Control had asked the aircraft to try to contact AA#11. This was the first indication she had of any problem on the flight.⁵³

At 8:21 a.m. the transponder on AA#11 was shut off which (NOTE: TEAM 8 WILL STATE THE ATC CONSEQUENCES).⁵⁴

At 8:21 a.m. Nydia Gonzales joined the call from Betty Ong. Gonzalez realized it was a serious matter and used another phone line to immediately contact an emergency line at the American Airlines System Operations Control (SOC) in Ft. Worth, Texas to inform headquarters that there was a problem aboard Flight #11. Gonzalez’ emergency call to the SOC was received by manager on duty Craig Marquis and tape recorded at the airlines’ headquarters. Gonzalez notified Marquis that American Airlines Flight #11 was reporting an emergency, that stabbings had taken place and that the flight attendants couldn’t get into the cockpit.

After confirming Gonzalez’ identity and position, at *8:22 a.m.* Marquis acknowledged the emergency and indicated to Gonzalez that he would “get ATC (Air Traffic Control) on here.” At this same time, while Marquis was relating this information to Gonzalez, Ong reported to Sadler that “I think the guys (hijackers) are up there. They might have gone there, jammed their way up there, or something. Nobody can call the cockpit. We can’t even get inside.” Thirty seconds after contacting American Airlines’ headquarters Gonzalez rejoined the call from Ms. Ong.

Also at **8:22 a.m.** Flight Attendant Madeline “Amy” Sweeney aboard AA Flight #11 attempted to contact the American Airlines flight services office at Logan International Airport by GTE airphone. The office Ms. Sweeney was attempting to call managed the scheduling and operation of flight attendants and the phone number was well known to the American flight attendants operating out of Boston.⁵⁵ Ms. Sweeney’s attempt to get through to the office failed (as did a second attempt at **8:24 a.m.**).

At **8:23 a.m.** American Airlines flight dispatcher Peggy Houck sent an Aircraft Communications and Reporting System (ACARS) text message to AA Flight #11: “Good Morning...ATC looking for you on (radio frequency) 135.32.”

Also at **8:23 a.m.** the tape recording by the reservations center of the Ong call ended. However, Gonzalez remained on the line with Ong for the next 21 minutes. While on the phone with Ong, Gonzalez continued to report the information she received from the flight attendant to Marquis at the American Airlines System Operations Center (SOC). The call between American’s reservations center and the operations center continued to be taped by the SOC until its conclusion.

At **8:24 a.m.** Ong indicated to Gonzalez that the hijackers were in the cockpit.

Also at **8:24 a.m.**, Air Traffic Controller Peter Zalewski stationed in FAA’s Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center continued his efforts to contact AA#11. The controller heard two clicks over the frequency assigned to the flight, and radioed in response “Is that American eleven trying to call?” Five seconds later a voice that sounded to be Middle Eastern was heard attempting to address the passengers but instead was broadcast over the radio frequency to Air Traffic Control: “We have some planes. Just stay quiet and you’ll be okay. We’re returning to the airport.” The Controller has indicated to the Commission that he did not initially comprehend the first sentence (“planes”), and only understood this after replaying the tape some time later. (See **9:05 a.m.** entry below.)
(PLACEHOLDER: ADD CITE FROM TEAM 8.)

Shortly thereafter, at **8:25 a.m.** Air Traffic Control heard the following transmission from the same Middle Eastern voice: “Nobody move! Everything will be okay. If you try to make any moves you’ll endanger yourself and the airplane. Just stay quiet.”⁵⁶ According to Betty Ong’s simultaneous reporting no announcements had been made from the cockpit to the passengers. This suggests that the hijackers’ announcement was not heard in the cabin, and that they did not know how to operate the radio properly which is why an announcement apparently intended for the passengers was instead broadcast over the radio. (PLACEHOLDER: PENDING INFORMATION FROM NTSB ON DUAL USE OF THE HEADSET AND HANDSET RADIO IN THE AIRCRAFT).

At **8:25 a.m.** AA Air Traffic Control specialist in the SOC Bob Marino sent another ACARS message to #11: “Plz contact Boston Center ASAP...They have lost radio contact and your transponder signal.” American Airlines Flight #11 failed to respond to the 8:23 Houck message, this Marino communication and all subsequent ACARS messages attempting to reestablish contact with the aircraft.⁵⁷

Also at 8:25 a.m., Flight Attendant Amy Sweeney's call to the American Airline's Flight Services Office at Boston was connected to American Airlines' employee [REDACTED] (PLACEHOLDER: WOODWARD SAYS IT'S A CELL CALL - CONFIRM WITH FBI) [REDACTED] reported that Sweeney told her that someone was hurt aboard AA Flight #12 but the phone call was cut-off. Michael Woodward, supervisor at the Boston office, hearing that a problem had been reported aboard an American airplane went to American's gate area at Logan with his colleague [REDACTED]. Woodward noted that the morning bank of flights had all departed Boston and the gate area was quiet. He further realized that Flight 12 was a flight to Boston from the West Coast that had not even departed yet, so he and [REDACTED] returned to the office to try to clarify the situation.⁵⁸

At 8:26 a.m. Ong reported to Gonzalez that the plane was "flying erratically." Gonzalez then passed this information to the American operations center.

Beginning at 8:27 a.m. AA Flight #11 made an unauthorized turn to the South.⁵⁹

At 8:29 a.m. Bill Halleck, ATC specialist at the AA SOC, contacted the FAA's Boston Air Traffic control center to ask about the status of AA#11. At 8:31 a.m. an Air Traffic Controller there (PLACEHOLDER: DETERMINE NAME) reported to Halleck that the last reported altitude of the aircraft was below 29,000 feet and that, "He (AA#11) was heading west. But right now he's pointed southwest of Albany."⁶⁰ The ATC official also informed Mr. Halleck that the transponder had been lost and that "...the controller heard a threat in the background, but that's unconfirmed and we're trying to pull the tape at this time."⁶¹

At 8:32 a.m. Michael Woodward returned to his office and discovered that Flight Attendant Madeline "Amy" Sweeney aboard AA#11 had called again, and was speaking with [REDACTED] in the office. Mr. Woodward, who was a friend of Ms. Sweeney's, took over the phone call from [REDACTED]². Ms. Sweeney reported that she was sitting in the back of the plane next to Betty Ong as Ms. Ong was on the phone with Nydia Gonzalez.⁶³

The phone call between Ms. Sweeney and Mr. Woodward lasted approximately twelve minutes (8:32 a.m. - 8:44 a.m.). This phone call was not taped. Information about its content was derived from a September 2001 e-mail from Mr. Woodward to American security; Mr. Woodward's contemporaneous notes; interviews with Mr. Woodward conducted by the FBI, American Airlines security, and the Commission; and the tape and transcript of the Nancy Wyatt phone call to the AA SOC described below.

According to Mr. Woodward, Ms. Sweeney was calm and collected and provided the following information: Ms. Sweeney was sitting in the back of the aircraft next to Betty Ong; the plane had been hijacked; a man in first class had his throat slashed; two flight attendants had been stabbed—Karen Martin had been stabbed seriously and was on oxygen while Bobbi Arestegui's wounds were not as serious and seemed to be okay; a

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doctor had been paged; the flight attendants were unable to contact the cockpit; and there was a bomb in the cockpit.⁶⁴

Ms. Sweeney told Woodward that she and Ong were trying to relay as much information as they could to people on the ground.⁶⁵

Sometime after 8:30 a.m. but before 8:45 a.m., American Airlines Executive Vice President Gerard Arpey made a routine call to AA System Operation Control and was informed that the SOC was on the phone with a flight attendant who was reporting violence and a cockpit intrusion aboard one of the company's flights. Upon learning this he attempted unsuccessfully to contact American Airlines' Chairman Don Carty to apprise him of the situation. Arpey immediately went to the SOC and learned that AA colleagues were setting up the company's System Operations Command Center (SOCC) in order to manage the emergency.

At 8:33 a.m. Craig Marquis received a report from Bill Halleck on Mr. Halleck's just-completed call to Boston ATC. Halleck told him that the aircraft was at "29,000 feet. They've lost Comm (communications) with 'em. Turned off his transponder. Tracking his primary only. Was westbound. Turned southbound. Said the controller heard on the frequency the pilot apparently adjust his mike...lot of loud voices...that sounded threatening...something about return or I'll kill ya or something to that effect...or threatening dialogue."⁶⁶

Also at 8:33 a.m. Ms. Gonzalez received a report from Betty Ong on the first indication of a fatality on board, and passed the information on to Marquis at 8:34 a.m. as follows: "They think they might have a fatality on the flight. One of our passenger, possibly on 9B, Levin or Lewis, might have been fatally stabbed."

At 8:35 a.m. Ms. Gonzalez confirmed the details of a report by Betty Ong on the identity of one of the hijackers: "He's the one that's in the...he's in the cockpit. Okay you said Tom Sukani? Okay...Okay and he was in 10B. Okay, okay, so he's one of the persons that are in the cockpit. And as far as weapons, all they have are just knives? Okay...was that 9...10? Okay I thought you said 10."

At 8:36 a.m. Craig Marquis received Ms. Gonzalez' report about hijacker "Tom al Sukami" (Satam al Suqami), who had been seated in 10B, and initiated action to "lockout" American Airlines Flight #11. This latter procedure is used to acknowledge an emergency on the flight and isolate information so that the case can be managed by top leadership at the airlines in a manner that protects information from being altered or released, and protects the identities of the passengers and crew (PLACEHOLDER: DEFINITION OF LOCKOUT).⁶⁷

At 8:38 a.m. Gonzalez reported to Marquis that the passengers had been moved out of first class and back to coach and the plane was flying erratically again.⁶⁸

Also at 8:38 a.m. American completed its lockout of Flight #11.⁶⁹

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At 8:40 a.m. Michael Woodward's colleague, Nancy Wyatt, standing at his side, contacted Ray Howland in the American Airlines System Operations Center to report the content of the ongoing call between Woodward and Amy Sweeney. Wyatt was able to relay information to the SOC as she heard Woodward's side of the conversation and read the notes he was taking.⁷⁰

As related by Nancy Wyatt to the American Airlines SOC, during the course of their conversation Ms. Sweeney told Mr. Woodward that the hijackers were Middle Easterners who were seated in 10(B), 9(D) and 9(G). One spoke very little English and one spoke excellent English. The hijackers had gained entry to the cockpit but she had no details regarding how access was gained. The aircraft was in a rapid descent. At 8:41 a.m. Ms. Sweeney told Mr. Woodward that passengers in coach were under the impression that there was a routine medical emergency in First Class. Flight attendants Jeff Collman, Sara Low and Diane Snyder were busy at duties such as getting medical supplies while Ms. Ong and Ms. Sweeney were reporting the events.⁷¹

At 8:41 a.m. Marquis instructed an unidentified colleague in the SOC: "Tell ATC to handle this as an emergency." The colleague replied "they have in there it's been hijacked." Marquis responded: "It is. Okay."⁷²

Also at 8:41 a.m. an unidentified colleague informed Marquis "They think he's (AA Flight #11 is) headed toward Kennedy...they're moving everybody out of the way...They seem to have him on a primary radar. They seem to think that he is descending."⁷³

At 8:44 a.m. Gonzalez reported to Marquis that the phone contact with Betty Ong had been terminated: "We, I think we might have lost her." In this time frame Amy Sweeney reported to Woodward "something is wrong. We are in a rapid descent...we are all over the place."⁷⁴ (PLACEHOLDER: SEE WOODWARD IV WITH DIANE SAWYER AND MICHAEL SWEENEY FOR MORE INFORMATION) Woodward asked Sweeney to look out the window to see if she could determine where they were. Sweeney told him "we are flying low. We are flying very, very low. We are flying way too low." Seconds later she said "Oh my God we are way too low" and then the phone call ended.⁷⁵

At 8:45 a.m. Nancy Wyatt reported to Ray Howland, "She (Sweeney) started screaming and saying something's wrong and now he's (Woodward's) having trouble...now he thinks he might be disconnected. Okay, we just lost connection."

Also at 8:45 a.m. American Airlines Director of Security Larry Wansley learned of the hijacking and contacted the Special Agent In Charge of the FBI's Dallas Field Office to tell him that a hijacking was taking place.⁷⁶

At 8:46 a.m. (PLACEHOLDER: ADD SECONDS AND TERMINAL VELOCITY FROM NTSB DATA) American Airlines Flight #11 crashed into the North Tower of the

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World Trade Center in New York City.⁷⁷ All 92 individuals on board were killed, as were an unknown number of individuals in the North Tower.

Also at 8:46 a.m. FBI Special Agent [REDACTED] dispatched a team of agents to go to American Airlines Headquarters in response to the hijack report.⁷⁸

At 9:05 a.m. the Boston Air Traffic Control center was replaying the tapes of the radio transmission it had received from AA Flight #11 at 8:24 a.m. and comprehending exactly what was said in the transmission. (PLACEHOLDER: ADD CITE FROM TEAM 8.)

At 9:16 a.m. Bill Halleck of American called Ellen King at the Herndon ATC command center and informed her that American "thought" Flight #11 had been the first aircraft to crash into the WTC. (PLACEHOLDER: ADD CITE FROM AA TRANSCRIPTS.)

By not later than 9:30 a.m. American Airlines confirmed that AA Flight #11 had crashed into the World Trade Center. (PLACEHOLDER: ADD CITE FROM AA SOCC TIMELINE.)

Gun Use on Flight #11

The Commission continues to investigate allegations that a gun was used aboard American Airlines Flight 11. This allegation arose from a notation in an executive summary produced on September 11, 2001 by FAA staff indicating that the FAA Headquarters had received a report of a shooting aboard the plane, reportedly from an American Airlines employee at the company's operations center.⁷⁹ The individual alleged to have made the report to the FAA denies having done so.⁸⁰

While the Commission continues to investigate the origins and accuracy of the report, it should be noted that regardless of what reports were received in the chaotic environment of various operations centers at the FAA, the airports and the airlines, the only authoritative information about whether a shooting occurred on Flight 11 had to have come from individuals on the aircraft who were reporting what was taking place to contacts on the ground.

Two flight attendants aboard American Airlines Flight 11 placed calls to ground contacts to report what was happening on the aircraft. The Commission notes that the flight attendants did their duty with remarkable courage. The evidence shows that the flight attendants remained in phone contact with authorities for an extended period of time until just before the crash, providing valuable information with extraordinary professionalism.⁸¹ Their actions were nothing short of heroic.

Neither the tape recordings of the call from flight attendant Betty Ong nor the accounts by at least seven separate witnesses to the calls placed by Ms. Ong or Ms. Madeline Sweeney reported the presence of a gun or the occurrence of a shooting.⁸² The witnesses' accounts of the phone calls are consistent and are quite specific about the kind of

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weapons that were reported present—knives, mace and a bomb—as well as the nature of the assaults on board—the “stabbing” of two crew members and a passenger.

In order to accept the accuracy of the initial FAA executive summary with regard to a shooting (disregarding the evidence by eyewitnesses to the contrary), one would have to believe that the American Airlines System Operations Center (SOC) relayed to the FAA the account of a shooting that no witness recalls while neglecting to include the account of a stabbing that was widely reported, including to personnel in the SOC. This seems highly implausible.⁸³

Finally, it should be noted that the alleged victim of the shooting was seated in 9(B). Both the seat and its occupant are described by several of the witness accounts from the aircraft as the place where the stabbing occurred.⁸⁴

At this point in the investigation it seems evident that the form of attack on the business class passenger—the only attack upon a passenger reported by eyewitnesses—became garbled as the account of the assault was relayed between airline and FAA authorities in the fog and confusion of the rapidly unfolding events of the day.

Other relevant evidence bears mentioning. While investigators have uncovered evidence of numerous knife purchases by the 19 hijackers leading up to September 11, 2001, no firearm purchases or possession are in evidence.⁸⁵

Further, the tactics of all four hijacking teams involved in the plot were similar. No evidence has been uncovered to suggest that the hijackers on any of the other flights used firearms, and none were found in evidence at any of the crash sites, notably the crash site of United Airlines Flight 93 where items from the aircraft were collected as evidence. To the contrary, the common tactic among the four teams of employing knives and mace, and the wielding of a bomb (either real or simulated), is indicated by all other evidence. It seems unlikely that one of the teams would depart from the tactical discipline of the plotters' mutual strategy.

Lastly, though it appears erroneous at this point in the investigation, staff continues to develop information on how the gun story may have come to be reported.

(PLACEHOLDER FOR THE CONTENTS OF ATTA'S LUGGAGE)

UNITED AIRLINES FLIGHT 175

Hijackers: Pilot: Marwan al Shehhi; Mohand al Shehri; Hamza al Ghamdi; Fayeze Banihammad; Ahmed al Ghamdi.

Hijacker Weapon and Ticket Purchases

On August 13, 2001 Marwan Al-Shehhi purchased two short-bladed knives (a Cliphanger Viper and an Imperial Tradesman Dual Edge) from the Sports Authority in Boynton Beach, FL. On the same day and in the same city, Fayeze Banihammad bought a two-piece Stanley knife snap set from Wal-Mart.⁸⁶

Fayeze Banihammad's SCB Visa card was used on August 27, 2001 [PLACEHOLDER: RECONCILE WITH MUELLER JJ TESTIMONY INDICATING DATE OF AUGUST 29] to purchase one-way tickets over the telephone for Banihammad (under the name of Fayeze Ahmed) and Mohand Al-Shehri on the September 11, 2001 flight of United Airlines Flight #175. (On September 6, 2001, Al-Shehri called the UA reservations office to correct the spelling of his first name, which had originally been listed as Mohald.)⁸⁷

Marwan Al-Shehhi bought his one-way ticket for UA Flight #175 and connecting flight to Las Vegas in person at the United Airlines ticket counter at Miami International Airport on August 28, 2001. He used a Visa credit card.⁸⁸

On August 29, 2001, Hamza Al-Ghamdi booked and paid for his ticket for UA Flight #175 (as well as for the follow-on United Airlines Flight 7950 from Los Angeles to San Francisco) using the United Airlines website. He used the same method to book a ticket on UA Flight #175 for Ahmed Al-Ghamdi at the same time, and paid for it the following day. All of these purchases were made Hamza Al-Ghamdi's Florida SunTrust Visa debit card.⁸⁹

There is no evidence that the UA Flight #175 hijackers purchased additional tickets for the flight beyond the ones they actually used.^{90 91} [PLACEHOLDER: ADD SPECIFIC CITES FROM AIRLINES.]

The Day of September 11, 2001

Arrival at the airport and Hijacker Check-in

At 6:20 a.m.⁹² Ahmed Al-Ghamdi and Hamza Al-Ghamdi checked in at the United Airlines ticketing counter at Logan International Airport in Boston, Massachusetts.⁹³ They first approached United Customer Service representative Manuel Carreiro, who immediately referred them to Customer Service representative Gail Jawahir because one of the men presented a "certificate" that Carreiro was unfamiliar with.⁹⁴

Ms. Jawahir has reported that one of the two indicated to her that he needed a ticket, but she observed that he already had a UA envelope with itinerary in his hand. Therefore, she told him that he didn't need a ticket but could go directly to check-in. Jawahir recalled that the men checked in two bags and she thought each had one carry-on piece, which looked like briefcases. She also remembered that each man had "problems" in responding to the standard security questions, and that she had to go over the questions again "very slowly" before receiving the responses which would determine whether the individuals cleared the check-in process. The two individuals then departed the counter area for the security checkpoint gate as directed by Ms. Jawahir.⁹⁵

At 6:31 a.m. [PLACEHOLDER: CONFIRMING TIME] Ahmed al Ghamdi checked in, and checked two bags which were bar code scanned and loaded onto the aircraft. At 6:45 a.m. Marwan Al-Shehhi was checked in by UA employee Gladys Willis,⁹⁶ checking a single bag which was bar code scanned and put on the plane at 6:51 a.m. [PLACEHOLDER: CONFIRM TIME/EVENT]

At 6:52 a.m., a call was placed from a pay phone in Terminal C (between the screening checkpoint and UA Flight 175's boarding gate⁹⁷) to Mohamed Atta's cell phone. The call lasted three minutes, and it is conjectured that this was a last-minute check between Marwan Al-Shehhi (who had just checked in his bag at the ticket counter) and Atta (who had just arrived in Boston on Colgan Air Flight #5930).⁹⁸

At 6:53 a.m. Fayez Banihammad (listed in the record as Fayez Ahmed) and Mohand (listed as Mohald) Al-Shehri checked in. Banihammad checked in two bags, which were scanned and loaded at 6:57 a.m.⁹⁹

Hijacker Pre-Screening Selectee Status

None of the UA Flight #175 hijackers were selected for additional security scrutiny by the Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-screening (CAPPS) system.^{100 101}

[PLACEHOLDER: GET TSA AND UA ASSESSMENT OF WHY NONE OF THE HIJACKERS WERE SELECTED IN SPITE OF SIMILAR PROFILES TO THE OTHER HIJACKERS, OF WHOM 9 OF 14 WERE SELECTED.]

Checkpoint Security Screening

As with AA Flight #11 no videotape or other records exist to document when the five UA Flight #175 hijackers passed through the security screening checkpoint, though that time would have been between check-in and boarding: Marwan al Shehi (6:45 a.m. – 7:27 a.m.); Fayez Banihammad (6:53 a.m. – 7:23 a.m.); Mohand al Shehri (6:53 a.m. – 7:23 a.m.); Ahmed al Ghamdi (6:20 a.m. – 7:27 a.m.); Hamza al Ghamdi (6:20 a.m. – 7:27 a.m.).

To have reached their departure gate, the hijackers would have had to pass through checkpoint C3 in Terminal C, which was under the custodial responsibility of United Airlines who had contracted the screening responsibility to Huntleigh USA Corporation.

At this checkpoint on 9/11, two walk-through metal detectors were the primary means for screening passengers and two x-ray machines were the principle method for screening carry-on bags.¹⁰² Comprehensive checkpoint assessments done by the FAA on December 14, 1999 and November 15, 2000 produced no security weaknesses or violations. Between September 11, 1999 and September 11, 2001, the FAA conducted 49 screener evaluations at checkpoint C3. In the fifteen tests involving the metal detectors, the test object was detected in 67% of the cases. In four physical search tests, the detection rate was 75%, while in the 30 x-ray tests, the detection rate was 87%. With respect to FY2001 national averages, C3 screeners met or exceeded the average for overall, physical search and x-ray detection, while falling below the norm for metal detection.¹⁰³

No FAA Special Assessments ("Red Team") were done at Logan security checkpoints over the two years prior to 9/11/01.¹⁰⁴

The Civil Aviation Security Field Office (CASFO) manager for Boston recalled that her office's interviews of screeners and other investigations revealed nothing out of the ordinary at the checkpoint that morning.¹⁰⁵

Pre-Flight Preparation

(PLACEHOLDER: ADD INFO ON WHEN PILOTS BEGAN FLIGHT PREP, AND ON JET FUEL TYPE AND AMOUNT VS AVERAGE)

Hijacker Boarding

Fayez Banihammad boarded UA Flight #175 at **7:23 a.m.** and was seated in 2A (First Class). Mohand Al-Shehri boarded at the same time and was seated in 2B (First Class). **Four minutes later**, both Marwan Al-Shehhi seated in 6C (Business Class) and Ahmed Al-Ghamdi seated in 9D (Economy Class) embarked. At **7:28 a.m.** Hamza Al-Ghamdi seated in 9C (Economy Class) boarded the flight.¹⁰⁶

Flight Profile

United Airlines Flight #175 was scheduled to depart from Boston Logan International Airport (BOS) for Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) at 8:00 a.m. Eastern Time. The aircraft was a Boeing 767-200, with tail number N612UA.

On this day, the plane was piloted by Captain Victor Saracini and First Officer Michael Horrocks Flight 175. The Flight Attendants were

- Robert Fangman, who at takeoff was seated in the middle center jump seats between the middle galley and the Economy Class Cabin, and provided service in Business Class.¹⁰⁷
- Amy Jarret, seated in the right jump seat, located in the back of the plane between the Economy Class Cabin and the rear galley, and provided service in economy.¹⁰⁸
- Amy King, seated in the forward center jump seat located between the forward galley and the First Class Cabin, and provided service in Business class.
- Kathryn Laborie, seated in the forward left jump seat next to the cockpit entrance, and provided service in First Class.
- Alfred Marchand, forward center jump seat located between the forward galley and the First Class Cabin, and provided service in First Class.
- Michael Tarrou, seated in the rear left jump seat, located in the back of the plane between the Economy Class Cabin and the rear galley, and provided service Economy.¹⁰⁹
- Alicia Titus seated in the middle center jump seats between the middle galley and the Economy Class Cabin, and provided service in Economy.¹¹⁰

The aircraft had a capacity of 168 passengers with 10 First Class seats, 33 Business Class seats, and 125 economy seats. On September 11, 2001, 56 passengers boarded UA Flight #175. Nine of the 10 First Class seats were occupied including hijackers Fayed Banihammad (2A) and Mohand al Shehri (2B). Eleven of the 33 Business Class seats were occupied including by [PLACEHOLDER: CONFIRM UA DOCUMENTS AT ODDS WITH FLIGHT SCHEMATIC] and 36 of the 125 economy seats were occupied, including [CONFIRM UA DOCUMENTS AT ODDS WITH FLIGHT SCHEMATIC] by hijackers.¹¹¹

United Airlines Flight #175 also carried 50 pieces of checked luggage¹¹² and (PLACEHOLDER: NUMBER OF POUNDS) of U.S. Mail. There was (PLACEHOLDER: AMOUNT OF CARGO) on board.¹¹³

The 56 passengers represented a load factor of 33.33% of the plane's passenger capacity of 168. This figure is considerably below the 49.22% average load factor for Flight 175 for Tuesdays in the three-month period prior to September 11 (June 11 through September 4, 2001), and in fact represents the third lowest load factor among all the 93 scheduled flights in that time period.¹¹⁴ (PLACEHOLDER: GET UA'S EXPLANATION OF CANCELLATION POLICY, AND WHETHER OR NOT, AND IF NOT WHY NOT, THE LOW 9/11 LOAD FACTOR FOR FLIGHT 175, TRIGGERED ANY CONCERNS.) In this three-month period, Tuesdays were the least traveled day for Flight 175, with Wednesday's next lowest at 53.28%.^{115 116} (PLACEHOLDER: ADD INFO ON NO-SHOWS/CANCELLATIONS)

Under United Airlines policy at the time, a key to the cockpit door was not given to the Flight Attendants¹¹⁷ but was stowed in the overhead bin above Seats 1A and 1B in First Class.¹¹⁸

No paperwork was filed to indicate that any cockpit jumpseat was occupied by anyone other than flight crew.¹¹⁹

The Flight

At 7:58 a.m. UA Flight #175 pushed back from Gate 19¹²⁰ and departed Logan Airport at 8:14 a.m.¹²¹ from runway 9. (PLACEHOLDER: Reconcile: This was fourteen minutes after the scheduled departure, and sixteen minutes after the departure time cited by the United Airlines "Flight Data Recap" and by FBI Director Mueller in his Statement for the Record to the Joint Intelligence Inquiry.¹²²)

At 8:33 a.m. UA Flight #175 reached its assigned cruising altitude of 31,000 feet.¹²³ At or around this time, Flight Attendants Laborie and Marchand would have begun cabin service in First Class, while Flight Attendants King and Fangman would have done the same in Business Class, and Tarrou, Jarret and Titus in Economy Class.¹²⁴

At 8:37 a.m. FAA air traffic controllers asked the UA Flight #175 flight crew to look for American Airlines Flight 11. At 8:38 a.m. the UA Flight #175 flight crew radioed air traffic control that they had spotted Flight 11 at 28 or 29,000 feet. FAA ATC then instructed UA Flight #175 to turn their aircraft to avoid AA Flight #11.¹²⁵

At 8:41 a.m. the flight crew of UA Flight #175 reported to air traffic controllers that "we heard a suspicious transmission on our departure out of Boston...like someone keyed the mike and said everyone stay in your seats."¹²⁶ The Manager of UA System Operations Control in Chicago (Rich Miles) reported that, though he normally received relevant information about United flights from the air traffic control system, on September 11, 2001 he did not recall ever receiving such information about any air traffic control communications with or from Flight 175, including the 8:41 a.m. report.¹²⁷ Other senior UA officials working in the System Operations Control Center on 9/11, including Bill Roy, Mike Barber and Sandy Rodgers, confirmed that they had never been made aware of such communications, though they indicated that air traffic controllers would "first and foremost" communicate directly with pilots. Furthermore, these officials reported that they never received any communication on the morning of September 11, 2001 from the FAA or the Air Traffic Control System advising the airline to contact its aircraft about the hijackings.¹²⁸

The last routine transmission from UA 175 was made at 8:42 a.m.¹²⁹

The Hijacking

Between 8:42 a.m. and 8:46 a.m. the hijackers began their takeover of the aircraft. Based on information supplied by eyewitness accounts the hijackers initiated and sustained their command of the aircraft using knives (as reported by two passengers and a flight attendant), mace (reported by one passenger) and a bomb (reported by the same

passenger). The hijackers employed violence in the form of the stabbing of flight crewmembers (as reported by a flight attendant and one passenger).

The first indication to air traffic controllers that something abnormal was occurring on UA Flight #175 came at **8:47 a.m.** when the aircraft changed beacon codes twice within a one-minute period.¹³⁰ Meanwhile at UA headquarters in Chicago, **around 8:50 a.m.** Alessandro "Sandy" Rogers, who was a UA Air Traffic Control Coordinator for West Coast flights, called the FAA Air Traffic Control System Command Center in Herndon, Virginia to confirm that the plane which had just impacted the World Trade Center was not a United airliner. He was informed that the aircraft was an American Airlines 757. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Rogers briefed Bill Roy, UA's System Operations Control Director, and Mike Barber, UA Flight Dispatch Operations Manager, about the call. Barber attempted to notify top corporate officials but was unable to do so immediately because the pager system wasn't working.¹³¹ **At 8:51 a.m.** UA Flight #175 deviated from its assigned altitude¹³² and **at 8:52 a.m.** New York air traffic controllers made the first of five unsuccessful attempts over a three-minute period to contact the flight.¹³³

At 8:52 a.m.¹³⁴ Lee Hanson received a phone call from his son, UA Flight #175 passenger Peter Burton Hanson, who informed him that his flight was being hijacked. According to Lee Hanson's notes, his son stated, "I think they've taken over the cockpit...An attendant has been stabbed...and someone else up front may have been killed. The plane is making strange moves. Call United Airlines...Tell them it's Flight 175, Boston to LA." Lee Hanson then called the Easton, CT Police Department, relayed the information from his son to Captain James Candee, and asked for the Captain's assistance.¹³⁵

Also at **8:52 a.m.**¹³⁶ Marc Policastro of the United Airlines Systems Aircraft Maintenance Office (Star-FIX) in San Francisco, received a phone call from a male flight attendant¹³⁷ (possibly Robert Fangman¹³⁸) on UA Flight #175 who reported that the flight had been hijacked, both pilots had been killed, a flight attendant had been stabbed, and the hijackers were probably flying the plane. The call lasted approximately two minutes, after which Policastro tried unsuccessfully to contact the flight via the Aircraft Communications and Reporting System (ACARS).¹³⁹ David Price, who worked in the same office with Policastro, also tried unsuccessfully to contact UA Flight #175 via ACARS around this time, with a message requesting the flight crew to confirm reports of an incident onboard.¹⁴⁰

8:57 a.m. UA Flight #175 turned to the Northeast and leveled off at 28,500 feet, and **one minute later** took a heading toward New York City and resumed its descent.¹⁴¹

At 8:58 a.m. UA Flight #175 passenger Garnet "Ace" Bailey unsuccessfully tried to reach his wife Katherine on both her business and home phone lines.¹⁴²

At 8:59 a.m.¹⁴³ Flight 175 passenger Brian David Sweeney attempted to call his wife Julie and left a message on their home answering machine indicating the plane had been hijacked.¹⁴⁴ (PLACEHOLDER: PENDING RECEIPT OF TRANSCRIPT)

At **8:59 a.m.** Jerry Tsen, of the UA Systems Aircraft Maintenance Office in San Francisco, sent three ACARS messages to UA Flight #175. The messages stated, "I heard of a reported incident aboard your acft (aircraft). Plz (Please) verify all is normal."¹⁴⁵ None of the messages were acknowledged by the aircraft.

At **9:00 a.m.**¹⁴⁶ Brian David Sweeney called his mother, Louise Sweeney, and informed her that his flight had been hijacked. He further told her that the passengers were thinking about storming the cockpit to take control of the plane away from the hijackers. Finally, he indicated that he thought the aircraft was flying somewhere over Ohio. Immediately after the call from her son, Louise Sweeney turned on the TV and saw the second aircraft impact the World Trade Center.¹⁴⁷

Also at **9:00 a.m.**¹⁴⁸, Lee Hanson received a second call from his son onboard Flight 175 in which Peter Burton Hanson made the following comments:

It's getting bad, Dad...A stewardess was stabbed...They seem to have knives and mace...They said they have a bomb...It's getting very bad on the plane...Passengers are throwing up and getting sick...The plane is making jerky movements...I don't think the pilot is flying the plane...I think we are going down...I think they intend to go to Chicago or someplace and fly into a building...Don't worry, Dad...If it happens, it'll be very fast...My God, my God.

At that point, the call ended abruptly and Lee Hanson could not tell whether his son had hung up, or the phone had malfunctioned. Mr. Hanson took two sheets of notes during the call, which served as the basis for his reconstruction of its contents. The only additional detail he recalled was that after his son had made the comment about the plane going to Chicago to fly into a building, a woman had screamed in the background. After the call, Lee Hanson turned on his television to watch coverage of the hijackings. Shortly thereafter, he saw the live footage of the second crash into the WTC.¹⁴⁹

Meanwhile, at the UA maintenance facility in San Francisco, one of Marc Policastro's supervisors called UA System Operations Control Manager Rich Miles in Chicago at **approximately 9:00 a.m.** to notify him of the call reporting that UA 175 had been hijacked. At first, Mr. Miles thought the report was actually referring to the American airline hijacking but the supervisor reiterated that it was about UA 175. Mr. Miles notified Bill Roy of the call, who in turn contacted UA Chief Operating Officer Andy Studdert and the UA CEO. (Mr. Roy recalled that Sandy Rogers' briefing on his 8:50 call to the FAA had triggered Roy's first communication with senior corporate leadership that day.) Mr. Miles also called UA security chief Rich Davis and Mr. Roy and Mr. Miles began the process of activating the crisis center at UA headquarters. (It took approximately 30 minutes for the Crisis Center to be fully activated on September 11, 2001.)¹⁵⁰ Also at **approximately 9:00 a.m.** American Airlines employee Bill Halleck, who was in communication with Air Traffic Control headquarters, notified AA System Operations Control Manager Craig Marquis that he had learned United was "missing a plane."¹⁵¹

Shortly after **9:00 a.m.** American Airlines Managing Director of Dispatch Operations Craig Parfitt telephoned his brother who worked at United and was informed that UA had “some planes missing.”¹⁵²

At 9:02:40 a.m. United Airlines Flight 175 impacted the South Tower of the World Trade Center (WTC) in the Manhattan Borough of New York City, with ground speed calculations indicating that the aircraft was traveling at over 587 miles per hour at impact.¹⁵³ All 65 individuals on board were killed, and, together with the previous crash of American Airlines Flight 11 into the North Tower of the World Trade Center, the impact caused the subsequent collapse of both WTC Towers, which resulted in the death of an estimated 2,688 individuals who were trapped within the Towers.¹⁵⁴

At 9:03 a.m. unaware that UA Flight #175 had impacted the World Trade Center, dispatcher Ed Ballinger became concerned about the status of UA 175 and unsuccessfully attempted to communicate with the aircraft via an ACARS message which read, “How is the ride.(?) Anything dispatch can do for you?”¹⁵⁵ He immediately notified the dispatch managers. Dispatch Operations manager Mike Barber came to his desk to advise him that UA Flight #175 was missing from radar¹⁵⁶ and that there may be some problems on other flights.¹⁵⁷ **Also at 9:03 a.m.** UA air traffic control specialist Sandy Rogers, who was working at the time with Ed Ballinger, sent an ACARS message to UA Flight #175 indicating, “NY (New York) approach lookin (looking) for ya (you) on (frequency) 127.4.”¹⁵⁸

At 9:10 a.m. UA Dispatch Operations Manager Mike Barber advised UA flight dispatcher Ed Ballinger that UA Flight #175 was missing on New York air traffic control radar, and that he should try to establish contact with the plane. In his timeline log entry, Barber wrote, “At that point a second aircraft had hit the WTC, but we didn’t know it was our United flight.”¹⁵⁹ **At 9:12 a.m.** an alert was sent out from Carl Artis, Staff Analyst for Automation, in UA headquarters advising United Dispatch (DD), Flight Safety (SY), and Flight Operations (FO) personnel about the American Airlines crash and the fact that UA Flight #175 was missing.¹⁶⁰

Between 9:10 a.m. and 9:20 a.m. UA Dispatch Operations Manager Mike Barber spoke with American Airlines Dispatch Operations Manager Craig Parfitt about the two crashes into the WTC Towers. At that point, Parfitt believed both aircraft were from American, but Mr. Barber was increasingly “confident” that the second one was UA Flight #175, especially when he viewed slowed-down and enlarged images of the second impact on CNN where he could discern that the airplane did not have the shiny metallic color of American jets.¹⁶¹

By 9:20 a.m. Mike Barber believed that the second aircraft to hit the WTC was UA Flight #175, but it was still unconfirmed.¹⁶² (An FAA Executive Summary of the 9/11 hijackings, prepared on September 17, 2001, indicated that UA 175 was “missing from radar” at **9:20 a.m.**¹⁶³) **At 9:21 a.m.** UA air traffic control specialist Sandy Rogers sent out a message to UA dispatchers advising them to communicate to their flights “to stay on alert and shut down all cockpit access in-flight.”¹⁶⁴

At **9:22 a.m.** UA Operations Control Manager Rich Miles issued an advisory under the name of UA Chief Operating Officer Andy Studdert, to all UA stations, including the flight dispatchers, that UA Flight #175 had been involved in an accident in New York City and that the Crisis Center had been activated.¹⁶⁵ ***Just prior to the Studdert advisory,*** the procedure to “lockout” information on UA Flight #175 was instituted.¹⁶⁶
(PLACEHOLDER: VERIFY THE TIME OF 175 LOCKOUT.)

At **9:24 a.m.** UA Flight Dispatcher Ed Ballinger sent out an ACARS message to all 16 United flights he was responsible for, including both Flight 175 and Flight 93, advising, “Beware any cockpit intrusion...Two aircraft in NY (New York) hit trade center builds (buildings).”¹⁶⁷ At the time he sent this message, Ballinger was not aware that UA Flight #175 had crashed.¹⁶⁸

AMERICAN AIRLINES FLIGHT 77

Hijackers: Pilot Hani Hanjour; Khalid al Mihdhar; Nawaf al Hazmi; Salem al Hazmi; Majed Moqed.

Hijacker Weapon and Ticket Purchases

No records have been discovered to indicate the purchase by the Flight 77 hijackers of knives or any other potential weapons. [PLACEHOLDER: VERIFY WITH PENTTBOM: AL HAZMI IS LISTED AS HAVING PURCHASED A MULTI-TOOL WAVE KNIFE.]

Khalid Al-Mihdhar used Travelocity in the afternoon of August 25, 2001 to search for Dulles to Los Angeles flights on September 11, 2001. Later that day, he and Majed Moqed became the first hijackers to book their 9/11 flights when they reserved their tickets for American Airlines Flight #77, using the American Airlines website. They were unsuccessful in purchasing the tickets at that time because the resident address they supplied could not be verified by the airline. Mihdhar's ticket purchase was flagged for possible ticket fraud. [PLACEHOLDER: AWAITING AA INFORMATION] The tickets were paid for, in cash, at Baltimore Washington International Airport (BWI) on September 5, 2001. Moqed was listed as a Frequent Traveler of American Airlines.¹⁶⁹ Mihdhar was issued AA ticket #0012178997836. Moqed was issued AA ticket #0012178997837. [PLACEHOLDER: RECONCILE CONFLICT BETWEEN MUELLER JI TESTIMONY DATE OF AUGUST 24, 2001, FBI DATE OF AUGUST 25, 2001 FOR RESERVATION AND MWAA POLICE DATE OF AUGUST 26, 2001 FOR RESERVATIONS.]

On August 27, 2001 Nawaf Al-Hazmi also used Travelocity to book, and pay for (via Nawaf Al-Hazmi's Visa debit card), tickets on AA Flight #77 for both himself (AA ticket #0017048007544) and Salem Al-Hazmi.¹⁷⁰

Hani Hanjour completed the ticket purchases for Flight 77, and for all of the 9/11 hijackers, when he used cash to buy his one-way ticket on August 31, 2001 at Advanced Travel Services Corporation in Totowa, NJ. (Hanjour had initially tried to use his Visa debit card to make the purchase, but the attempt failed because the ticket cost exceeded the card's credit limit.)¹⁷¹

There is no evidence that AA Flight #77 hijackers purchased additional tickets for the flight beyond the ones they actually used.^{172 173} [PLACEHOLDER: ADD SPECIFIC CITES FROM AIRLINES.]

The Day of September 11, 2001

Hijacker Arrival at Airport

[PLACEHOLDER: PENDING PARKING INFORMATION FROM MWAA AND FBI]

[PLACEHOLDER: ADD HANJOUR CHECK-IN INFO]

Hijacker Check-in and Checkpoint Security Screening

At 7:15 a.m. Majed Moqed and Khalid Al-Mihdhar checked in at the American Airlines ticket counter, and proceeded to checkpoint screening.

At 7:18 a.m. Majed Moqed and Khalid Al-Mihdhar entered the Main Terminal West security screening checkpoint (IAD02). They placed their carry-on bags on the x-ray machine belt and proceeded through the first magnetometer. Both set off the alarm and were subsequently directed to a second magnetometer. While Al-Mihdhar did not alarm the second magnetometer and was permitted through the checkpoint, Moqed failed once more and was then subjected to a personal examination by a screener utilizing a hand-held metal detection "wand." Moqed passed this inspection and then was permitted to pass through the checkpoint.¹⁷⁴

At 7:29 a.m. Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Salem Al-Hazmi came to the American ticket counter to check in.

At 7:35 a.m. Hani Hanjour placed two carry-on bags on the x-ray belt in the Main Terminal West Checkpoint, and proceeded, without alarm through the magnetometer. He picked up his carry-on bags and passed through the checkpoint. *One minute later*, Nawaf and Salem Al-Hazmi entered the same checkpoint. Salem Al-Hazmi successfully cleared the magnetometer and was permitted through the checkpoint. Nawaf Al-Hazmi set off the alarms for both the first and second magnetometers and was then hand-wanded before being passed. In addition, his shoulder-strap carry-on bag was swiped by an explosive trace detector and then passed.¹⁷⁵ The video footage indicates that Nawaf al Hazmi was carrying an item in his back pocket that was clipped to the rim of the pocket. (PLACEHOLDER: CLASSIFIED ISSUE)

On September 11, 2001, screening for AA Flight #77 was conducted at both the East (IAD01) and West (IAD02) checkpoints in the Main Terminal. United Airlines was the air carrier responsible for screening, and contracted out the work to Argenbright security. All five of the hijackers passed through the West checkpoint.¹⁷⁶

At the Dulles checkpoints, the primary method for passenger screening was walk-through metal detectors. If a passenger triggered an alarm while passing through the primary detector, he or she was sent through a secondary metal detector. If that too alarmed, final resolution was to be done via hand-wanding of the passenger. Carry-on bags were

primarily screened via x-ray machines, but explosive trace detectors could be employed as well.¹⁷⁷

The FAA field office manager responsible for Dulles characterized the United-Argenbright screening operation there as "above average," which the FAA tested frequently and which had a "decent" assessment program run by United. In particular, he felt that capability for detecting improvised explosive devices was the "best in the country."¹⁷⁸

IAD02 was subjected to a comprehensive FAA assessment on November 13, 2000, which detected no violations or security weaknesses at the checkpoint. Over the twenty-four months preceding 9/11/01, 46 screener evaluations were conducted by the FAA at IAD02. Of these, 14 involved the metal detectors, five were physical searches and 27 were with the x-ray machine, with detection rates of 57%, 100% and 63% respectively. While the physical search results exceeded the national average, both the metal detector and x-ray results were below average.¹⁷⁹

The Screening Activities Report for FY2000 indicated that all Dulles checkpoints combined detected a total of 10 handguns over that year, with no reports of knife detections. No FAA Special Assessments ("Red Team") were done at Dulles security checkpoints over the two years prior to 9/11/01. (Red Team testing did occur within that time frame with respect to explosive detection systems for checked baggage. All seven such tests in the period were successfully passed.)¹⁸⁰

Immediately after the event, the FAA's Washington Civil Aviation Security Field Office (WDC CASFO) began an investigation into the screening operations at Dulles on 9/11. After interviewing 43 of the 44 screeners (the other individual was in the hospital) identified by Argenbright as being on duty on September 11, 2001, the WDC CASFO made the following report:

Overall, the responses provided by the screeners were consistent. They reported nothing out of ordinary nor suspicious activity on the morning of September 11, 2001. None of the screeners on duty at the East and West checkpoints recalled handling any passengers identified as selectees.¹⁸¹

The CAPPS and videotape evidence reviewed by the Commission, and cited above and below, indicates that all five AA Flight #77 hijackers were selectees, that all passed through the West checkpoint, that four of the five set off at least one magnetometer alarm, and that two set off both magnetometers and were hand-wanded.

Hijacker Pre-Screening Selectee Status

The Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-screening System (CAPPS) selected **all five** of the Flight 77 hijackers for security scrutiny. Under the CAPPS system in use by American Airlines at Dulles on 9/11, American's ticket agents were to mark as "selectees" those passengers who did not provide correct responses to the required security questions, were

identified by certain triggers developed by the FAA, held a passport from one of nine foreign countries or were chosen at random by the airline's computerized CAPPS system.¹⁸²

Hani Hanjour, Khalid Al-Mihdhar and Majed Moqed were chosen via the CAPPS criteria, while Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Salem Al-Hazmi were made selectees because they provided inadequate identification information to the airline.¹⁸³ The only consequence of selection, however, was that a selectee's bags were held off the plane until it was confirmed that he or she had boarded the aircraft.^{184 185}

Thus, for hijacker selectees Hani Hanjour, Nawaf Al-Hazmi, and Khalid Al-Mihdhar, who checked no bags on September 11, there were no consequences for their selection by the system. For Salem Al-Hazmi, who checked two bags, and Majed Moqed, who checked one bag, the sole consequence was that their baggage was not loaded onto Flight 77 until after their boarding was confirmed.^{186 187}

Pre-Flight Preparation

[PLACEHOLDER: ADD TIME PILOTS BEGAN FLIGHT PREP]

AA Flight #77 was loaded with 49,900 pounds of JET-A fuel (which was the normal type and grade of fuel used for this flight). This amount was below the average fuel for the flight during 2001 of 59,400 pounds.¹⁸⁸

Hijacker Boarding

At 7:50 a.m. Majed Moqed and Khalid Al-Mihdhar boarded AA Flight #77 and were seated in 12A and 12B respectively (Coach section). Hani Hanjour, assigned to seat 1B (First Class), boarded at 7:52 a.m. Finally, Nawaf Al-Hazmi (seat 5E, First Class) and Salem Al-Hazmi (seat 5F, First Class) embarked on the plane at 7:55 a.m.¹⁸⁹

Flight Profile

American Airlines (AA) Flight 77 was scheduled to depart from Washington Dulles International Airport (IAD) for Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) at 8:10 a.m. Eastern Time (all times in this section are Eastern Time unless noted otherwise). The aircraft was a Boeing 757, with tail number N5BP.

On this day was piloted by Captain Charles F. Burlingame and the First Officer David Charlesbois. The Flight Attendants serving on AA Flight #77 were:

- Michele Heidenberger who would have been in the rear left jump seat in the very back of the plane at takeoff¹⁹⁰
- Jennifer G. Lewis who would have been seated in the right middle jump seat between First Class and Coach (between the hijackers in 5E, 5F and those in 12A, 12B)¹⁹¹

- Kenneth E. Lewis who would have been seated in the right rear jump seat.^{192 193}
- Rene May¹⁹⁴ who would have been seated in the forward left jump seat next to the entry area and between the first row of First Class (including Seat 1B) and the cockpit.¹⁹⁵

The aircraft had a capacity of 176 passengers with 22 First Class seats and 154 economy seats. On September 11, 2001 the flight carried 58 passengers, two cockpit crew and four cabin crewmembers, for a total of 64 persons on board. Of the 22 First Class seats 15 were occupied by passengers, including three by hijackers Hani Hanjour (1B), Nawaf al Hazmi (5E) and Salem al Hazmi (5F). Of the 154 economy seats aboard, 43 were occupied by passengers including two by hijackers, Khalid al Mihdhar (12B) and Majed Moqed (12A).

The 58 passengers represented a load factor of 32.95% of the plane's passenger capacity of 176. This figure is almost identical to the 32.8% average load factor for Flight 77 for Tuesdays in the three-month period prior to September 11 (June 11 through September 4, 2001). In this three-month period, Tuesdays were the least traveled day for Flight 77, with Wednesday's next lowest at 40.3%.^{196 197}

Sixty-one individuals held reservations for Flight 77 on 9/11, meaning that there were 3 "no-shows" on that day. This represented a lower number than the average for Flight 77 for both all flights in 2001 (average of 10.9 "no-shows") and all Tuesday flights in 2001 (average of 9.1).¹⁹⁸

According to American's records, "no documentation for a jump seat passenger was filed for AA Flight #77."¹⁹⁹ [PLACEHOLDER: GET CLEARER STATEMENT ON WHETHER THERE WAS ANY POSSIBILITY THERE COULD HAVE BEEN SUCH A PASSENGER IN ABSENCE OF PAPERWORK.]

Flight 77 also carried 37 pieces of checked luggage and 1,786 pounds of U.S. Mail. There was no cargo on board.²⁰⁰

Under American Airline policy in effect on 9/11, every crew member, including each of the Flight Attendants, had a key to the cockpit. The airline's Flight Standards Manual instructed the crew to guard their key carefully.²⁰¹

The Flight

AA Flight #77 pushed back from IAD Gate D-26 in the C/D Midfield Terminal at **8:09 a.m.** and at **8:20 a.m.** it took off from IAD Runway 30L.²⁰²

At **8:46 a.m.** AA Flight #77 reached its assigned cruising altitude of 35,000 feet.²⁰³ Around this point of the flight, cabin service by the Flight Attendants would have started, with Rene May likely working in the First Class Galley between the cockpit and First Class, Michele Heidenberger in the Aft Galley at the rear of the plane, Jennifer Lewis circulating in the First Class aisle, and Kenneth Lewis in the Main Cabin aisle.²⁰⁴

At **8:51 a.m.** AA 77 transmitted its last routine radio communication.²⁰⁵

The Hijacking

Between 8:51 a.m. and 8:56 a.m. the hijackers began their takeover of the aircraft. Based on information supplied by eyewitness accounts the hijackers initiated and sustained their command of the aircraft using knives and box cutters (reported by one passenger) and had moved all of the passengers (and possibly crew) to the rear of the aircraft (reported by one flight attendant and one passenger). Finally, a passenger reported that an announcement had been made by the “pilot” that the plane had been hijacked.

Notably, neither of the first hand accounts to come from AA Flight #77, from Flight Attendant Rene May and from passenger Barbara Olson, mentioned any actual use of violence (i.e. stabbings), or the threat or use of either a bomb or mace, though both of these witnesses began the flight in the First Class cabin. Instead, the use of a hijacking announcement by someone the witness described as the pilot was reported.

At **8:55 a.m.** the aircraft deviated from its assigned course by making a turn to the South.²⁰⁶ The transponder on Flight 77 was turned off at **8:56 a.m.** At that same time, the Indianapolis Air Traffic Control Center made the first of 10 unsuccessful attempts over the next six and a half minutes to contact the aircraft via radio.²⁰⁷ At **8:59 a.m.** American Airlines dispatchers made the first of six unsuccessful attempts over the next three minutes to contact Flight 77 using the ACARS system to advise the flight crew to contact the Indianapolis Air Traffic Control Center.²⁰⁸

At around **9:00 a.m.** (PLACEHOLDER: TRY TO VERIFY TIME OF REPORT WITH TEAM 8), FAA Headquarters received a report from a sheriff in Ashland, Kentucky that a commercial aircraft had crashed nearby. FAA believed that this aircraft was AA Flight #77. As a result, the FAA “stopped looking” for the aircraft at this time. It was later determined that the entire basis for the sheriff’s belief that a crash had occurred nearby was a request he received from the FAA’s Great Lakes air traffic control center shortly after 8:56 a.m. that local officials look for a downed plane in their area. Thus, the FAA itself was the ultimate “source” of the crash report.²⁰⁹ [PLACEHOLDER TEAM 8 WILL AMPLIFY]

At **9:00 a.m.** American Airlines Executive Vice President Gerald Arpey learned that communications had been lost with AA Flight #77 and he ordered all American Airlines flights that had not taken off to remain on the ground in the Northeast.²¹⁰

Also at **9:00 a.m.** AA Flight #77 headed east and shortly thereafter began to descend.²¹¹ At **9:02 a.m.** the FAA’s air traffic controllers reported to American Airlines that they didn’t know the location of AA Flight 77, and were unable to contact it.²¹² **Three minutes later,** American began lockout procedures for the flight.²¹³

Between **9:05 a.m. and 9:10 a.m.** the American Airlines System Operation Command Center learned that United Airlines had lost communications with one of its flights and Arpey extended the American ground stop nationwide.²¹⁴

AA Flight #77 leveled off at 25,000 feet and made a slight course change to the East-Northeast **at approximately 9:07 a.m.** and **one minute later** its autopilot was disconnected for about three minutes.²¹⁵ **Also by 9:08 a.m.** officials in American Airlines' System Operations Command Center (SOCC) had concluded that the second aircraft to hit the World Trade Center might have been Flight 77.²¹⁶

At **9:11 a.m.** Flight 77 Flight Attendant Rene May called her mother, Mrs. Nancy May, in Las Vegas, NV. Airphone records indicate that a second call was placed to the same number at **9:12 a.m.**²¹⁷ and presumably the second call is the one that reached Mrs. May. In the conversation, Rene May told her mother that her flight was being hijacked by six individuals who had moved them – Mrs. May was not sure whether her daughter meant all the passengers or just the crew – to the rear of the plane.^{218 219} She then asked Mrs. May to call American Airlines and make sure that they knew about the hijacking, giving her three (703) phone numbers (in Northern Virginia) to call. After finishing the call with her daughter, Mrs. May and her husband, Ron May, immediately did so and reached Patty Carson with American, giving her the information provided by Rene May, including Rene May's phone number onboard and the flight number.²²⁰

At **9:16 a.m.** American Airlines ATC liaison Bill Halleck phoned Ellen King at the Herndon ATC Command Center to inquire about the status of New York City air traffic. Over the course of this two and a half minute conversation, Halleck informed her that American "thought" that AA Flight #11 had crashed into the World Trade Center (WTC). He then told her that AA Flight #77 was "missing" but, as he was reporting this, he received an update from the American Systems Operation Center (SOC) indicating that the aircraft may also have crashed into the WTC. Mr. Halleck relayed this report to Ms. King, while indicating he was unsure how AA Flight #77 could have gotten to New York City. Ms. King replied that the second crash may not have been AA Flight #77 because "we (ATC) have another call sign" for that incident, but at that point, Herndon was not sure of the identity of either of the crashed aircraft.²²¹

At some point between when Rene May phoned her mother (9:12 a.m.) and Flight 77 crashed into the Pentagon (9:37:45 a.m.), Patty Carson received the call from Rene May's parents while at her workstation at Reagan National Airport. They relayed the message from their daughter about the hijacking (including that Rene May was in the rear of the plane but didn't know about the status of the pilots), but at first Ms. Carson thought she was talking about the aircraft that had hit the WTC. Mrs. May reiterated she was speaking of AA Flight #77 that was still in the air. After completing the call, Ms. Carson was told to leave the building because it was being evacuated. On her way out, she heard explosions from the direction of the Pentagon, though she wasn't sure if it was the aircraft crash, and she informed Toni Knisley, a Flight Services Manager at Washington Reagan National Airport, about her conversation with the Mays.²²²

Several minutes after the second crash into the WTC (9:02:40 a.m.) AA Flight #77 passenger Barbara Olson called her husband's (Solicitor General Ted Olson's) office in Washington, DC collect, and was connected to one of his secretaries, Lori Keyton. Ms. Keyton immediately notified Helen Voss, special assistant to the Solicitor General, about the call and indicated that Ms. Olson was in a panic. The call was then immediately transferred to the Solicitor General who spoke to his wife for approximately one minute before the call was cut off. She reported that the flight had been hijacked, and the hijackers had knives and box cutters. She never mentioned anything about the hijackers stabbing or slashing the crew or passengers²²³ She further indicated that the hijackers were not aware of her phone call, and that they had put all the passengers in the back of the plane. (Ms. Olson had been seated in first class.)²²⁴ The call was then cut off.²²⁵

Right after the first call, Solicitor General Olson tried unsuccessfully to reach the Attorney General and then contacted the Department of Justice Command Center and requested that they send someone to his office. He also told the Command Center that his wife's flight had been hijacked and gave them the flight number. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Keyton buzzed him to say that Barbara Olson was back on the line and then transferred the call to him. During the second call, Ms. Olson reported that the pilot had announced that the flight had been hijacked, and she asked her husband what she should tell the captain to do. Ted Olson asked for her location and she replied that the aircraft was then flying over houses. Another passenger told her they were traveling northeast. The Solicitor General then informed his wife of the two previous hijackings and crashes, but she did not display signs of panic nor did she indicate any awareness of an impending crash. At that point, the second call was cut off.²²⁶

According to the FBI's review of calls made from the airphones onboard Flight 77 on September 11, 2001, at *9:19 a.m.* someone on Flight 77 dialed zero and was subsequently connected to a telephone number in U.S. Solicitor General Ted Olson's office in Washington, DC.²²⁷ [PLACEHOLDER CORRELATE WITH OLSON INTERVIEW AND COOPERATIVE RESEARCH AND OTHER PUBLISHED ACCOUNTS.]

After the end of the second call from Barbara Olson, Ted Olson resumed watching television coverage of the hijackings in his office. He was joined shortly thereafter by Allen Ferber, a Security Officer at the Department of Justice Command Center, who had been sent in response to the Solicitor General's call to the Command Center. Ferber recalled watching the television coverage of the hijackings for approximately ten minutes, but he left before the coverage began on the crash into the Pentagon.²²⁸

At 9:22 a.m. AA Flight #77 resumed its descent from 25,250 feet.²²⁹ *Two minutes later,* the FAA notified NORAD of the hijacking of the flight, and FAA controllers observed that it was on a heading for Washington, DC.²³⁰ *At 9:29 a.m.* the autopilot on AA Flight #77 was once more disengaged, with the aircraft at 7,000 feet and approximately 35 miles west of the Pentagon. *At 9:34 a.m.* AA Flight # 77 was 3.5 miles West/Southwest of the Pentagon and began a 330-degree right turn that ended with the aircraft at 2,000 feet and 4 miles Southwest of the Pentagon.²³¹ *At that same time,* an update by the American

Airlines SOCC indicated that AA Flights #11 and #77 had been the aircraft to crash into the World Trade Center.

At 9:37:45 a.m. American Airlines Flight 77 crashed into the Pentagon Building in Northern Virginia, with ground speed calculations indicating that the aircraft was traveling at approximately 530 miles per hour at impact.²³² All 64 individuals on board were killed, as were 125 civilian and military personnel in the Pentagon.²³³

At 9:42 a.m. Tommy McFall, American's director of safety programs²³⁴ who happened to be in Washington, DC at the time, confirmed for American Airlines SOCC officials "something has hit the Pentagon."²³⁵

By not later than 10:30 a.m. American confirmed that AA Flight #77 had crashed into the Pentagon.²³⁶

UNITED AIRLINES FLIGHT 93

Hijackers: Pilot: Ziad Jarrah; Saeed al Ghamdi; Ahmet al Nami; Ahmad al Haznawi.

Hijacker Weapon and Ticket Purchases

[PLACEHOLDER: PENDING WEAPONS PURCHASE INFORMATION FROM FBI]

Ticket records show that on [PLACHOLDER: DATE], hijacker Ziad Jarrah purchased a one-way, first class ticket aboard UA Flight #93 with a connection in San Francisco to Las Vegas using the United Airlines website.²³⁷ The ticket was paid for using a Visa card (What Bank under whose name).²³⁸

On August 27, 2001 hijacker Saeed al Ghamdi purchased a (paper or E-ticket) one-way, first class ticket aboard UA Flight #93 with no further connection through a call to the United Airlines reservations phone service.²³⁹ The ticket was paid for using a credit card (PLACEHOLDER: WHAT CARD UNDER WHOSE NAME).

On (PLACEHOLDER: DATE), Ahmad al Haznawi purchased a (PLACEHOLDER: PAPER OR E-TICKET) one-way, first class ticket aboard UA Flight #93 with a connection to San Diego²⁴⁰ using the Internet (PLACEHOLDER: WHOSE SITE?).²⁴¹ The ticket was paid for using a credit card (PLACEHOLDER: WHAT CARD UNDER WHOSE NAME).

On August 27, 2001, hijacker Ahmed al Nami Ahmad al Haznawi purchased a (PLACEHOLDER: PAPER OR E-TICKET) one-way, first class ticket aboard UA Flight #93 with a connection to (PLACEHOLDER: WHERE) through a travel agent (PLACEHOLDER: WHICH ONE).

There is no evidence that UA Flight #93 hijackers purchased additional tickets for the flight beyond the ones they actually used.^{242 243} (PLACEHOLDER: ADD SPECIFIC CITES FROM AIRLINES.)

The Day of September 11, 2001***Hijacker Arrival at Airport and Check-in***

At 7:01 am, Ziad Jarrah arrived at the Newark Liberty Airport and parked his rental car in lot D3. (PLACEHOLDER: CONFIRM EVIDENCE). It is not known how or at what time the other hijackers arrived at the airport, and it is possible that one or more of the hijackers arrived with Jarrah.

At 7:03 am, Saeed al Ghamdi checked in at the United Airlines ticket counter at Newark with counter agent John Bloxham but checked no baggage.²⁴⁴ Ahmed al Nami checked in with counter agent Sharon Kolibak and checked two bags.²⁴⁵

At 7:24 am, Ahmad al Haznawi checked in with UA counter agent Sharon Kolibak, and checked a single bag.²⁴⁶

At 7:39 am, Ziad Jarrah checked in at the UA ticket counter with (PLACEHOLDER: AGENT), and checked no bags.²⁴⁷

Pre-Screening Selection Status

[PLACEHOLDER: PENDING UPDATED CAPPs INFORMATION]

Ahmad Al-Haznawi was the sole CAPPs selectee among the Flight 93 hijackers. His checked bag was screened for explosives and then loaded on the plane.^{248 249}

Checkpoint Security Screening

Each of the hijackers would be required to pass through A-1, the single checkpoint that services United Airlines flights from Concourse A from which UA Flight #93 departed. The checkpoint was owned by United Airlines and operated under contract by Argenbright Security.

The checkpoint did not feature closed circuit television surveillance so there is no documentary evidence to determine what time the hijackers passed through the checkpoint or what alarms may have been indicated or security procedures were administered. The FAA Civil Aviation Security Field Unit (CASFU) interviewed each of the screeners on duty at the checkpoint, and none of the interviewees reported anything unusual or suspicious.²⁵⁰

The checkpoint featured two lanes. Each lane was outfitted with a walk through magnetometer, x-ray machine, and hand-wand magnetometers. (PLACEHOLDER: FIND OUT ABOUT TRACE DETECTORS).

An October 27, 2000 comprehensive checkpoint assessment by the FAA found two security violations at A-1, both of which involved explosives trace detection (ETD). In the twenty-four months prior to 9/11/01, the FAA conducted 45 screener evaluation tests at the checkpoint, including 10 metal detector tests, 12 physical search tests and 23 x-ray tests. For metal detection, the test object was detected in 80% of the tests. The detection rates for physical searches and x-rays were 92% and 87% respectively. All of these detection rates met or exceeded the national averages for this time period.²⁵¹

No FAA Special Assessments ("Red Team") were done at Newark security checkpoints over the two years prior to 9/11/01.²⁵²

(PLACEHOLDER: ADD NYC CASFO SUMMARY OF 9/11 SCREENING OPS FROM NYC CASFO EXECUTIVE SUMMARY FOR FLIGHT 93)

Because the hijackers would have had to pass through the checkpoints at some time between check-in and passenger boarding the time ranges within which each would have been processed at the checkpoint are as follows: Jarrah (7:39 a.m. to 7:48 a.m.); al Ghamdi (7:03 a.m. to 7:39 a.m.); al Nami (7:03 a.m. to 7:40 a.m.); and al Haznawi (7:24 a.m. to 7:39 a.m.).

Pre-Flight Preparation (includes Fuel report)

[PLACEHOLDER: PENDING PRE-FLIGHT BULLETIN REPORT]

Hijacker Boarding

At 7:39 am, Ahmad al Haznawi and Saeed al Ghamdi boarded the aircraft, with Haznawi seated in 6B (First Class) and al Ghamdi seated in 3D (First Class). At 7:40 am, Ahmed al Nami boarded and was seated in 3C (First Class). At 7:48 am, Ziad Jarrah boarded and was seated in 1B (First Class).²⁵³

Departure

At 8:00 a.m. UA Flight #93 pushed back from gate 17A at Newark Liberty Airport bound for San Francisco, California and taxied to its departure area. Due to "the local air traffic" the flight took 41 minutes to taxi out (according to United, "this time of day is extremely busy at (Newark) with a typical flight taking 29 minutes to taxi-out")²⁵⁴ (PLACEHOLDER: WORKING WITH TEAM 8 TO IDENTIFY FROM ATC MORE DETAILS ON WHY THE LATE TAKE-OFF) and remained in a holding status until 8:41:53 am when it departed from runway 22R.²⁵⁵

United Airlines Flight #93 provided daily, non-stop service from Newark Liberty International Airport, (Newark, New Jersey) to San Francisco International Airport.

On this day, the plane was piloted by Captain Jason Dahl and First Officer Lee Roy Homer. Seven flight attendants provided cabin services: Chief Flight Attendant Deborah Welsh (First Class, Seat J1 at takeoff); Sandra Bradshaw (Coach, Seat J5); Wanda Green (First Class, Seat J4); Lorraine Bay (Coach, Seat J3); and Ceecee Lyles (Coach, Seat J6).²⁵⁶ (PLACEHOLDER: ADD INFO FROM UNITED ON LOCATION OF JUMPSEATS)

(PLACEHOLDER: ADD LOADING INFO, OTHER FLIGHT PROFILE DETAILS.)

The 33 passengers represented a load factor of 20.33% of the plane's passenger capacity of 168. This figure is considerably below the (PLACEHOLDER #)% average load factor for Flight 93 for Tuesdays in the three-month period prior to September 11 (June 11 through September 4, 2001), and in fact represents the lowest load factor among all the 93 scheduled flights in that time period, except for five which were cancelled.²⁵⁷ (PLACEHOLDER: GET UA'S EXPLANATION OF CANCELLATION POLICY, AND WHETHER OR NOT, AND IF NOT WHY NOT, THE LOW 9/11 LOAD FACTOR

FOR FLIGHT 93, TRIGGERED ANY CONCERNS.] In this three-month period, (PLACEHOLDER) were the least traveled day for Flight 93, with (PLACEHOLDER: next lowest at xx.xx)%^{258 259} [PLACEHOLDER: ADD INFO ON NO-SHOWS/CANCELLATIONS]

Under United Airlines policy at the time, a key to the cockpit door was not given to the Flight Attendants²⁶⁰ but was stowed in (PLACEHOLDER: ADD LOCATION FROM UA DOCUMENTS).²⁶¹

No paperwork was filed to indicate that any cockpit jumpseat was occupied by anyone other than flight crew.²⁶²

The Flight

At 9:15 a.m. the flight reached its cruising altitude of 35,000 feet.²⁶³ The United Airlines Chief pilot indicated that under typical circumstances, the pilot will turn off the seatbelt sign when the aircraft reached cruising altitude or about 20 minutes into the flight.

At 9:20 a.m., an Aircraft Communication and Response System (ACARS) text message was sent to First Officer LeRoy Homer at the request of his wife who wanted to ascertain her husband's welfare after hearing about the attacks on the World Trade Center. (PLACEHOLDER: WAS THIS ACKNOWLEDGED).

At 9:24 a.m. United Airlines flight dispatcher Ed Ballinger sent an ACARS message to the flight, along with his 15 other transcontinental UA flights, to: "beware cockpit intrusion; two a/c (aircraft) hit WTC (World Trade Center)."

At 9:26 a.m. UA 93 acknowledged receiving the ACARS message from dispatch regarding the cockpit intrusion warning. (PLACEHOLDER: TEXT OF ACARS)

The Hijacking

Between 9:26 a.m. when the cockpit acknowledged receiving the cockpit warning via ACARS and 9:31 a.m., the hijackers took over the aircraft. (PLACEHOLDER: ADD SUMMARY OF REPORTED WEAPONS AND TACTICS.)

(9:28 am: PLACEHOLDER: What is the MAYDAY Radio call distress call heard in English indicated by Penttbom summary pg. 63)

At 9:28 a.m. Air Traffic Control overheard a transmission from one of the UA 93 flight deck crew, saying: "Hey get out of here....get out of here...get out of here." At the same time as this transmission the aircraft descended 600 feet. (PLACEHOLDER: AWAITING INTERPRETATION FROM NTSB).

At 9:29 a.m. the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued nation-wide ground-stop and closed the national airspace except for military aircraft.

At 9:31 a.m. Air Traffic Control overheard a transmission of threatening language from UA #93: "We have a bomb onboard." (PLACEHOLDER: GET TAPE TRANSCRIPT FROM TEAM 8)²⁶⁴

At 9:32 a.m. the Flight 93 Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) began recording sounds from the cockpit.²⁶⁵ (PLACEHOLDER: CLARIFY WITH CHARLEY PEREIRA)

(PLACEHOLDER DID HAMILTON TAKE A PHONE CALL)

At 9:36 a.m. Flight Attendant Sandy Bradshaw contacted the United Airlines maintenance facility in San Francisco answered by UA maintenance employee Andrew Lubkemann. The call was taken over by manager Richard Belme. The phone number is one that flight crews know to call in order to report mechanical and systems problems and obtain advice on troubleshooting and request maintenance in-flight. Ms. Bradshaw, reporting from in back of the plane, told Belme that two hijackers were behind the First Class curtain and that the hijackers had announced they had a bomb on the plane. Belme reported the emergency to his manager Ray Kime, who passed the information on to the United Airlines Crisis Center. Belme then instructed the GTE air phone operator to try and reestablish contact with the plane but the effort was unsuccessful.

Also at 9:36 a.m. Flight 93 passenger Mark Bingham called his mother, notifying her that three men had taken over the plane and they had a bomb.

At 9:37 a.m. passenger Jeremiah Glick contacted his wife. (PLACEHOLDER: ADD INFO ABOUT CONTENT OF THIS CALL, AND ABOUT TIMING AND CONTENT OF GLICK CALL TO HIS MOTHER-IN-LAW)

At 9:39 a.m. FAA Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center overheard the following radio transmission from UA #93: " ah this is the captain uh would like to all remain seated there is a bomb aboard and we go back to the airport and to have our demands...please remain quiet."²⁶⁶

At 9:39 a.m. Flight Attendant Ceecee Lyles called her husband Lorne using a GTE air phone and left a message stating that the aircraft had been hijacked (PLACEHOLDER: FBI HAS THE RECORDING GET RECORDING OR THE TRANSCRIPT).

At 9:41 a.m. the transponder on the plane was turned off.

At 9:43 a.m. passenger Todd Beamer contacted Lisa Jefferson, a GTE Airfone Operator, and reported the following information:

The flight had been hijacked; the captain and first officer were lying on the floor of the first class cabin and were injured or possibly dead. Beamer stated that one of the hijackers stated he had a bomb strapped to his waist and that two of the hijackers had entered the cockpit and closed the door behind them. Beamer said that those in the rear of the plane were not being monitored by the hijackers and that the plane was going up and

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down and had turned or changed direction. Beamer told Jefferson that he and some other passengers were planning something and he was going to place the phone down. Jefferson heard someone say "Are you guys ready?" and "Let's roll." Shortly thereafter she heard screaming followed by silence.²⁶⁷ (PLACEHOLDER: DID THIS MEAN THE PHONE WAS DEAD)

At 9:49 a.m. Flight Attendant Sandy Bradshaw called her husband to report the emergency. Her husband reported to her that earlier in the morning two planes crashed into the World Trade Center. Sandy Bradshaw informed her husband that the plane had been hijacked by three men and that one of the hijackers was in the front while three others were in the back. She described that the hijackers were carrying knives and had put on red headbands. She believed that the plane may have been over the Mississippi because they were passing over a large river, and reported that the passengers were headed toward the back and were getting hot water to throw on the hijackers and rush them.

At 9:53 a.m. Passenger (PLACEHOLDER: WHO) called (PLACEHOLDER: WHO) and advised that the plane was being hijacked. (PLACEHOLDER: CHECK WITH FBI).

At 10:03 a.m. Flight 93 struck the ground in Somerset (Stony Creek Township), Pennsylvania, at 563 miles per hour. (PLACEHOLDER: ADD INFO ON FATALITIES)

¹ FBI 265A-NY-280350-302-10916

² FBI 265A-NY-280350-302-10916

³ FBI Timeline "The Final 24 Hours—PENTTBOM" 12/8/03

⁴ FBI 265A-NY-280350-302-6597

⁵ FBI Timeline "The Final 24 Hours—PENTTBOM" 12/8/03

⁶ FBI 265A-NY-280350-302-10916

⁷ FBI 265A-NY-280350-302-46163

⁸ Commission MFR for Portland Jetport Briefing

⁹ Air Carrier Standard Security Program.

¹⁰ FBI Timeline "The Final 24 Hours—PENTTBOM" 12/8/03

¹¹ Commission MFR for Portland Jetport Briefing

¹² RFBI 04016421 "Copy of Surveillance Video ATTA/ALOMARI in Portland, Maine

¹³ FBI 265A-NY-280350-302-23367

¹⁴ FBI 265A-NY-280350-302-786

¹⁵ FBI 265A-NY-280350-302-23367

¹⁶ FBI 265A-NY-280350-302-46874

¹⁷ Commission MFR for briefing by Portland (Maine) Police Chief Michael Chitwood

¹⁸ FBI Timeline "The Final 24 Hours—PENTTBOM" 12/8/03

¹⁹ Commission MFR: Tom Kinton

²⁰ FBI, "Summary of Penttbom Investigation," January 31, 2003.

²¹ PENTTBOM Report, January 12, 2003, pg. 52

²² "Flight 11-September 11,2001" AAL Bates stamp 003966-003969.

²³ "Flight 11-September 11,2001" AAL Bates stamp 003966-003969.

²⁴ PENTTBOM Report, January 12, 2003, pg. 52

²⁵ "Flight 11-September 11,2001" AAL Bates stamp 003966-003969.

²⁶ PENTTBOM Report, January 12, 2003, pg. 52

²⁷ "Flight 11-September 11,2001" AAL Bates stamp 003966-003969.

²⁸ FBI, *Documents In Response To and In Lieu of Briefing Request #6, Topic 8.* [LES]

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- ²⁹ NOTE: This addresses the 9/11 Families' question: Did the hijackers purchase extra seats on the airplanes?
- ³⁰ "AA Flight #11 11Sep01 BOS-LAX reservation/ticket review" AAL bate stamp 003422-003425
- ³¹ "Flight 11-September 11,2001" AAL Bates stamp 003966-003969.
- ³²
- ³³ Commission MFR:
- ³⁴ FBI 302 with Shawn Trotman; "Dispatch Environmental Control/Weekly Flight Summary" AAL Bate stamp 003159-003200.
- ³⁵ http://local543.twuatd.org/new_page_2.htm
- ³⁶ Reck FBI IV 302 ???; Commission Interview MFR with Peggy Houck
- ³⁷ American Airlines SABRE response for Flight 11, September 11, 2001.
- ³⁸ QFR response from American Airlines: March 15, 2004
- ³⁹ AAL Document submission "Dispatch Environmental Control/Weekly Flight summary Bates Stamp 003159-003199.
- ⁴⁰ American Airlines, "Flight Attendant Jump Seat Locations During Takeoff and Flight Attendant Typical Cabin Positions During Start of Cabin Service for Flights 11 and 77."
- ⁴¹ See FBI 302 9627
- ⁴² See aircraft schematic provided by American Airlines
- ⁴³ AAL document bate stamped 003434
- ⁴⁴ AA Kean Commission 006390
- ⁴⁵ NOTE: This address the 9/11 Families question: "Were the flights less crowded than normal? Did this raise any red flags that something was amiss?"
- ⁴⁶ "AA Flight #11 11Sep01 BOS-LAX reservation/ticket review" AAL bate stamp 003422-003426
- ⁴⁷ FBI 302 19106;
- ⁴⁸ FBI 302 19106
- ⁴⁹ NTSB, "American Airlines Flight 11 – Flight Profile."
- ⁵⁰ American Airlines, "Flight Attendant Jump Seat Locations During Takeoff and Flight Attendant Typical Cabin Positions During Start of Cabin Service for Flights 11 and 77."
- ⁵¹ Commission MFR: Nydia Gonzalez
- ⁵² Interview of Nydia Gonzalez, November 19, 2003.
- ⁵³ Interview of Bill Halleck and Peggy Houck, January 8, 2004.
- ⁵⁴ TEAM 8 Reference and augmentation
- ⁵⁵ Commission MFR: Michael Woodward
- ⁵⁶ Tape position 46R at ZBW (FAA Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center)
- ⁵⁷ AA Kean Comm 003197-00320
- ⁵⁸ Commission MFR: Michael Woodward
- ⁵⁹ TEAM 8 Reference
- ⁶⁰ AA Kean Commission 006382 (transcript of tape)
- ⁶¹ AA Kean Commission 006382 (transcript of tape)
- ⁶² Commission MFR: Michael Woodward
- ⁶³ Commission MFR: Michael Woodward
- ⁶⁴ Commission MFR: Michael Woodward
- ⁶⁵ Commission MFR: Michael Woodward
- ⁶⁶ AA Kean Commission 006340 (transcript of tape)
- ⁶⁷ AA Kean Commission 006341
- ⁶⁸
- ⁶⁹ AA Kean Commission 006343
- ⁷⁰ Commission MFR: Michael Woodward
- ⁷¹ Commission MFR: Michael Woodward
- ⁷² AA Kean Commission 006343
- ⁷³ AA Kean Commission 006344
- ⁷⁴ Commission MFR: Michael Woodward
- ⁷⁵ Commission MFR: Michael Woodward
- ⁷⁶ Commission MFR: Larry Wansley

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78 Commission MFR: Larry Wansley

79 See Commission IV with Janet Riffe, FAA Principal Security Inspector to American Airlines.

80 Commission IV with Suzanne Clark of AAL 11/03

81 FBI 302-12952

82 Tape of Ong call in evidence; Tape of Gonzales call in evidence; FBI 302 and/or Commission Interview and/or Statement to AAL of: Nydia Gonzales, [redacted] Michael Woodward, [redacted]

[redacted] Vanessa Minter; Winston Sadler.

83 See "Executive Summary" produced by the FAA on 9/11/2001 and subsequent drafts

84 See "Executive Summary" produced by the FAA on 9/11/2001

85 FBI list of knife purchases submitted to Commission 1/04

86 Penttbom Team, Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Summary of Penttbom Investigation*, January 31, 2003, p. 48 [LES]

87 Statement for the Record by FBI Director Robert S. Mueller, Joint Intelligence Committee Inquiry, p. 7; Penttbom Team, Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Summary of Penttbom Investigation*, January 31, 2003, p. 52 [LES]; and FBI Interview of [redacted] October 1, 2001. [LES]

88 Statement for the Record by FBI Director Robert S. Mueller, Joint Intelligence Committee Inquiry, p. 7; Penttbom Team, Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Summary of Penttbom Investigation*, January 31, 2003, p. 52-53 [LES]; FBI Interview of [redacted] October 1, 2001. [LES]

89 Statement for the Record by FBI Director Robert S. Mueller, Joint Intelligence Committee Inquiry, p. 8; Penttbom Team, Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Summary of Penttbom Investigation*, January 31, 2003, p. 53 [LES]; and FBI Interview of [redacted] October 1, 2001. [LES]

90 FBI, *Documents In Response To and In Lieu of Briefing Request #6, Topic 8*. [LES]

91 NOTE: This addresses the 9/11 Families' question: Did the hijackers purchase extra seats on the airplanes?

92 Ms. Jawahir recalled that her encounter with the Al-Ghamdi's occurred at "shortly before 7 a.m. and when shown photos of the hijackers she indicated that Mohand Al-Shehri resembled one of the two she checked in. Thus, her experience may have actually been with Fayez Banihammad and Mohand Al-Shehri, who checked in at 6:53 a.m. However, Jawahir recalled that the two individuals she spoke with had the same last name and had assigned seats on Row 9, both of which fit the Al-Ghamdis and therefore that account has been adopted here. In either case, it is almost certain that she was dealing with one set of the hijackers.

93 United Airlines, "Flight 175 - 11Sep01 Passenger ACI Check-in History," July 11, 2002.

94 FBI Interview of Manuel Carreiro, September 28, 2001. [LES]

95 FBI Interview of Gail Jawahir, September 16, 2001. [LES]

96 FBI 302-51589

97 Logan Site Visit and Briefing, August 15, 2003.

98 FBI, *Documents In Response To and In Lieu of Briefing Request #6, Topic 11*. [LES]

99 United Airlines, "Flight 175 - 11Sep01 Passenger ACI Check-in History," July 11, 2002.

100 Transportation Security Administration, "Selectee Status of September 11 Hijackers." [SSI]

101 NOTE: This partially addresses the 9/11 Families' question: "Explain how the hijackers were processed by airport/airline security, particularly those who were held up for security reasons."

102 Logan Briefing and Site Visit, August 15, 2003. [SSI]

103 Federal Aviation Administration, Office of Civil Aviation Security Operations, "Assessment and Testing Data for BOS, EWR, and IAD: Boston-Logan International Airport (BOS)," September 21, 2001 [SSI]

104 Federal Aviation Administration, Office of Civil Aviation Security Operations, "Assessment and Testing Data for BOS, EWR, and IAD: Boston-Logan International Airport (BOS)," September 21, 2001 [SSI]

105 Interview of Mary Carol Turano, March 11, 2004.

106 United Airlines, "Flight 175 - 11Sep01 Passenger ACI Check-in History," July 11, 2002.

107 United Airlines, "Flight 175: Flight Attendant Positions/Jumpseats." (SSI)

108 United Airlines, "Flight 175: Flight Attendant Positions/Jumpseats." (SSI)

109 United Airlines, "Flight 175: Flight Attendant Positions/Jumpseats." (SSI)

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- ¹¹⁰ United Airlines, "United Flight 175: Flight Attendant Positions/Jumpseats" [SSI]
- ¹¹¹ FAA, "Executive Summary Chronology of a Multiple Hijacking Crisis, September 11, 2001," September 17, 2001; United Airlines, Flight 175 ACARS Report; and United Airlines Flight 175, Flight Data Recap.
- ¹¹² United Airlines, Daily Bag Counts – AM, 11 Sep 01.
- ¹¹³
- ¹¹⁴ UAL #175 was cancelled on Monday, July 16, 2001, and contained a load factor of only 28.57% on Wednesday, August 29, 2001.
- ¹¹⁵ United Airlines, "Flight 175 BOS-LAX Load Factors."
- ¹¹⁶ NOTE: This point partially responds to 9/11 Families' question: Were the flights less crowded than normal? Did this raise any red flags that something was amiss?"
- ¹¹⁷ Briefing on United 757/767 Aircraft, November 20, 2003.
- ¹¹⁸ United Airlines, "United Flight 175: Flight Attendant Positions/Jumpseats" [SSI]
- ¹¹⁹ United Airlines, "Information Concerning Boeing Key and Who Sat in Jump Seats on the Hijacked Flights." (SSI)
- ¹²⁰ NTSB, "UAL 175 Radio Communications."
- ¹²¹ FAA, "Executive Summary Chronology of a Multiple Hijacking Crisis, September 11, 2001," September 17, 2001; and NTSB, "United Airlines Flight 175 – Flight Profile."
- ¹²² United Airlines Flight 175, Flight Data Recap; and Statement for the Record by FBI Director Robert S. Mueller, Joint Intelligence Committee Inquiry, p. 10.
- ¹²³ NTSB, "UAL 175 Radio Communications."
- ¹²⁴ United Airlines, "Flight 175: Flight Attendant Positions/Jumpseats." (SSI)
- ¹²⁵ NTSB, "UAL 175 Radio Communications."
- ¹²⁶ NTSB, "UAL 175 Radio Communications;" and FAA, *Criminal Acts Against Civil Aviation 2001*, pp. 39-40.
- ¹²⁷ Interview of Rich "Doc" Miles, November 21, 2003.
- ¹²⁸ Briefing on the UAL System Operations Control Center and Crisis Center, November 20, 2003.
- ¹²⁹ NTSB, "UAL 175 Radio Communications."
- ¹³⁰ NTSB, "United Airlines Flight 175 – Flight Profile."
- ¹³¹ Briefing on the UAL System Operations Control Center and Crisis Center, November 20, 2003; and Mike Barber September 11, 2001 Timeline.
- ¹³² NTSB, "United Airlines Flight 175 – Flight Profile."
- ¹³³ NTSB, "UAL 175 Radio Communications."
- ¹³⁴ ~~PLACEHOLDER: ADD ORIGINAL SOURCE FROM PENTTBOM~~
- ¹³⁵ FBI Interview of Lee Hanson, September 11, 2001. [LES]
- ¹³⁶ The time of 8:52 a.m. is based on GTE-Airfone records, which indicate two completed calls to the SAMC Star-fix location from Flight 175, the first of 75 seconds duration beginning at 8:52:01 Eastern Time, and the second of 31 seconds beginning at 8:56:19 Eastern Time. The recipient of the Star-fix call(s) from Flight 175, Marc Policastro, recalled only one such communication. United investigators determined that there was only one call. (Letter from Jeff Plantz, United Senior Staff Investigator, to Assistant United States Attorney David J. Novak, July 31, 2002) (SSI) Whether or not there were two calls or only one, the longer first communication is more consistent with Policastro's recollection of the duration and information imparted during the call. (Interview of Marc Policastro, November 21, 2003)
- ¹³⁷ Flight crew onboard United aircraft could contact this office by simply dialing *349 on an airphone. FBI Interview of [REDACTED] January 24, 2002. [LES]
- ¹³⁸ Though he believed the Flight Attendant had identified himself at the time of the call, Policastro was not sure of the identity afterward. However, when read the name of the three male flight attendants he was certain that the caller was not either Alfred Marchand or Michael Tarrou, and thus he thought it must have been Robert Fangman.
- ¹³⁹ Interview of Marc Policastro, November 21, 2003; and FBI Interview of Marc Policastro, September 11, 2001. [LES]
- ¹⁴⁰ FBI Interview of [REDACTED] January 24, 2002. [LES]
- ¹⁴¹ NTSB, "United Airlines Flight 175 – Flight Profile."

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- ¹⁴² FBI, "Lead To Contact Final Phone Numbers Called From Airphones," [LES]; and FBI Interview of [REDACTED] September 12, 2001. [LES]
- ¹⁴³ ~~PLACEHOLDER: ADD ORIGINAL SOURCE FROM PENTTBOM~~
- ¹⁴⁴ FBI Interview of Julie Sweeney, October 10, 2001. [LES]
- ¹⁴⁵ UAL, Flight 175 ACARS Report; and FBI Interview of Edward D. Ballinger, January 29, 2002. [LES]
- ¹⁴⁶ ~~PLACEHOLDER: ADD ORIGINAL SOURCE FROM PENTTBOM~~
- ¹⁴⁷ FBI Interview of Louise Sweeney, September 28, 2001. [LES]
- ¹⁴⁸ ~~PLACEHOLDER: ADD ORIGINAL SOURCE FROM PENTTBOM~~
- ¹⁴⁹ FBI Interview of Lee Hanson, September 11, 2001. [LES]
- ¹⁵⁰ Interview of Marc Policastro, November 21, 2003; Interview of Rich "Doc" Miles, November 21, 2003; and Briefing on the UAL System Operations Control Center and Crisis Center, November 20, 2003.
- ¹⁵¹ Interview of Craig Marquis, November 19, 2003.
- ¹⁵² Interview of Craig Parfitt, November 19, 2003.
- ¹⁵³ NTSB, "United Airlines Flight 175 – Flight Profile."
- ¹⁵⁴ FAA, *Criminal Acts Against Civil Aviation 2001*, p. 41.
- ¹⁵⁵ UAL, Flight 175 ACARS Report.
- ¹⁵⁶ Ed Ballinger Timeline of Events for September 11, 2001; UAL Timeline for Dispatch/SMFDO Activities – Terrorist Crisis, September 11, 2001; and Briefing on the UAL System Operations Control Center and Crisis Center, November 20, 2003.
- ¹⁵⁷ FBI Interview of Edward D. Ballinger, January 29, 2002. [LES]
- ¹⁵⁸ UAL, Flight 175 ACARS Report.
- ¹⁵⁹ Mike Barber September 11, 2001 Timeline.
- ¹⁶⁰ Mike Barber September 11, 2001 Timeline; and UAL Timeline for Dispatch/SMFDO Activities – Terrorist Crisis, September 11, 2001.
- ¹⁶¹ Briefing on the UAL System Operations Control Center and Crisis Center, November 20, 2003.
- ¹⁶² Mike Barber September 11, 2001 Timeline.
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- ¹⁶⁴ UAL Timeline for Dispatch/SMFDO Activities – Terrorist Crisis, September 11, 2001.
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- ¹⁶⁹ Statement for the Record by FBI Director Robert S. Mueller, Joint Intelligence Committee Inquiry, p. 7; Penttbom Team, Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Summary of Penttbom Investigation*, January 31, 2003, pp. 51-52 [LES]; and Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority Police Department Crime Report, *Case #200103723, September 11, 2001, American Flight #77*.
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- ¹⁷² FBI, *Documents In Response To and In Lieu of Briefing Request #6, Topic 8*. [LES]
- ¹⁷³ NOTE: This addresses the 9/11 Families' question: Did the hijackers purchase extra seats on the airplanes?
- ¹⁷⁴ Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority, videotape of Main Terminal checkpoints, September 11, 2001 [SSI]
- ¹⁷⁵ Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority, videotape of Main Terminal checkpoints, September 11, 2001 [SSI]

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- ¹⁷⁹ Federal Aviation Administration, Office of Civil Aviation Security Operations, "Assessment and Testing Data for BOS, EWR, and IAD: Washington-Dulles International Airport (IAD)," September 21, 2001 [SSI]
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- ¹⁸¹ FAA, Washington, DC Civil Aviation Security Field Office, "Executive Summary, American Airline Flight #77: Hijacking and Crash into the Pentagon, September 11, 2001."
- ¹⁸² FAA Interview of Donna Thompson, September 23, 2001. [SSI]
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- ¹⁸⁴ FAA Interview of Donna Thompson, September 23, 2001. [SSI]
- ¹⁸⁵ NOTE: This partially addresses the 9/11 Families' question: Explain how the hijackers were processed by airport/airline security, particularly those who were held up for security reasons.
- ¹⁸⁶ FAA, Civil Aviation Security, "Selectee List - AALA #77." [SSI]
- ¹⁸⁷ NOTE: This partially addresses the 9/11 Families' question: Explain how the hijackers were processed by airport/airline security, particularly those who were held up for security reasons.
- ¹⁸⁸ Letter from Desmond T. Barry, Jr., March 15, 2004, Response to Question 77.4.
- ¹⁸⁹ American Airlines SABRE response for Flight 77, September 11, 2001.
- ¹⁹⁰ American Airlines, "Flight Attendant Jump Seat Locations During Takeoff And Flight Attendant Typical Cabin Positions During Start of Cabin Service for Flights 11 and 77."
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- ¹⁹⁵ American Airlines, "Flight Attendant Jump Seat Locations During Takeoff And Flight Attendant Typical Cabin Positions During Start of Cabin Service for Flights 11 and 77."
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- ¹⁹⁷ NOTE: This point partially responds to 9/11 Families' question: Were the flights less crowded than normal? Did this raise any red flags that something was amiss?"
- ¹⁹⁸ Letter from Desmond T. Barry, Jr., March 15, 2004, Response to Question 77.11.
- ¹⁹⁹ Letter from Desmond T. Barry, Jr., March 15, 2004, Response to Question 77.12.
- ²⁰⁰ FAA, Washington, DC Civil Aviation Security Filed Office, "Chronology of the September 11, 2001 Attacks and Subsequent Events Through October 24, 2001."
- ²⁰¹ Interview of Craig Marquis, Craig Parfitt, Joe Bertapelle and Mike Mulcahy, November 19, 2003.
- ²⁰² FAA, Washington, DC Civil Aviation Security Field Office, "Chronology of the September 11, 2001 Attacks and Subsequent Events Through October 24, 2001."
- ²⁰³ NTSB, "American Airlines Flight 77 - Flight Profile."
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- ²⁰⁸ American Airlines, "Dispatch Environmental Control/Weekly Flight Summary: Flight 77, September 11, 2001.
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- ²¹³ American Airlines, "Systems Operation Command Center (SOCC) Chronology for September 11, 2001."
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- ²¹⁶ American Airlines, "Systems Operation Command Center (SOCC) Chronology for September 11, 2001."
- ²¹⁷ FBI, "American Airlines Airphone Usage," September 20, 2001. [LES]
- ²¹⁸ FBI Interview of Ronald and Nancy May, September 12, 2001. [LES]
- ²¹⁹ NOTE: This point addresses the 9/11 Families' question: Is there evidence to support or contradict a 9/12/01 *Washington Post* article which reported that the passengers and crew of Flight 77 were "herded to the back of the plane" and "ordered to call relatives to say they were about to die"?
- ²²⁰ FBI Interview of Ronald and Nancy May, September 12, 2001. [LES]
- ²²¹ American Airlines, *Transcript of 9/11 Telephone Calls*, "Bill Halleck to Ellen (FAA Command Center Head of Central Traffic Flow)," and FAA, Herndon Air Traffic Control Center, 9/11 Tape from NOM Line 5149, position 34B.
- ²²² Interview of Patty Carson, November 19, 2003; and E-mail from Christopher R. Christensen, January 20, 2004.
- ²²³ NOTE: This point partially addresses the 9/11 Families' question: Where did the information on box-cutters come from? How do we know that the terrorists were armed with these?
- ²²⁴ NOTE: This point addresses the 9/11 Families' question: Is there evidence to support or contradict a 9/12/01 *Washington Post* article which reported that the passengers and crew of Flight 77 were "herded to the back of the plane" and "ordered to call relatives to say they were about to die"?
- ²²⁵ FBI Interview of Theodore Olson, September 11, 2001; [LES] and FBI Interview of [REDACTED] September 14, 2001. [LES]
- ²²⁶ FBI Interview of Theodore Olson, September 11, 2001. [LES]
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- ²³⁴ Interview of Larry Wansley, January 8, 2004.
- ²³⁵ American Airlines, "Systems Operation Command Center (SOCC) Chronology for September 11, 2001."
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- ²³⁸ FBI 265A-NY-280350-302-51539
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- ²⁴⁰ UASSI1-00000015
- ²⁴¹ FBI 265A-NY-280350-302-51539
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- ²⁴³ NOTE: This addresses the 9/11 Families' question: Did the hijackers purchase extra seats on the airplanes?
- ²⁴⁴ FBI 265A-NY-280350-302-104078; UAL Document 00000552; UASSI1-00000055
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²⁵² Federal Aviation Administration, Office of Civil Aviation Security Operations, "Assessment and Testing Data for BOS, EWR, and IAD: Newark International Airport (EWR)," September 21, 2001 [SSI]
²⁵³ FBI "The Final 24 Hours" 12/08/2003
²⁵⁴ E-mail from [REDACTED] January 23, 2004.
²⁵⁵ RFAA 3003840C pg 6
²⁵⁶ UASSII-00031947
²⁵⁷ UAL #93 was cancelled on 6/11/01, 6/19/01, 6/25/01, 7/3/01, and 8/22/01.
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²⁶³ Summary of Penttbom Investigation, Department of Justice (FBI), January 13, 2003, pg. 63.
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