David M Norton (HD) Franklin Sector 8:42-9:50

UAL 93's flight through Franklin airspace was normal from initial handoff from NY Center until handoff to Lorain Sector. After switching UAL 93's frequency I noticed a change in the altitude of UAL 93 and called Lorain to see what was going on and to verify they were talking with the aircraft.

I do not remember what the various settings of the operational equipment were at the time of the accident. 11/29/01

Brad Kennedy (KB) Franklin-D 9:02-9:50

UAL 93 was westbound toward DJB at FL350. We were busy diverting aircrraft from ZNY airspace, handed UAL 93 off to sector (Lorain?) about 20-30 miles from boundry. About 10 miles from boundry noticed UAL93 altitude descended slowly 4 to 5 hundred feet. We advised supervisor Barnett to watch aircraft something might be wrong and then we continued working.

I did not view satori or listen to tapes to confirm my statement, but would like to do that in the near future. I do not remember what the various settings of the operational equipment were at the time of the accident. 9/13/01

John Werth (WH) Lorain Radar 8:55-10:18

I was working the Lorain radar position when the incident with UAL93 occurred. I issued traffic to UAL93 and received a normal response from the crew. I heard two transmissions which sounded like a struggle took place. Shortly afterwards the aircraft descended several hundred feet. The aircraft made an abrupt turn at DJB VOR to the south. Two more transmissions followed, stating that a bomb was on board, the aircraft had started to climb and was heading s/e in the general direction of two other aircraft which I had already started to vector away from UAL93. When UAL93 reached approx. FL410 he stopped his beacon squawk. I then started a primary track to follow the target. I received no more transmissions from UAL93, and continued vectoring several other aircraft clear of his position. I then transferred control of the data block to the area s/e of mine to monitor the aircraft's track.

I do not remember what the various settings of the operational equipment were at the time of the accident. 9/13/01

David Leister (LE) LOR (Lorain)-D 8:39-10:18

I have listened to the voice tape of UAL93 and I would like to say I am deeply shocked and horrified about this event. The data tapes have recorded my computer input as well as my voice transmissions. As the events unfolded, I quickly realized there was nothing we could do for UAL93. Our training and common sense dictated that we protect surrounding aircraft, and that became my primary goal. I called for a supervisor at the first indication of trouble, which brought two additional controllers to our aid, making sure that we fulfilled our mission of protecting other aircraft. God bless the souls of UAL93.

I do not remember what the various settings of the operational equipment were at the time of the accident.

Mike Zientarski (MW) LOR (Lorain) Handoff position 9:30-9:43

I was put in to track at LOR-radar because traffic was starting to build. About that time UAL93 descended about 500 feet. A transmission was made that was unintelligible to me but another aircraft claimed to have heard that a bomb was on board. At that time I told another controller to assist on the associate position. I then began to direct him to pointouts and reroute aircraft away from our sector. Southeast of DJB contact was lost and then I helped to reestablish his positioning. We continued tracking what we believed to be UAL93 and I continued to have aircraft moved away. This continued until the target we believed to be UAL93 was out of the airspace.

I do not remember what the various settings of the operational equipment were at the time of the accident. 9/13/01

Mark Saunders (MS) Assoc. Radar D-side 9:33-10:00

I was told to plug in and help the D-side position, because of the unusual situation. I saw UAL93 make radical turns and head to the southeast. The transponder went off and we tracked the primary target. I told sectors around us about this and to move all aircraft around us because we didn't know what altitude he was at.

I do not remember what the various settings of the operational equipment were at the time of the accident. 12/10/01

George W. Keaton (VP) IRL (Imperial) 8:52-10:20

During the time in question I was the radar controller at the IRL sector, obviously aware at this time of what had occurred at the Pentagon and World Trade Center. During my time on position a PVD appeared on my scope with no altitude readout (UAL93). A controller from Area IV appeared in the area and explained the aircraft was deviating from its flight path and noone was receiving altitude information. I was told to keep all aircraft away from UAL93, which was proceeding towards the Washington area approximately on J518. I had to vector 2 - 4 aircraft away from the flight path of UAL93, including one NWA flight and a C130 proceeding northwest on J518. I remember turning the C130 to about a 030 heading, because of its speed. Observing UAL93, I saw it proceed almost directly over the PIT area, and the southeast of PIT it made an abrupt turn up to the northeast for about 10-15 miles. Once it turned back to the Washington area it disappeared from my scope one to two minutes later. Sometime during this period I was ordered to land all aircraft. I asked the pilot of the C-130 if he had observed anything off his left side. He said he observed a dark cloud of smoke off his left in the clouds. I asked for approximate distance and, if I remember correctly, he said about 15 miles. As I turned and told my supervisor (Tim Guess), I heard someone in Area V say they had a visual sighting of the plane at low altitude. The location gioven by the C130 pilot was the approximate position UAL93 went down. Few minutes later I questioned the C130 pilot for his reason for being in the air. He informed me his mission was noncritical and he would call for orders. A few minutes later he requested clearance to YNG, which I gave. At that point my airpace was sterile.

I do not remember what the various settings of the operational equipment were at the time of the accident. I certify, to the best of my knowledge and recollection the above statement is correct. 9/12/01

Linda Justice (LJ) IRL (Imperial)-D 8:15-10:20

We were given a data block with which to track UAL93. The aircraft appeared to be heading toward Washington Center airspace. In an attempt to expedite the situation I put a charge of routing in to reflect HGR->DCA. This was only to forward to (the) information to the sectors the aircraft appeared to be tracking toward. I then called POT sector to verbally point him out and flashed the handoff to HGR sector. We took the handoff back when UAL93 changed direction to the east and did not resume the handoff to ZDC. Contact (visually) was lost with the target shortly thereafter.

I do not remember what the various settings of the operational equipment were at the time of the accident. 9/12/01

Donald Edouard Lamoureux (DF) WMD (Westmoreland)-R 8:34-10:13

While working the R-position of the WMD sector I had been notified that UAL93 was a hijacked plane had a bomb on board and was headed toward Pittsburgh Airport and WMD sector. UAL93 was tracking as a primary target with no altitude readout. UAL93 was tracking passed PIT and near a VFR aircraft (N56865) with whom I was in contact with, I asked the VFR pilot to look to his left and up to see if he could see him visually. The VFR aircraft reported the B757 about 1000 feet above him which would put him at about 8000 ft. The VFR pilot reported the UAL93 landing gear was down and his wings were rocking back and forth. UAL93 began to track NE toward JST Tower. Tower has been advised of the situation. Shortly after UAL93 turned SE and then the primary target disappeared in the Somerset area. 9/13/01

I did not review SATORI and voice tape information and I would like to do so before I make a final statement. I do not remember what the various settings of the operational equipment were at the time of the accident. 9/16/01

Brian C. Hanlon (AZ) WMD (Westmoreland)-D 9:42-10:13

UAL93 was reported visually by a VFR aircraft at 070 near LBE airport. VFR reported he had a UAL flight visually and appeared 1000 ft above; reported the landing gear down and wings flapping, and said the aircraft appeared to be in distress. Several minutes later, UAL93 appeared to track NE bound towards JST airport. Tower was advised aircraft had been hijacked, may have a bomb, and to evacuate. Shortly after, UAL turned SE and dropped track on sector boundry.

I did not review satori or voice information, and would like to so do before making a final statement. I do not remember what the various settings of the operational equipment were at the time of the accident. 9/14/01

Stacey Taylor (ST) IHD (Indianhead) 9:14-10:17(?)

I was working the Indianhead sector and observed the primary target and associated data block of UAL93 enter my airspace altitude and flight path unknown. I had been told the aircraft was a hijacking and that there was a bomb aboard the aircraft. At some point I was given the hand-off on UAL93, but at no time did I have communications with the aircraft. I observed the aircraft heading towards Johnstown and attempted to get another aircraft out of his flight path. We had been told that the aircraft was reported to be flying at 7.500 (?) feet by a supervisor. UAL 93 flight then appeared to take turn down toward the southeast and I had two radar hits on him showing an altitude of 8.200 feet. I turned my aircraft back to the north to avoid UAL93 and around the Somerset airport, shortly after the turn. I lost the primary target on UAL93 and we suspected it had gone down. I then vectored N20VF toward the supected incident side and asked if he would look for smoke. I explained that we were looking for a downed aircraft that may have a bomb on board, and we didn't know if the bomb had gone off. He said he would overfly the site and he spotted smoke and flames and gave us the position of the crash site and a description of the area.

I do not remember what the various settings of the operational equipment were at the time of the accident. 9/16/01